# Of Marigold Beer: A Reply to Vermaas and Houkes  ## Metadata - Author: [[readwise.io]] - Full Title: Of Marigold Beer: A Reply to Vermaas and Houkes - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: JSTOR collaborates with Oxford University Press and The British Society for the Philosophy of Science to digitize and extend access to The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Vermaas and Houkes propose desiderata for artifact function theories, arguing for intentionalist non-reproduction theories. They discuss the distinction between proper and accidental functions in artifact theory. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/151087871 - Source File: Of Marigold Beer- A Reply to Vermaas and Houkes by Preston.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > hey main- tain that only an intentionalist non-reproduction theory can satisfy all the desiderata, and they offer a version that they believe does satisfy all of them. I reply that inten- tionalist non-reproduction theories, including their version, fail to satisfy their first desideratum. Thus neither type of function theory satisfies all the desiderata. This suggests that the list of desiderata may well be inconsistent, and that ultimately we may have to decide whether to give up the first desideratum or the fourth one. I recommend giving up the fourth one on the grounds that this choice preserves the phenomenologically salient social aspects of artifact function ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96d5t84kry91hjxv67x13s8)) > . They main- tain that only an intentionalist non-reproduction theory can satisfy all the desiderata, and they offer a version that they believe does satisfy all of them. I reply that inten- tionalist non-reproduction theories, including their version, fail to satisfy their first desideratum. Thus neither type of function theory satisfies all the desiderata. This suggests that the list of desiderata may well be inconsistent, and that ultimately we may have to decide whether to give up the first desideratum or the fourth one. I recommend giving up the fourth one on the grounds that this choice preserves the phenomenologically salient social aspects of artifact function. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96d997j8camqz8tb1ncgg12)) > . There are non-intentionalist reproduction theories, which do not require (although they do permit) an appeal to the intentional states of intelligent agents, but do require a history of selection and reproduction in order for function to be established. On the other hand, there are intentionalist non-reproduction the- ories, which require an appeal to intentional states of agents, but do not require any reference to the history of reproduction of an artifact. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96db7kpwyc6cpgeck7jb9pw)) > Thus in principle, no theory which requires an appeal to a history of reproduction can satisfy D4. Theories of this type include Neander's ([1991a, 1991b]) selected-effects theory, Millikan's ([1984, 1993]) theory of direct proper function, and my ([1998]) pluralist theory.' But Neander and Millikan both incorporate into their overall theories an inten- tionalist non-reproduction component that does satisfy D4. The details differ, but the outcome in both cases is that provision is made for the intentions of intelligent agents to suffice for the establishment of proper function. If the designer of the novel can opener intended it to open cans, then that just is its proper function. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96djf692svpjmcxcgkg99n9)) > Vermaas and Houkes claim that in both cases this intentionalist non- reproduction component continues to satisfy Dl and D2, but that both now fail to satisfy D3, the physical structure desideratum, because reference to a history of selection and reproduction has been dropped. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96dk9mc0g4gvz0p8v43y6ec)) - Note: why do they say this about d3? > Vermaas and Houkes claim that in both cases this intentionalist non- reproduction component continues to satisfy Dl and D2, but that both now fail to satisfy D3, the physical structure desideratum, because reference to a history of selection and reproduction has been dropped. This history built in the relationship between physical structure and function, because only physical structures that could in fact perform the function in question ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96dv7hxbrc7rc9zm63m1fed)) > got selected and reproduced. But if artifact function depends only on what the designer wants, hopes, or expects the artifact to do, there is no explicit provision for any justification that its physical structure is such as to make its actually performing that function likely, or even possible. In order to remedy this defect, Vermaas and Houkes suggest the addition of a clause requiring an appeal to the technical knowledge the designer has and exercises in the design process. This does not guarantee that the artifact will perform as desired, of course, but it does justify the expectation that it will. And this is just what you want, for if the designer's knowledge guaranteed the desired performance, no artifact could ever malfunction, thus violating D2. In short, Vermaas and Houkes claim to have preserved the satisfaction of D1, D2, and D4, already incorporated in the intentionalist non-reproduction components of Neander's and Millikan's theories, while in addition providing for the satisfaction of D3. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96dtr79c2f54m3rc0hxsnd4)) > Non-intentionalist reproduction theories aim in the first instance to explain how proper functions are established. In general, the idea is that if the ances- tors of a thing engaged in a particular performance, and if so doing resulted in their selection and reproduction, that performance is a proper function of their descendants. Any other performances of these descendants are accidental functions. Pluralist theories such as the one I espouse go on to include an explicit analysis of accidental functions, usually along the lines of Cummins's ([1975]) system function theory.2 In general, then, non-intentionalist theories of function maintain the distinction between proper function and acciden- tal function by reference to the distinction between the embedding of a ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96ecqf1s7xt0872q2tkehkq)) > performance in a history of selection and reproduction, and the embedding of a performance in a currently operating system. But intentionalist theories of function eschew reference to either the ancestry or the system context of an artifact, and rest everything on the intentional states of agents. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96ecvg05wytnb08nb9vmqft)) > . For example, if my desire is to open cans, I may fulfill it by designing a novel device to do the job, or by using an artifact whose proper function is not opening cans-a heavy knife or a hacksaw, say. In the first case, the novel device derives the proper function of opening cans from my intentional states. In the second case, the artifact used does not derive the proper function of opening cans, even though this is what the user desires and intends, and even though it may work better than the novel device ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j96en0fshew7kvsax2gex90g))