# In defense of Forsey’s Aesthetics of Design  ## Metadata - Author: [[Favara Kurkowski]] - Full Title: In defense of Forsey’s Aesthetics of Design - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: The text defends Jane Forsey's theory of design aesthetics, emphasizing the importance of function in assessing the aesthetic value of design objects. Criticisms of Forsey's proposal are addressed, highlighting the need to clarify the purpose of aesthetics in design. Forsey's interpretation of Kantian Dependent Beauty is key to understanding how the recognition of function influences the aesthetic dimension of design. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/163195086 - Source File: In Defense of Forsey’s Aesthetics of Design by Monika Favara-Kurkowski.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > Folkmann, 2013; ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjz4r82f1d74fkb8ybnw6ka)) - Note: #toread > , Forsey expands the applicability of the judgment of beauty to functional objects. For this purpose, she reaches to the Kantian theory of “Dependent Beauty” (pulchritudo adhearens) since she endorses the view that the aesthetic ”constitutes a mental act rather than a property of objects […] or a form of physical pleasure.” (Forsey, 2013, p. 73) This notion allows Forsey to describe how the recognition of purpose (functionality) influences the assessment of the aesthetic dimension of design. To be specific, she proposes an aesthetics of design based on evaluating an object „because of the perfection in the way it fulfills its purpose.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzcnm600k35g47dr1pa8ns)) > […] the free play of the faculties when faced with a work of craft will consider the contin- gency of the way that object fulfills its function by means of the individual skill at creating it from a given raw material. With judgements of design, we do not attend to this aspect of the object: we feel no individual hand at work when we appraise a laptop computer or a car, and we do not judge it according to how a single individual has manipulated some raw material to produce it. (Forsey, 2013, p. 180) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvkpk4b6zyjb8hrbce8crng5)) > Forsey proposes that „our appraisal of [design objects] will be tied to this intended function rather than to whatever uses they might serve.” (Forsey, 2013, p. 43) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjze3e901ymhqc4xafvg7j1)) > To establish whether the object perfectly fulfills its function, we must know its intended use; in other words, we could not judge a design object as beautiful in a dependent sense if we do not know what this object is used for. In most cases, this knowledge is of cultural derivation where form and function are mediated by words—e.g., “chair,” “kettle,” “gun”—and, Forsey adds, that the function—the concept of “chair,” “kettle,” “gun”—depends on what a designer intended an object to be, to further avoid confusion with the notion of “use.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzg6jfe51e3ac0r84b9qas)) > The four “intuitive characteristics” Forsey derives are functionality, immanence, muteness, and mass-presence. To be more specific, objects have to satisfy a practical purpose to be con- sidered objects of use; therefore, they are functional. Furthermore, we don’t expect a design object to „achieve the transcendence of art” (Forsey, 2013, p. 28). In other words, since design objects pertain mainly to quotidian life, they are not directly subject to metaphysical problems; therefore, they are immanent. This aspect links to their lack of expressive content, in the sense that the designer, unlike the artist, does not want to communicate anything profound, or at least we do not expect her/him to do so, i.e., they are mute. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzj0jx3n0n9jvm4a5k9803)) > Furthermore, a design object is characterized by the fact that it is mass-produced by techno- logical means, rather than hand made. Forsey is not specifically interested in hybridization cases between art and design as, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzke872nh8en1gx9an82jh)) > As Forsey intends it in critically appraising design in our daily life, the designer’s role and expressiveness are marginal. She writes: With design, we merely judge the relative perfection of the thing in fulfilling its function, absent any knowledge of—or often any interest in—who actually did the work. (Forsey, 2013, p. 180) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzqxsce30ypgcyn8eaxhba)) > Forsey’s theory of design is a more complex philosophical endeavor than a mere argument in favor of acknowledging design by philosophical aesthetics. There is no doubt that design is a valid subject of aesthetic appraisal, but Forsey wants to define how this appraisal is specifi- cally aesthetic for design, without falling into the trap of mere aestheticization. The decision to take the tortuous road of Kant’s Third Critique, often difficult to grasp for non-specialists, also reveals the deep foundation of her theory: first, the rejection of an essentialist definition of what is properly aesthetic; and, second, the „defense of the aesthetic as an autonomous and significant facet of human experience” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzskne6d39w2sgxnkrq67n)) > If an object is not practical, we will most likely not consider it an excellent example of an object of its kind, let’s say a comfortable chair. