# AESTHETICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT ![rw-book-cover](https://readwise-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/media/reader/parsed_document_assets/226465470/FDgrjxG4tlbiB70C40lvn_rNuoiNj1_0_0ncTFOMCK0-cove_0whlvMS.png) ## Metadata - Author: [[Allen Carlson]] - Full Title: AESTHETICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Note: Q: what is aspection according to this text. please give me all the details. - Source File: AESTHETICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT The appreciation of nature, art and architecture by Allen Carlson.pdf A: Aspection, according to Allen Carlson in "Aesthetics and the Environment," refers to the various acts or methods of attending to and appreciating aesthetic objects, particularly in relation to different types of art and environments. It includes activities such as contemplating, scanning, and scrutinizing, which vary based on the nature of the object and the knowledge the appreciator possesses about it, thereby guiding the appropriate way to engage with and appreciate both art and nature. - Document Tags: [[ai aesthetics paper]] [[philosophy]] - Summary: Environmental aesthetics suggests that all environments, whether natural, rural, or urban, have aesthetic value similar to art. However, appreciating nature can be complicated due to its chaotic nature and our lack of guidelines. Scientific knowledge can enhance our understanding and appreciation of nature's beauty. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/226465470 ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > This suggests a third model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the natural environmental model. This model, which I develop throughout Part I of this volume, recommends two things. First, that, as in our appreciation of works of art, we must appreciate nature as what it in fact is, that is, as natural and as an environment. Second, it recommends that we must appreciate nature in light of our knowledge of what it is, that is, in light of knowledge provided by the natural sciences, especially the environmental sciences such as geology, biology, and ecology. The natural environmental model thus accommodates both the true character of nature and our normal experience and understanding of it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhgqf13hkczra495pj4rjzdc)) > Another view that also seems to diverge from the natural environmental model is the arousal model. This model challenges the central place the natural environmental model grants to scientific knowledge in aesthetic appreciation of nature. The arousal model holds that we may appreciate nature simply by opening ourselves to it and thus being emotionally aroused by it. The view contends that this less intellectual, more visceral experience of nature is a way of legitimately appreciating nature without involving any knowledge gained from science. Unlike the engagement model, this model does not call for a total immersion in nature, but only for an emotional relationship with it based on our common, everyday knowledge and experience of it. Consequently, in contrast to the engagement model, the arousal model does not lose the right to call its experience of nature aesthetic. Nor does it undercut the distinction between trivial and serious appreciation of nature, even though the appreciation it stresses may be more the former than the latter. However, the contrast between the arousal model and the natural environmental model is less clear. If we recognize our scientific knowledge of the natural world as only a finer-grained and theoretically richer version of our common, everyday knowledge of it, and not as something essentially different in kind, then the difference between the arousal model and the natural environmental model is mainly one of emphasis. Both models track the appreciation of nature, although the arousal model focuses on the more common, less cognitively rich, and perhaps less serious end of the continuum.7 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhgqgqbdgz2t54hhwrnva7hn)) - Tags: [[ai aesthetics paper]] - Note: The continuum between practical and scientific understanding. > With art objects there is a straightforward sense in which we know both what and how to aesthetically appreciate. We know *what* to appreciate in that, first, we can distinguish a work and its parts from that which is not it nor a part of it. And, second, we can distinguish its aesthetically relevant aspects from its aspects without such relevance. We know that we are to appreciate the sound of the piano in the concert hall and not the coughing that interrupts it; we know that we are to appreciate that a painting is graceful, but not that it happens to hang in the Louvre. In a similar vein, we know *how* to appreciate in that we know what “acts of aspection” to perform concerning different works. Paul Ziff says: > …to contemplate a painting is to perform one act of aspection; to scan it is to perform another; to study, observe, survey, inspect, examine, scrutinize, etc., are still other acts of aspection… I survey a Tintoretto, while I scan an H.Bosch. Thus I step back to look at the Tintoretto, up to look at the Bosch. Different actions are involved. Do you drink brandy in the way you drink beer?1 > It is clear that we have such knowledge of what and how to aesthetically appreciate. It is, I believe, also clear what the grounds are for this knowledge. Works of art are our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not a part of a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them. We have made them for the purpose of aesthetic appreciation; in order for them to fulfil this purpose this knowledge must be accessible. In making an object we know what we make and thus its parts and its purpose. Hence in knowing what we make we know what to do with that which we make. In the more general cases the point is clear enough: in creating a painting, we know that what we make is a painting. In knowing this we know that it ends at its frame, that its colors are aesthetically important, but where it hangs is not, and that we are to look at it rather than, say, listen to it. > All this is involved in what it is to be a painting. Moreover, this point holds for more particular cases as well. Works of different particular types have different kinds of boundaries, have different foci of aesthetic significance, and perhaps most important demand different acts of aspection. In knowing the type we know what and how to appreciate. Ziff again: > Generally speaking, a different act of aspection is performed in connection with works belonging to different schools of art, which is why the classification of style is of the essence. Venetian paintings lend themselves to an act of aspection involving attention to balanced masses: contours are of no importance, for they are scarcely to be found. The Florentine school demands attention to contours, the linear style predominates. Look for light in a Claude, for color in a Bonnard, for contoured volume in a Signorelli.2 > I take the above to be essentially beyond serious dispute, except as to the details of the complete account. If it were not the case, our complementary institutions of art and of the aesthetic appreciation of art would not be as they are. We would not have the artworld that we do. But the subject of this chapter is not art nor the artworld. Rather it is the aesthetic appreciation of nature. The question I wish to investigate is the question of what and how to aesthetically appreciate concerning the natural environment. It is of interest since the account that is implicit in the above remarks, and that I believe to be the correct account for art, cannot be applied to the natural environment without at least some modification. Thus initially the questions of what and how to appreciate concerning nature appear to be open questions. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfv06cgp1wpn2bhsy3ax833)) > Allen Carlson ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01ja7eyzk789png9emm5j8573p)) > This suggests a third model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the natural environmental model. This model, which I develop throughout Part I of this volume, recommends two things. First, that, as in our appreciation of works of art, we must appreciate nature as what it in fact is, that is, as natural and as an environment. Second, it recommends that we must appreciate nature in light of our knowledge of what it is, that is, in light of knowledge provided by the natural sciences, especially the environmental sciences such as geology, biology, and ecology. The natural environmental model thus accommodates both the true character of nature and our normal experience and understanding of it.5 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je5vjf6v2yvffxkc4fb280nf)) > p ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je5vh2kf8z6adg885r1xeepa)) > pe models, distort nature itself, it > may yet be thought > to somewhat misrepresent our appreciation of nature. > Its > emphasis on scientific knowledge gives such appreciation a highly cognitive and > what may be judged an overly in ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je5vh5nmbccx0hxkxvck9axv)) > scientific knowledge of the natural world as only a finer-grained and theoretically r ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je10c47yj5yjb3f9n4sk0wx1)) > If we recognize our scientific knowledge of the natural world as only a finer-grained and theoretically richer version of our common, everyday knowledge of it, and not as something essentially different in kind, then the difference between the arousal model and the natural environmental model is mainly one of emphasis. Both models track the appreciation of nature, although the arousal model focuses on the more common, less cognitively rich, and perhaps less serious end of the continuum.7 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jczajn0bpfrbz0tbbg0qtnrr)) > However, the contrast between the arousal model and the natural environmental model is less clear. If we recognize our scientific knowledge of the natural world as only a finer-grained and theoretically richer version of our common, everyday knowledge of it, and not as something essentially different in kind, then the difference between the arousal model and the natural environmental model is mainly one of emphasis. Both models track the appreciation of nature, although the arousal model focuses on the more common, less cognitively rich, and perhaps less serious end of the continuum.7 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je5vm0a0pajasca62jh5mzpb)) > The natural > environmental model, > in rejecting artistic and other related models of nature > appreciation in favour of a dependence on common sense/scientific knowledge, > provides a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. This model suggests that > in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it > people or > pets, > farmyards or > neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and > driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself.18 I ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jh54vp5tpb469k9atjhn6sgw)) > this, one way of approaching the issue of the significance of formal qualities in the aesthetic appreciation and evaluation of the natural environment might be to consider ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je5v8656gns65wgh799gqy8h)) > With art objects there is a straightforward sense in which we know both what and > how to aesthetically appreciate. We know what to appreciate in that, first, we can > distinguish a work and its parts from that which is not it nor a part of it. And, > second, we can distinguish its aesthetically relevant aspects from its aspects without > such relevance. We know that we are to appreciate the sound of the piano in the > concert hall and not the coughing that > interrupts it; we know that we are to > appreciate that a painting is graceful, but not that it happens to hang in the Louvre. > In a similar vein, we know how to appreciate in that we know what “acts of > aspection” to perform concerning different works. Paul Ziff says: > …to contemplate a painting is to perform one act of aspection; to scan it is to > perform another; to study, observe, survey, inspect, examine, scrutinize, etc., > are still other acts of aspection… I survey a Tintoretto, while I scan an > H.Bosch. Thus I step back to look at the Tintoretto, up to look at the Bosch. > Different actions are involved. Do you drink brandy in the way you drink > beer?1 > It is clear that we have such knowledge of what and how to aesthetically appreciate. > It is, I believe, also clear what the grounds are for this knowledge. Works of art are > our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not a part of > a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them. > We have made them for the purpose of aesthetic appreciation; in order for them to > fulfil this purpose this knowledge must be accessible. In making an object we know > what we make and thus its parts and its purpose. Hence in knowing what we make > we know what to do with that which we make. In the more general cases the point > is clear enough: in creating a painting, we know that what we make is a painting. In > knowing this we know that it ends at its frame, that its colors are aesthetically > important, but where it hangs is not, and that we are to look at it rather than, say, > listen to it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqrhpcswe8dtcakeym06mxm)) > i ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqrra9cx8a7jyr8es6w55eb)) > All this is involved in what it is to be a painting. Moreover, this point holds for more particular cases as well. Works of different particular types have different kinds of boundaries, have different foci of aesthetic significance, and perhaps most important demand different acts of aspection. In knowing the type we know what and how to appreciate. Ziff again: Generally speaking, a different act of aspection is performed in connection with works belonging to different schools of art, which is why the classification of style is of the essence. Venetian paintings lend themselves to an act of aspection involving attention to balanced masses: contours are of no importance, for they are scarcely to be found. The Florentine school demands attention to contours, the linear style predominates. Look for light in a Claude, for color in a Bonnard, for contoured volume in a Signorelli.2 I take the above to be essentially beyond serious dispute, except as to the details of the complete account. If it were not the case, our complementary institutions of art and of the aesthetic appreciation of art would not be as they are. We would not have the artworld that we do. But the subject of this chapter is not art nor the artworld. Rather it is the aesthetic appreciation of nature. The question I wish to investigate is the question of what and how to aesthetically appreciate concerning the natural environment. It is of interest since the account that is implicit in the above remarks, and that I believe to be the correct account for art, cannot be applied to the natural environment without at least some modification. Thus initially the questions of what and how to appreciate concerning nature appear to be open questions. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqrnbnvjk6dhm00ts54dq0t)) > To confirm this we need to consider the concept of the aesthetic as it is elaborated by John Dewey in Art as Experience.17 Dewey’s concept is such that anything that is aesthetically appreciated must be obtrusive; it must be foreground, but it need not be an object and it need not be seen (or only seen). Moreover, to assume that that which is aesthetically appreciated need be an object or only seen is to confine aesthetic appreciation to either the object model or the landscape model, which, as we have noted, impose unacceptable limitations on the aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. > I suggest then that the beginning of an answer to the question of how to aesthetically appreciate an environment is something like the following. We must experience our background setting in all those ways in which we normally experience it, by sight, smell, touch, and whatever. However, we must experience it not as unobtrusive background, but as obtrusive foreground. What is involved in such an “act of aspection” is not completely clear. Dewey gives us an idea in remarks such as: To grasp the sources of esthetic experience it is…necessary to have recourse to animal life below the human scale… The live animal is fully present, all there, in all of its actions: in its wary glances, its sharp sniffing, its abrupt cocking of ears. All senses are equally on the qui vive.18 And perhaps the following description by Yi-Fu Tuan gives some indication: further An adult must learn to be yielding and careless like a child if he were to enjoy nature polymorphously. He needs to slip into old clothes so that he could feel free to stretch out on the hay beside the brook and bathe in a meld of physical sensations: the smell of the hay and of horse dung; the warmth of the ground, its hard and soft contours; the warmth of the sun tempered by breeze; the tickling of an ant making its way up the calf of his leg; the play of shifting leaf shadows on his face; the sound of water over the pebbles and boulders, the sound of cicadas and distant traffic. Such an environment might break all the formal rules of euphony and aesthetics, substituting confusion for order, and yet be wholly satisfying.19 Tuan’s account as to how to appreciate fits well with our earlier answer to the question of what to appreciate, namely everything. This answer, of course, will not do. We cannot appreciate everything; there must be limits and emphases in our aesthetic appreciation of nature as there are in our appreciation of art. Without such ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs4g5t2pk82d9y9p67h75h)) > t ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfpject5bpergh85xnssa0r)) > h ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfpjnxymxxctw44phv4xav3)) > . This knowledge, essentially common-sense/scientific knowledge, seems to me the only viable candidate for playing the role concerning the appreciation of nature that our knowledge of types of art, artistic traditions, and the like plays concerning the appreciation of art. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhmfx73ny2t6d62wv7bnweh9)) > The fact that nature is natural—not our creation—does not mean, however, that we must be without knowledge of it. Natural objects are such that we can discover things about them that are independent of any involvement by us in their creation. Thus, although we have not created nature, we yet know a great deal about it. This knowledge, essentially common-sense/scientific knowledge, seems to me the only viable candidate for playing the role concerning the appreciation of nature that our knowledge of types of art, artistic traditions, and the like plays concerning the appreciation of art. Consider the aesthetic appreciation of an environment such as that described by Tuan. We experience the environment as obtrusive foreground— the smell of the hay and of the horse dung, the feel of the ant, the sound of the cicadas and of the distant traffic all force themselves upon us. We experience a “meld of sensations” but, as noted, if our state is to be aesthetic appreciation rather than just the having of raw experience, the meld cannot be simply a “blooming, buzzing confusion.” Rather it must be what Dewey called a consummatory experience: one in which knowledge and intelligence transform raw experience by making it determinate, harmonious, and meaningful. For example, in order for there to be aesthetic appreciation we must recognize the smell of the hay and that of the horse dung and perhaps distinguish between them; we must feel the ant at least as an insect rather than as, say, a twitch. Such recognizing and distinguishing results in certain aspects of the obtrusive foreground becoming foci of aesthetic significance. Moreover, they are natural foci appropriate to the particular natural environment we are appreciating. Likewise our knowledge of the environment may yield certain appropriate boundaries or limits to the experience. For example, since we are aesthetically appreciating a certain kind of environment, the sound of cicadas may be appreciated as a proper part of the setting, while the sound of the distant traffic is excluded much as we ignore the coughing in the concert hall. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfpjxdh59qvvcn06k5p1wh4)) - Tags: [[ai aesthetics paper]] - Note: common sense and scientific knowledge allows us to separate foreground from background. > It seems that we must survey a prairie environment, looking at the subtle contours of the land, feeling the wind blowing across the open space, and smelling the mix of prairie grasses and flowers. But such an act of aspection has little place in a dense forest environment. Here we must examine and scrutinize, inspecting the detail of the forest floor, listening carefully for the sounds of birds, and smelling carefully for the scent of spruce and pine. Likewise, the description of environmental appreciation given by Tuan, in addition to being a model for environmental acts of aspection in general, is also a description of the act of aspection appropriate for a particular kind of environment—one perhaps best described as pastoral. Different natural environments require different acts of aspection; and as in the case of what to appreciate, our knowledge of the environment in question indicates how to appreciate—that is, indicates the appropriate act of aspection. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01je12pvxazvhr91w87620e0r8)) > quipped to aesthetically appreciate nature.21 > This point about what to appreciate in nature also has ramifications for how to > appreciate nature. In discussing the nature of an environment, I suggest that Tuan’s > description seems to indicate a general act of aspection appropriate for any > environment. However, since natural environments differ in type it seems that > within this general act of aspection there might be differences which should be > noted. To aesthetically appreciate an environment we experience our surroundings > as obtrusive foreground, allowing our knowledge of that environment to select > certain foci of aesthetic significance and perhaps exclude others, thereby limiting the > experience. But certainly there are also different kinds of appropriate acts of > aspection which can likewise be selected by our knowledge of environments. Ziff > tells us to look for contours in the Florentine school and for color in a Bonnard, to > survey a Tintoretto and to scan a Bosch. Consider different natural environments. It > seems that we must survey a prairie environment, looking at the subtle contours of > the land, feeling the wind blowing across the open space, and smelling the mix of > prairie grasses and flowers. But such an act of aspection has little place in a dense > forest environment. Here we must examine and scrutinize, inspecting the detail of > the forest floor, listening carefully for the sounds of birds, and smelling carefully for > the scent of spruce and pine. Likewise, the description of environmental > appreciation given by Tuan, in addition to being a model for environmental acts of > aspection in general, is also a description of the act of aspection appropriate for a > particular kind of environment—one perhaps best described as pastoral. Different > natural environments require different acts of aspection; and as in the case of what > to appreciate, our knowledge of the environment in question indicates how to > appreciate—that is, indicates the appropriate act of aspection. > The model I thus suggest for the aesthetic appreciation of nature is that which is > introduced in Chapter 1 as the natural environmental model. It involves recognizing > that nature is an environment and thus a setting within which we exist and that we > normally experience with our complete range of senses as our unobtrusive > background. But in order for our experience to be aesthetic requires unobtrusive > background to be experienced as obtrusive foreground. The result is the experience > of a “blooming, buzzing confusion” that > in order > to be appreciated must be > tempered by the knowledge we have discovered about the natural environment so > experienced. Our knowledge of the nature of the particular environments yields the > appropriate boundaries of appreciation, the particular foci of aesthetic significance, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs5k51g631w3dewjc7dhwd)) > and the relevant act or acts of aspection for that type of environment. We thus have a model that begins to give answers to the questions of what and how to appreciate in the natural environment and that seems to do so with due regard for the nature of that environment. And this is important not only for aesthetic but also for moral and ecological reasons. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs5qqc4sggds2y18dd7j3z)) > Ibid. Ziff is mainly concerned with the way in which knowledge of types yields different acts of aspection. For an elaboration of this point and its ramifications concerning what is and is not aesthetically significant in a work, see K.Walton, “Categories of Art,” Philosophical Review, 1970, vol. 79, pp. 334–67. How our knowledge of art and the artworld yields the boundaries between art and the rest of reality is interestingly discussed in A.Danto, “The Artistic Enfranchisement of Real Objects, the Artworld,” Journal of Philosophy, 1964, vol. 61, pp. 571–84. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs65pbc9613tq919kkm7g8)) > These observations are developed by different individuals in different ways. As noted in Chapter 4, Ziff captures the idea of appropriate aesthetic appreciation by distinguishing different “acts of aspection.” He contends: “Generally speaking, a different act of aspection is performed in connection with works belonging to ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs6g41f4r8sp0emhvxfm06)) > different schools of art, which is why the classification of style is of the essence.”60 As spelled out in detail in Chapter 5, the importance of classification is further developed by Walton who introduces the notion of “categories of art.” “Such categories include media, genre, styles, forms, and so forth—for example, the categories of paintings, cubist paintings, Gothic architecture, classical sonatas.”61 Walton points out that works of art can be “perceived in” different categories and only by perceiving them in the correct categories are we likely to achieve an appropriate aesthetic appreciation of them. Correctness of categories, Walton further argues, is in part determined by certain facts about the origins of works, in particular, in what category their artists intend them to be perceived and what categories are well established and recognized by the societies in which they are produced. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs6n835fba8yzvq91vbz9y)) > The shift of emphasis to appreciation is followed up by Paul Ziff. Ziff’s treatment > is informative in that it retains the insights of the disinterestedness position without > embracing its flaws.16 As noted in Chapters 4 and 6, the essence of his account is > the notion of an “act of aspection,” the way of attending to an object that in part > constitutes its appropriate appreciation.17 Ziff argues that different acts of aspection > are appropriate in the appreciation of, for example, works of art of different kinds, > styles, and schools. Thus, knowledge of a work’s history and nature dictates the > proper acts of aspection: appreciation is a set of activities not only responsive to the > object but incorporating knowledge of it as an essential component. Ziff further > argues not simply that “anything that can be viewed is a fit object for aesthetic > attention,” > but > that > “anything viewed makes demands.”18 That objects of > appreciation make demands means that following the lead of the object rules out > the possibility of anything like a general criterion of aesthetic relevance. Since > objects of appreciation obviously differ a great deal, so does what is relevant to and ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqrkz4abcjdb7h59jmp88cx)) > involved in their appreciation: “As the character of the objects attended to vary, the > character of the actions, the conditions, and the requisite qualities, skills, and > capacities of the person may