# Feeling Fit for Function-– Haptic Touch and Aesthetic Experience  ## Metadata - Author: [[Tom Roberts]] - Full Title: Feeling Fit for Function-– Haptic Touch and Aesthetic Experience - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: The text explores how haptic touch can contribute to aesthetic experiences and the perception of functional beauty in objects. It argues against the traditional exclusion of touch from the aesthetic domain, highlighting the potential for tactile sensations to reveal an object's form and function. Touch can offer unique insights into the aesthetic qualities of objects, challenging the notion that only visual attributes contribute to beauty. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/165285086 - Source File: Feeling Fit for Function-– Haptic Touch and Aesthetic Experience by Tom Roberts .pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > Which of our sensory modalities are capable of delivering distinctively aesthetic experi- ences? A traditional answer is to defend the possibility of aesthetic experience for the distal senses of vision and audition while excluding the proximal senses of taste, smell, and touch.1 The distal senses have aesthetic credentials, the thinking goes, because they inform us of complex, public objects, in contrast to the private and rudimentary pleasures of mere internal sensation. Admitting the proximal senses to the aesthetic domain would ‘obliterate’ a distinction that is both long-standing and firmly marked in linguistic usage between genuinely appreciative experiences such as regarding a painting or listening to music on the one hand, and the simple enjoyment of ‘taking a bath’ or ‘drinking lem- onade’ on the other (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 178). It is only to the former class of perceptual encounters, facilitated by the ‘higher’ distal senses, that aesthetic attributions such as beautiful are warranted, while experiences of the latter sort, derived from the ‘lower’ proximal senses, deserve only to be called agreeable or pleasing. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2ahvmckvd38s7sneqvt700)) > Touch has a two-dimensional character. On the one hand, it can involve relatively simple sensations felt on or within the boundary of the skin, such as feelings of warmth, cold, tingling, or prickling. On the other hand, however, touch is capable of delivering richly exteroceptive experiences: that is, experiences of ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2an7zxdvwxj3te768zez5f)) > objects and features that are external to the body.2 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2anecfh7f0w7yj6qye55ty)) > An embodied subject deploys haptic touch when, for instance, they lift and grip an object; squeeze, swing, or flex it in the hands; or run their fingers over its surface. Dynamic and exploratory activities such as these enable the perception of an array of properties that belong to material objects, such as rigidity, elasticity, weight, balance, solidity, tension, pliability, and smoothness. > Furthermore, these are properties that can determine how well an object is formed for its function—including, for example, how well-suited it is for manual manipulation; for wielding, striking, or pulling; for cutting and slicing; for riding upon or driving in; and for performing activities such as throwing, writing, eating, knitting, or running. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2b7t07b619yj495zg625qt)) > There is, as Dowling (2010, p. 239) has put it, nothing in the world to anchor whatever felt qualities are reported by the subject of bodily sensa- tions in the way that the material features of a sculpture, for example, provide a mind- independent ground for our aesthetic attributions in the visual domain. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2bnnzxy5n03cd43embgstw)) > Thirdly, there is the argument from linguistic conservativism, which holds that ex- panding the term ‘aesthetic’ to encompass experiences derived from the proximal senses would do an injustice to the well-entrenched ways in which this concept is de- ployed in our discourse. To bestow bodily sensations with aesthetic credentials, that is, is to be excessively permissive: ‘the pleasures of exercising, taking a bath, drinking lem- onade, or engaging in sexual activity may all count... as aesthetic pleasures’ (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 178). But established linguistic usage has—‘since ancient times’ (2008, p. 185)—carved out a distinction between aesthetic and merely sensuous gratifi- cation that acknowledges a fundamental phenomenological difference between these two categories. Any attempt to dissolve this distinction both disregards tradition and runs the risk of trivializing the very concept of the aesthetic (Forsey, 2013, p. 211; Dowling, 2010, p. 226). According to this argument, even relatively non-committal evaluative de- scriptions such as ‘aesthetically pleasing’, which fall short of such full-blown accolades as ‘beautiful’, ‘sublime’, or ‘exquisite’, are strained and unnatural when ascribed to the proximal senses (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 180). Where language like this is used to describe the objects of the proximal modalities—as it sometimes is for, say, tempting foodstuffs or fine whisky (Davies, 2010, p. 325)—it should be regarded as non-literal. Strictly speaking, we should apply our aesthetic terminology only where it belongs: to what we see and what we hear. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2bqjvgjwxexx4cpexcydd3)) > I will argue that they rest upon ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2brgxxsv9fgzfh4yrps8pt)) > an impoverished conception of the content and character of this modality, because touch does not only let us feel sensations internal to the body, it enables us to make haptic- perceptual contact with material features of the extra-mental environment. Once we recognize this, we can see that touch allows us to feel the positive aesthetic qualities that stem from the relation between an object’s form and its function. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2brdc660f0svwx7wfafeqe)) > While looking fit is the fundamental species of functional beauty, it is not the only one to be derived from the Waltonian framework. For example, an object that is seen to manifest only standard features for its kind is likely to be regarded as having ‘simplicity, gracefulness, or elegance’ (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 96), or to appear streamlined, clean, or restrained for an object of its type. Minimalist design, for instance, prizes those objects that are stripped back to their essentials with an unembellished economy of form. Once again, knowledge of the category to which an item belongs makes these sorts of aesthetic attributions possible: an object with a glass door and a discreet set of burners may appear elegant when viewed under one description (‘stove’) but not under another (‘safe’) because the standard features for objects in each category are different (2008, pp. 97–98). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2ccpgrmayabstd3qbzfzv7)) > Lastly, Parsons and Carlson argue that contra-standard features of an object may be aesthetically significant when they have a pleasingly unexpected or incongruous effect. For example, a top-heavy industrial crane may exhibit ‘an aesthetically pleasing visual Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bjaesthetics/article/62/1/49/6494333 by guest on 22 April 2024 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2cd0fa4x98ex2yf954arqg)) > 3 tension’ (Parsons and Carlson, 2008, p. 99), when it seems from a distance to lack the structural integrity required for moving heavy loads. Here, the standard-for-cranes prop- e ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2ccypx8rzqk4aa2ng1dndx)) > Other proponents of functional beauty share this visuo-centric attitude. Panos Paris (2020, p. 522), for instance, is keen to avoid the ‘worry’ that his analysis might entail the exist- ence of tactile beauty, and argues that the way to block this implication is by recognizing that touch only delivers simple and formally uncomplicated bodily sensations. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2cgf2xhgv7ft4seqgvm3b1)) > we should acknowledge, at least, that touch-like bodily experiences exhibit a diversity of forms. There are those that are not connected to sensory input from the world beyond the skin and have no readily identifiable intentional content, such as a spontaneous feeling of pins-and-needles on the back of the knee. There are those that involve a passive receptivity to cutaneous stimula- tion, such as the feeling of a fly landing on one’s arm, or of the heat from a nearby radiator. Of greater interest for current purposes, moreover, are those experiences that derive from active bodily engagement with external things—when we use, for example, the fin- gers and hands to explore the material constituents of our surroundings. By bringing our body into contact with objects and surfaces, we uncover what is out there in the world: what has edges and corners, what is solid and immobile, what is soft, smooth, pliable, sticky, heavy, or abrasive. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2cq21n4p01qsk2t64w4c4h)) > On Richardson’s (2013) ‘simple view’, for example, the world-directed character of touch is already captured within many of our tactile sensations, a complete articulation of which must make ineliminable reference to the external object that appears to be in contact with part of the body. This is to say that the sensations must themselves be characterized relationally (2013, p. 142) as feelings of one’s body being in touch with something that lies beyond the skin. Pressing our hand against a table, for example, gives rise to a feeling whose conscious character cannot be individuated except by appeal to the table, its prop- erties, and the pressure it exerts upon the active body (2013, pp. 142–143). T ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2ctdjqm9mcnqxdjjrhfa8x)) > A similar perspective is developed by Brogaard (2012, pp. 18–19), who argues that the hardness of a rock held in the palm can be felt in virtue of the sensations of pressure it generates on the skin. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2d08dz1drbxvxey1s1v7x4)) - Note: #toread > These active forms of touch require the agent to have a sense of where her body is and what her body is doing, and so to keep track of kinaesthetic and proprioceptive in- formation.9 Following convention (e.g. Fulkerson, 2011; Ratcliffe, 2012), let us reserve the term haptic touch for this complex kind of sensory perception; the form of touch that comprises exploratory, active bodily contact with the material world. Haptic touch can be distinguished from the tactile awareness of mere bodily sensations such as prickling, stinging, or throbbing in virtue of its richer content. Haptic experiences give us percep- tual access to the material qualities of ordinary things. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2d58sg2xzggy4pej4xxqbx)) > We should also observe the distinction between using a functional object and testing it. On the one hand, an agent can haptically perceive an item in the course of pursuing some end: wielding the sabre as a weapon, sprinting in the shoes, or colouring a canvas with the brush. On the other hand, the subject can probe and explore the object without putting it to practical use in order to get a sense of how it is constituted: flexing a shoe between the hands, or giving the sabre an experimental swipe or two. This is significant because it allows us to forestall the worry that haptic engagement with a functional item can tell us only how well that item is working—a matter of efficiency or performance that might be thought to fall short of aesthetic evaluation. When we test an object through haptic exploration, we become attentive to properties of its form that are indicative of its functionality, and we do so from something approaching the standpoint of a disinterested observer. Active touch reveals how the object is put together, how its parts interlink, how its mechanisms operate, and how well these combine in the service of its function. There is thus a mode of haptic perception that is closer to traditional notions of the aesthetic, enabling the perceiver to take pleasure in the unity of form and function. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2daqmn48c5zkcy1hcfaw2q)) > Saito (2001, p. 92) argues that ‘the aesthetic value of a knife consists not only of its visual qualities and its feel in my hand, determined by its surface texture, weight, and balance but, most importantly, by how smoothly and effortlessly I can cut an object with it’. Parsons and Carlson (2008, p. 190) state that, in Saito’s description of the beauty of the knife, ‘functionality ... is not viewed as an integral component of aesthetic value, but only as a happy source of additional bodily pleasures ... smooth movements of the limbs, pleasing tactile sensations, and so on’. If we concur, we can regard the proposal of the current paper as giving proper emphasis to functionality in cases like Saito’s. If we think that function is already integral to Saito’s analysis, we can regard the current project as that of filling out the details of this analysis. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2debz9xs4v850yyfaxq0ap)) > My new hiking boots, for example, can feel beautiful when > I try them on and experience how well they support my ankle and grip the floor with their > treads. A bicycle can be said not only to look beautiful, but to ride beautifully, where this is > a matter of how it feels to the user.15 > Aesthetic attributions such as these are not jarring or > unnatural; they are an intelligible component of our ordinary aesthetic vocabulary. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2ds0j4xjg23x4xjsxvqcsy)) > It is likely that some of these examples will strike one as more plausible than others. Perhaps, for example, the feel of a simple household object such as a serving spoon ought never to be described as beautiful, no matter how fitting it seems for its function. I do not hope to persuade a critic otherwise, but we can observe that this is a challenge for the notion of functional beauty in general (can a spoon look functionally beautiful?) rather than for haptic functional beauty in particular. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2drej672d0mknpct6ztp77)) > Korsmeyer, C. (2019b). Things: In touch with the past. Oxford: OUP. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2bfbxcag6gx0r2r1z8hxg2)) - Note: #toread > Montero, B. (2006). ‘Proprioception as an aesthetic sense’. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64, pp. 231–242. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2bedypdxhvt4g3nteakwvs)) - Note: #toread > Montero, B. (2016). ‘Aesthetic effortlessness’, in Irvin, S. (ed.), Body Aesthetics. Oxford: OUP. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hw2dmj12kt13g7f5kcmstty4)) - Note: #toread