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvneqasztrwrbjz75k5fnhcr)) > However, Jiménez Sánchez adds something more. She wants to emphasize that the practice of design does not focus solely and exclusively on the production of practically functional objects. Instead, as has already happened with art, designers have begun to reflect on their practice and the postulates of design theory, expanding their sphere of action toward more conceptual work. In this regard, Jiménez Sánchez presents the “chair” of Katerina Kamprani Uncomfortable Chair 3. This chair is part of a collection of deliberately uncomfortable everyday objects that make simple daily tasks, e.g., sitting, a real challenge. Kamprani’s work is purely conceptual, not only because it remains mostly as a ren- dering or prototype, but because, according to the designer herself, by sabotaging the user experience, she intends to convey a message: „ ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzx262s1xb096gcff6qza8)) > However, if we want to insist that it is a chair, we have to consider that it is uncomfortable, and as such, we will not positively evalu-ate it as a good specimen of a chair—a perfect chair. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvnet3pk3v5kj78zx5w4m0k8)) > I want to argue that appealing to Kant’s theory of beauty does not exclude the appreciation of impractical objects. Before Forsey cast out Dependent Beauty specifically for design objects, this notion was already applied to non-practically functional objects. As Robert Stecker points out, „Kant suggests that a proper understanding of the appreciation of most art is not captured by the notion of a pure judgment of taste” (Stecker, 1987, p. 89) but impure ones, the object of which is always Dependent Beauty. What Forsey shows is how the function specifically af- fects this impure aesthetic judgment, not that only function affects it. For example, we could defend our aesthetic appraisal of Uncomfortable Chair 3 by pointing to its formal features alone. This justification would make us even more faithful to the original Kantian theory. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvjzzq3svaqpf35eqfrpf4rg)) > Jiménez Sánchez is right in pointing out that designers are more and more following the path of avant-garde endeavor, but is wrong in insisting that „[b]eautifully said, […] functional ac- counts are not consistent with design cases in which aesthetic judgments are not entirely sup- ported by the object’s practical or functional success.” (Jiménez Sánchez, 2019, p. 144) I want to argue that appealing to Kant’s theory of beauty does not exclude the appreciation of impractical objects. Before Forsey cast out Dependent Beauty specifically for design objects, this notion was already applied to non-practically functional objects. As Robert Stecker points out, „Kant suggests that a proper understanding of the appreciation of most art is not captured by the notion of a pure judgment of taste” (Stecker, 1987, p. 89) but impure ones, the object of which is always Dependent Beauty. What Forsey shows is how the function specifically af- fects this impure aesthetic judgment, not that only function affects it. For example, we could defend our aesthetic appraisal of Uncomfortable Chair 3 by pointing to its formal features alone. This justification would make us even more faithful to the original Kantian theory. > What Jiménez Sánchez has to do is cast an argument or a definition that supports the fact that Kamprani’s practice results in objects commonly understood as design objects and not, let us say, sculptures or a physical manifestation of a critique of design theory. Suppose we want to develop an aesthetic theory for design seriously. In that case, firstly, one has to justify what is particularly aesthetic for design that has not already been cast out for other aesthetic objects. The risk of not doing this is to consider design as a secondary art form precisely because it submits to other creative practices. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvnf0qwmr3byxtj6w2ay4s1z)) > In this regard, Jiménez Sánchez presents This is a Lamp, by Tobias Wong, another designer who took the initiative in the nebulous area around the world of traditional design. Among other “para-design” objects he created, this specific object is an adaptation of Philippe Starck Bubble Club chair—a plastic outdoor piece of furniture—into a „lamp” by inserting a lighting system inside it. According to Jiménez Sánchez, this product „introduces that not only proper function is responsible of design beauty but accidental functions too” (Jiménez Sánchez, 2019, p. 144). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk07dhtf442n33f6f0rh7y8)) > Unlike Glenn Parson and Allen Carlson, Jane Forsey defines the proper function of the object, not as an essential property of the object, but as established by the designer (intended function). In other words, making a correct aesthetic judgment implies that we understand what function the designer intended the object to perform. This definition of function „may well sport func- tional innovations too,” (Forsey, 2013, p. 58) of which This is a Lamp is an example. Moreo- ver, the intended function and the function we apprehend are not an essential property of the object. It is a problem of semantics if we wish, a „consideration of our linguistic practices.” (Forsey, 2013, p. 15) It might be that in the distant future, the “lighting chair” will become a typical kind of object in our homes, and other designers, in addition to Tobias Wong, will improve this kind of object, as a compound of the concept of sitting and of giving light, among which we can compare and assess our judgment. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk0939r60649r3b7f302q0v)) > The first time we see a lamp with the shape of a chair, according to the Kantian theory of beauty, refined by Forsey, we can critically appraise the object as a Free Beauty specimen. This is because we don’t have a definite concept at this time in history. Alternatively, we can appraise it as Dependent Beautiful for its sitting function and individually for its lighting func- tion. Associating a chair shape with light is a creative (and critical) act on the designer’s part, which Forsey does not develop in detail.1 What Forsey intends is that if at any given time in history, we have never experienced a lamp with the “non-standard” lamp shape at that time, we can make a pure judgment of beauty.2 However, from now on, as we have experienced it (perhaps even used it), we have a concept for this type of object. Forsey does not deny that „the binomial model form-function is problematic” (Jiménez Sánchez, 2019, p. 146); indeed, her theory emphasizes the fact that an object can „fulfill its function in a variety of ways, [and] these ways themselves should also be part of our overall appraisal of it.” (Forsey, 2013, p. 164). It is precisely by acknowledging this fact that Forsey’s theory allows taking into con- sideration not only the localized, specific, and personal interactions of who is formulating the judgment (Forsey, 2013, p. 216) but also the historical evolution of objects of design. The cases presented by Jiménez Sánchez are not born from a void, but are formal and functional evolutions of pre-existing objects. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk0ave3s8snr4xjxbhn8w97)) - Note: read again > Jiménez Sánchez sees in Functional Beauty accounts: the problem of exclusivity. She claims that „[t]he Functional Beauty Account is wrong in thinking that aesthetic judgements which are partly based on func- tional considerations are to be exclusively based on those kinds of considerations” (Jiménez Sánchez, 2019, p. 146). In other words, these accounts exclude from appreciation other prop- erties that are not necessarily related to functionality, i.e., expressive properties. As we have seen, Forsey seems to endorse precisely this aspect of design when she claims that design objects are mute. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk0hsxhs0j09yd72zne3cbs)) > The definition that Sanchez has in mind for design beauty is too broad, as to have insufficient explanatory power. This does not mean that actual design practice does not (or should not) expand in other fields, but because we have an intuitive understanding of what design is with respect to other practices, we can say that it expands in them. In other words, Forsey does not exclude that design practice is much more artistic than a Bic Ball-pen or an anonymous kettle might reveal. Nevertheless, for the appreciation of an object as a good specimen of its kind (pen or kettle), the designer’s expressiveness is not as fundamental as its function. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk15nbxtpxh91w4pf7vs0p4)) > . Focusing on the debate with Everyday Aestheticians, Forsey leaves out much of the research design theory has carried out, making her theory more a challenge for philosophical aesthetics than for design studies (Margolin, 2015). F ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk165229cns139jrg89n8xt)) > Focusing on expressiveness, which Forsey individuates as one of the main concerns of art- centered aesthetics, would proclaim “our response to fine arts as the form all aesthetic expe- rience should take” (Forsey, 2013, p. 195), trivializing, at the same time, what is unique about design. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk19qzaybcake1142zj9gjh)) > what do we want to achieve with an aesthetic theory of design? If art has been the privileged subject of aesthetics, particularly so when the avant-garde managed to put it in crisis, what does design offer that art has not al- ready? The answer is simple, almost banal, and Forsey, while not asserting it directly, makes it emerge throughout her book. Art has always been in tension with life. The relationships that bind art and life have been the subject of much reflection of art and its philosophy. Some of the most fundamental theories of aesthetics are linked precisely to this relationship. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk1eva593rrg8fa0x7pz1t7)) > when Jiménez Sánchez claims: design objects do not have to be quotidian to be design. There are lots of design objects that are not part of our daily lives, but that are still designed, such as particles accelerators or conceptual design cases. (Jiménez Sánchez, 2019, pp. 4-5) she expresses a narrow understanding of the importance of the everyday for aesthetics. A par- ticle accelerator is an everyday object for CERN physicists, and a conceptual design is an eve- ryday object for those who designed it. This should suffice to make us under- stand why an aesthetic theory of design does not need to mimic the path of the philosophy of art and art criticism. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk1g751d9nq91jtpt56a4ms))