also have to vary, if attention to the objects is to be > aesthetically worthwhile.”19 Thus, the appreciation of each of, to use some of Ziff’s > examples, a work of art by Leonardo Da Vinci, a Barry McKenzie comic strip, an > alligator basking in the sun, or a pile of dried dung requires engaging in different > acts of aspection, using different capacities and skills, and knowing different things. > The general criterion of aesthetic relevance is replaced by object-given indications of > appreciative relevance. > Stolnitz’s > and Ziff’s > remarks on appreciation demonstrate > that > although > philosophical aesthetics has relatively little to say about the concept, it is yet possible > to derive from its investigation of the aesthetic some useful observations. Ironically > it is precisely in drawing back from the tradition’s obsession with the aesthetic that > the concept of appreciation is brought into focus. The obsession with the aesthetic > inhibits a proper understanding of appreciation by pulling in the direction of a > passive state of limited scope, restricted by a general criterion of aesthetic relevance, > and comparable to a blank, cow-like stare. By contrast, the concept of appreciation > that can be coaxed from philosophical aesthetics, seemingly almost against its will, > reveals appreciation as engaged mental and physical activity applicable to any object > whatever, exceedingly responsive to that object, and guided almost exclusively by its > nature. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqrktm1zmh5dcxxhvamnh2e)) > Design appreciation involves awareness and understanding of the three entities and their central properties. Especially important are awareness and understanding of the interplay among them and of the ways they function, severally and jointly, to achieve this interplay, for the interplay embodies the design and thereby determines the nature of the object of appreciation. In this sense design appreciation is object orientated: knowledge of the nature of the object dictates relevant acts of aspection and guides the appreciative response. A part of this response involves making judgments about the interplay, ones that assess the designed object in terms of the talents of the designer and the undertaking set by the initial design—judgments such as whether the object is a success or failure, good or bad, or, as it is often put, whether it “works” or, as Gombrich puts it, whether it is “right.” Such judgments, together with the mental and physical acts of aspection required for making them, are at the core of design appreciation—and thus essential to paradigmatic art appreciation. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs7161ra74m5185475amx6)) > Appreciating nature: design appreciation > Frequently the appreciation of nature is assimilated to the appreciation of art. Such > an assimilation is both a theoretical mistake and an appreciative pity. On the > theoretical level, it typically involves misunderstanding not only appreciation but > also one or both of art and nature. On the appreciative level, it can result in either > failing to appreciate nature at all or appreciating it in an inappropriate manner— > relying on the wrong information, engaging in the wrong acts of aspection, and > having the wrong responses. As noted in Chapter 4, Ronald Hepburn puts this point > concisely: If our “aesthetic education” instills in us “the attitudes, the tactics of > approach, the expectations proper to the appreciation of art works only,” we “either > pay very little aesthetic heed to natural objects or else heed them in the wrong > way.”46 > The theoretical mistake of assimilating nature appreciation and art appreciation, > as with some other mistakes noted previously, can be traced in part to the > disinterestedness > tradition. However, at times in its > history, especially in its > beginnings, the tradition assimilated the appreciation of art to that of nature rather > than the other way around. Nonetheless, whichever way it goes the assimilation is a > mistake. When generated by disinterestedness, the mistake has the same roots as > that of ignoring the designed nature of art, which was noted in the second section of > this chapter. When the notion of disinterestedness is treated such that the object of > appreciation is isolated and divorced from its interrelationships, and its appreciation > is constrained by the general criterion of aesthetic relevance, the stage is set for the > assimilation. According to this construal of disinterestedness, both works of art and > natural objects are in their appreciation more or less severed from their natures and > their histories. Thus, both kinds of objects may be appreciated in the same way: as > pure aesthetic objects. The result is one form of appreciation—aesthetic appreciation > —that appropriately applies to any and all kinds of things. Art appreciation and > nature appreciation collapse into one. > As argued in the first section of this chapter, however, > this > construal of > disinterestedness is a mishandling of the concept. With it, not only do all forms of > appreciation collapse into one, also, as noted, all seemingly collapse into the blank, > cow-like stare. Thus, the key to avoiding this path to the assimilation of art and > nature appreciation is the same as that to avoiding the cow-like stare: the key is the > object-orientated nature of appreciation. This understanding of appreciation, as it > facilitates the recognition of the designer-centered nature of paradigmatic > art > appreciation, also both closes down this route to the assimilation and points toward > the proper understanding of nature appreciation. However, the coast is not yet > clear. > Even with object-orientated > appreciation and without mishandling > disinterestedness, there are yet means to assimilate art and nature appreciation. > Indeed, the temptation to assimilate them is seemingly so strong that one suspects > that the desire for assimilation is in fact the cause and mistakes such as mishandling > disinterestedness only an effect. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jcqs7r3td6rdmvkjdaaewsqh)) > On the assumption that order appreciation provides the correct model for the appreciation of nature, such appreciation has the following general form: An individual qua appreciator selects objects of appreciation from the things around him or her and focuses on the order imposed on these objects by the various forces, random and otherwise, that produce them. Moreover, the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic story that helps make them appreciable by making this order visible and intelligible. Awareness and understanding of the key entities—the order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appreciative response. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jexzsb9tp58syzkfbendrs1n)) - Tags: [[appreciation of ai]] > On the assumption that order appreciation provides the correct model for the appreciation of nature, such appreciation has the following general form: An individual qua appreciator selects objects of appreciation from the things around him or her and focuses on the order imposed on these objects by the various forces, random and otherwise, that produce them. Moreover, the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic story that helps make them appreciable by making this order visible and intelligible. Awareness and understanding of the key entities—the order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appreciative response. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfspatyd9dnyt82g9cw8bf0)) > c ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhfsysfsyb8fgab2fg1kev5n)) ## New highlights added February 15, 2025 at 12:44 PM > This suggests a third model for the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the natural environmental model. This model, which I develop throughout Part I of this volume, recommends two things. First, that, as in our appreciation of works of art, we must appreciate nature as what it in fact is, that is, as natural and as an environment. Second, it recommends that we must appreciate nature in light of our knowledge of what it is, that is, in light of knowledge provided by the natural sciences, especially the environmental sciences such as geology, biology, and ecology. The natural environmental model thus accommodates both the true character of nature and our normal experience and understanding of it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhgqf13hkczra495pj4rjzdc)) ## New highlights added February 16, 2025 at 1:09 PM > When nature is aesthetically appreciated in virtue of the natural and environmental sciences, positive aesthetic appreciation is singularly appropriate, for, on the one hand, pristine nature—nature in its natural state—is an aesthetic ideal and, on the other, as science increasingly finds, or at least appears to find, unity, order, and harmony in nature, nature itself, when appreciated in light of such knowledge, appears more fully beautiful ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jm78445qe5r8jcsnr6x6brm1)) > Another consequence concerns the discipline of aesthetics itself. The natural environmental model, in rejecting artistic and other related models of nature appreciation in favour of a dependence on common sense/scientific knowledge, provides a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. This model suggests that in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it people or pets, farmyards or neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself.18 In all such cases, what is appropriate is not an imposition of artistic or other inappropriate ideals, but rather dependence on and guidance by means of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, that is relevant given the nature of the thing in question.19 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jm785b459mqwyvgmdzhdkkd8)) > natural objects possess what we might call an organic unity with their environments of creation: such objects are a part of and have developed out of the elements of their environments by means of the forces at work within those environments. Thus the environments of creation are aesthetically relevant to natural objects. And for this reason the environments of display are equally relevant in virtue of the fact that these environments will be either the same as or different from the environments of creation. In either case the aesthetic qualities of natural objects will be affected. Consider again our rock: on the mantel it may seem wonderfully smooth and gracefully curved and expressive of solidity, but in its environment of creation it will have more and different aesthetic qualities—qualities that are the product of the relationship between it and its environment. It is here expressive of the particular forces that shaped and continue to shape it and displays for aesthetic appreciation its place in and its relation to its environment. Moreover, depending upon its place in that environment it may not express many of those qualities, for example, solidity— that it appears to express when on the mantle. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jm792gqnpzbcnyzf3dre9kcp)) - Note: excellent description of environmental forces. > If to aesthetically appreciate art we must have knowledge of artistic traditions and styles within those traditions, to aesthetically appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the different environments of nature and of the systems and elements within those environments. In the way in which the art critic and the art historian are well equipped to aesthetically appreciate art, the naturalist and the ecologist are well equipped to aesthetically appreciate nature ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jm79s2c47d3syps5cvrxjtn8)) ## New highlights added February 27, 2025 at 10:29 AM > co ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn3b35yjwy7myxn5m2ak5jcy)) > environments typically are not the products of designers and typically have no design. Rather they come about “naturally,” they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes. Or they come about by means of human agency, but even then only rarely are they the result of a designer embodying a design. In short, the paradigm of the environmental object of appreciation is unruly in yet another way: neither its nature nor its meaning are determined by a designer and a design. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn3b2d8dwmwvshdv6348kk6c)) ## New highlights added February 27, 2025 at 12:34 PM > Rather they come about “naturally,” they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn3d7txc5rhvpbrv76tfg4pd)) > objects are a part of and have developed out of the elements of their environments by means of the forces at work within those environments. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn3db9m23qqzhjscmr7y75xd)) ## New highlights added February 27, 2025 at 2:36 PM > When nature is aesthetically appreciated in virtue of the natural and environmental sciences, positive aesthetic appreciation is singularly appropriate, for, on the one hand, pristine nature—nature in its natural state—is an aesthetic ideal and, on the other, as science increasingly finds, or at least appears to find, unity, order, and harmony in nature, nature itself, when appreciated in light of such knowledge, appears more fully beautiful. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn3m0bbs0gbc3mcf198dm32k)) ## New highlights added March 1, 2025 at 1:09 PM > natural objects possess what we might call an organic unity with their environments of creation: such objects are a part of and have developed out of the elements of their environments by means of the forces at work within those environments. Thus the environments of creation are aesthetically relevant to natural objects. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jn8qttkkx4tvjgkayvhwa6hx)) ## New highlights added May 28, 2025 at 10:28 PM > art objects which are self-contained aesthetic units. These objects are such that neither the environment of their creation nor the environment of their display are ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jwbzfhp7vynxyzbhb8pmh2vv)) > However, natural objects possess what we might call an organic unity with their environments of creation: such objects are a part of and have developed out of the elements of their environments by means of the forces at work within those environments. Thus the environments of creation are aesthetically relevant to natural objects. A ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jwbzewnyjzj2f4rxzhqkx0wq)) ## New highlights added July 11, 2025 at 6:22 PM > Another consequence concerns the discipline of aesthetics itself. The natural > environmental model, > in rejecting artistic and other related models of nature > appreciation in favour of a dependence on common sense/scientific knowledge, > provides a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. This model suggests that > in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it > people or > pets, > farmyards or > neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and > driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself.18 In all such cases, what > is appropriate is not an imposition of artistic or other inappropriate ideals, but > rather dependence on and guidance by means of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, > that is relevant given the nature of the thing in question.1 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jzx3r4qwk3wbtfk4nztvp3vb)) > The content of nature appreciation can now be added to its form. Its form, as noted, centers on the entities significant to order appreciation: order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it. Its content is as follows. First, the relevant order is that typically called the natural order. Second, since there is no artist, not even one assimilated to processes and materials, the relevant forces are the forces of nature: the geological, biological, and meteorological forces that produce the natural order by shaping not only the planet but everything that inhabits it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jzx3ghm915wp0n7xa1s2g31q)) ## New highlights added July 13, 2025 at 10:52 AM > Rather they come about “naturally,” they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes. Or they come about by means of human agency, but even then only rarely are they the result of a designer embodying a design. In short, the paradigm of the environmental object of appreciation is unruly in yet another way: neither its nature nor its meaning are determined by a designer and a design. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k01eq3ph71v9cwprfahz788k)) ## New highlights added July 14, 2025 at 12:55 PM > environments typically are not the products of designers and typically have no design. Rather they come about “naturally,” they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes. Or they come about by means of human agency, but even then only rarely are they the result of a designer embodying a design. In short, the paradigm of the environmental object of appreciation is unruly in yet another way: neither its nature nor its meaning are determined by a designer and a design. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k048ht10ddh30a15h0desesq)) > environments typically are not the products of designers and typically have no design. Rather they come about “naturally,” they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes. Or they come about by means of human agency, but even then only rarely are they the result of a designer embodying a design. In short, the paradigm of the environmental object of appreciation is unruly in yet another way: neither its nature nor its meaning are determined by a designer and a design. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k048hx0vq6vyd2ttabk8pm76)) ## New highlights added July 24, 2025 at 1:09 PM > Moreover, the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic story that helps make them appreciable by making this order visible and intelligible. Awareness and understanding of the key entities—the order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appreciative response. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k0xzszjrzw1cmxh4m8kdcv08)) ## New highlights added August 22, 2025 at 5:17 PM > On the assumption that order appreciation provides the correct model for the appreciation of nature, such appreciation has the following general form: An individual qua appreciator selects objects of appreciation from the things around him or her and focuses on the order imposed on these objects by the various forces, random and otherwise, that produce them. Moreover, the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic story that helps make them appreciable by making this order visible and intelligible. Awareness and understanding of the key entities—the order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appreciative response. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k394t7kxs05x0n8y0mdgrxyj)) > i ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k394tcf45e5vm4hxampt2yk7)) ## New highlights added August 15, 2025 at 3:20 PM > n must be centered on and driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k2px9v1nsj3m10163psbys74)) > This model suggests that > in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it > people or > pets, > farmyards or > neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and > driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself.1 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k2pxa963c2ckdxac8es3mxeg)) ## New highlights added September 9, 2025 at 1:20 PM > Another consequence concerns the discipline of aesthetics itself. The natural > environmental model, > in rejecting artistic and other related models of nature > appreciation in favour of a dependence on common sense/scientific knowledge, > provides a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. This model suggests that > in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it > people or > pets, > farmyards or > neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and > driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself.18 In all such cases, what > is appropriate is not an imposition of artistic or other inappropriate ideals, but > rather dependence on and guidance by means of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, > that is relevant given the nature of the thing in question. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k4q2p51c1hs7q42shxmtsm5d)) > y among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appr ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k4q2sgp80pcmsvy9e9new7nm)) ## New highlights added September 22, 2025 at 10:04 AM > . > In order > to > appreciate our everyday functional landscapes in a comparable manner, however, we > must explicitly consider their functions and how and how well they are designed to > perform these functions. