# seeing in and seeming to see (2) **Opening (not a real abstract):** Thus at the heart of seeing-in lies (ii), seeming to see the depicted object. In the case of ordinary pictures, this is the difference between seeing the marks without making sense of them and seeing them with understanding. Throughout we see what is before us as a marked surface – hence (i). To see what the marks depict is for (i) to be supplemented with visual experience as of that scene. Thus far Gombrich himself would agree. However, he was not a Gombrichian, since he rejected (b). He held that no picture elicits (i) and (ii) simultaneously. Rather, we swing between awareness of ordinary pictures as marks on a surface and apparent awareness of the depicted scene (Gombrich 1960: 4–6). Gombrichians take the more plausible view that before ordinary pictures we are simultaneously aware of their double **Authors:** [[ROBERT HOPKINS]]