# seeing-in and seeming to see **Opening (not a real abstract):** Gombrichians offer the following answer: (a) Our experience of ordinary pictures comprises both (i) visual experience of P and (ii) visual experience as of O. (Lopes 2005: 39–40; Kulvicki 2009: 387–88; Newall 2011: 40) (b) In such cases, (i) and (ii) occur simultaneously. (Lopes 2005: 31; Kulvicki 2009: §4; Newall 2011: 25) (c) Our experience of some pictures, trompe l’oeils, comprises (ii) in the absence of (i). (Lopes 2005: 39–40; Newall 2011: 26–27) (d) When pictorial experience comprises both (i) and (ii), we are not tempted to believe that O is before us. We are tempted to believe only that P is. (Lopes 2005: 30; Newall 2011: 24–25) Thus at the heart of seeing-in lies (ii), seeming to see the depicted object. In the case of ordinary pictures, this is the difference between seeing the marks **Authors:** [[hopkins]]