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k5r52rza85wk046yb6vsknq8)) ## New highlights added September 22, 2025 at 1:04 PM > such things have a function, a purpose; and they are what they are in virtue of what they are meant or intended to accomplish. Consequently information simply about their histories of production is typically not sufficient for addressing the question of aesthetic relevance. Rather, given an object- focused approach together with the fact that these things are functional things, what is absolutely necessary for and central to their appropriate aesthetic appreciation is information about their functions. With all such things the main issue is not simply how they came to be as they are, but why they came to be as they are. The key to their natures is the purpose or the function they are meant to serve. In appropriate aesthetic appreciation of these things, the first and most important request for “outside information” is not, as it is for both pristine nature and pure art, “What is it and how did it come to be as it is?” Rather the primary question is “What does it do and why does it do it?” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k5rg9dyng2k53vxkvp31718t)) ## New highlights added November 8, 2025 at 2:05 PM > Whatever the state of affairs in philosophical aesthetics, the point that art appreciation must focus on the artist is seemingly taken for granted by many art critics and art historians. A glance at the treatment of the point in some classic discussions of the history of art is revealing. For example, E.H. Gombrich opens his *The Story of Art* with the uncompromising claim that: “There really is no such thing as Art. There are only artists.”23 He elaborates by stressing that “what we call ‘works of art’ are not the results of some mysterious activity, but objects made by human beings for human beings”—objects designed such that “every one of their features is the result of a decision by the artist.”24 Indeed, Gombrich characterizes the artist as the ultimate designer, one who “must always be ‘fussy’ or rather fastidious to the extreme,” obsessed with, as he puts it, “whether he has got it ‘right’.”25 Gombrich discusses what he calls “that modest little word ‘right’” at great lengths so that we may “begin to understand what artists are really after.”26 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k9hn6qndkh9eb0vkftv1r41x)) ## New highlights added October 20, 2025 at 11:29 AM > On the assumption that order appreciation provides the correct model for the appreciation of nature, such appreciation has the following general *form*: An individual qua appreciator selects objects of appreciation from the things around him or her and focuses on the order imposed on these objects by the various forces, random and otherwise, that produce them. Moreover, the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and nonartistic story that helps make them appreciable by making this order visible and intelligible. Awareness and understanding of the key entities—the order, the forces that produce it, and the account that illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of aspection and guide the appreciative response. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k80f4a1vjssvn8wwkz2ctymr)) ## New highlights added October 21, 2025 at 11:21 AM > Rather, given an object- focused approach together with the fact that these things are functional things, what is absolutely necessary for and central to their appropriate aesthetic appreciation is information about their functions. With all such things the main issue is not simply how they came to be as they are, but why they came to be as they are. The key to their natures is the purpose or the function they are meant to serve. In appropriate aesthetic appreciation of these things, the first and most important request for “outside information” is not, as it is for both pristine nature and pure art, “What is it and how did it come to be as it is?” Rather the primary question is “What does it do and why does it do it?” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k82yj5z76rp0k455ckp6a3d0)) - Note: carlson on functional objects ## New highlights added October 23, 2025 at 10:15 PM > Supposing I am walking over a wide expanse of sand and mud. The quality of the scene is perhaps that of wild, glad emptiness. But suppose that I bring to bear upon the scene my knowledge that this is a tidal basin, the tide being out. I see myself now as virtually walking on what is for half the day sea-bed. The wild, glad emptiness may be tempered by a disturbing weirdness ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k8985zge29dtb9f37cae2h30)) ## New highlights added November 30, 2025 at 5:56 AM > For in nature a broken twig is equal in beauty and importance to the clouds and the stars. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kb8kc8fk71pbsnvhgp6b36q0)) ## New highlights added December 13, 2025 at 12:37 PM > Especially revealing of the relevance of order appreciation to the appreciation of nature are the claims of the artists who initiated these works of art and antiart. For example, it is said such art “urges man to identify himself with nature” and is itself comparable to the objects of nature.56 Arp, for instance, claims that: “These paintings, sculptures, objects should remain anonymous and form a part of nature’s great workshop as leaves do, and clouds, animals, and men. Yes, man must once again become a part of nature.”57 Of automatic poetry, in particular, Arp says: Automatic poetry comes straight out of the poet’s bowels or out of any other of his organs that has accumulated reserves… He crows, swears, moans, stammers, yodels, according to his mood… Neither the Postillon of Longjumiau, nor the Alexandrian, nor grammar, nor aesthetics, nor Buddha, nor the Sixth Commandment are able to constrict him. [Nor, we might add, the general criterion of aesthetic relevance.] His poems are like nature; they ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kcbp9a1a3a5t16adfw218ez2)) ## New highlights added December 22, 2025 at 12:00 PM > What should be said about action painting concerning design, object, and artist? First, there does not seem to be an initial design that becomes embodied in the object. Haftmann says that such art is composed of and “by motor energies.”30 However, even if an embodied design is lacking, the “motor energies” yet form a pattern, which is a function of the interplay between the other two entities. Thus, Janson says of Pollock’s works: The actual shapes visible…are largely determined by the internal dynamics of his material and his process: the viscosity of the paint, the speed and direction of its impact upon the canvas, its interaction with other layers of pigment.31 In this way the object and its properties achieve a greater significance than they have in more conventional art. They are no longer constrained by an attempt to make them embody a particular given design; rather they in part strongly determine a resultant pattern. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kd2s57ej7men7wcnz765mdng)) > In short, appreciable patterns are those that reveal, or at least can be seen as revealing, an order, those that are or can be seen as the marks of the forces that have ordered the drips, spatters, and dribbles into whatever pattern they form. Thus, although the artist loses his or her role as designer, he or she acquires the role of selecting ordered and hence appreciable patterns. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kd2s8dkx3hj9fnfqhpy4khm7)) ## New highlights added July 9, 2026 at 1:08 PM > AESTHETICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01kx33dwzaa2m264mfchxq6mjh))