# On Needing Time to Think: Consciousness, Temporality, and Self-Expression ![rw-book-cover](https://media.springernature.com/full/springer-static/cover-hires/journal/11097) ## Metadata - Author: [[Springer Vieweg]] - Full Title: On Needing Time to Think: Consciousness, Temporality, and Self-Expression - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: The paper argues that conceptual thought can be part of subjective experience. It challenges the claim that thoughts must arrive “all at once” and cannot unfold in time. Attention to language comprehension and self-expression supports including thought within experience. - URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-019-09631-8 - Source File: On needing time to think: consciousness, temporality, and self-expression by Charles Siewert.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > Let me now be clear about this point. By speaking of having something “*unpremeditated”* to say, and saying it, I mean to distinguish this not only from “delayed expression”—including cases where, after having already clearly knowingly thought something to yourself (perhaps without saying it even to yourself), you then go on to verbalize the thought that just struck you. What I’m talking about is also not the same as the “tip of the tongue” phenomenon. *That* is what I take to occur when I find myself unable (at least temporarily) to find the word for someone or something I’m thinking of (“what’s the name of that comedian who played the 70’s news anchorman?” “What is the French word for *thesis defense*?”)—even though I’m trying to produce it. When, additionally, I have the impression or feeling that I may well, with some persistence, recall the elusive expression, I have it “on the tip of my tongue.” Sometimes I find a word I take to have been the object of my quest: a happy ending. But what I wish, in reflection, to contrast with such cases—both tip of the tongue and delayed expression—are cases where I have something to say, but haven’t yet had the thought I seek to express, nor have I thought of that for which I try to find the word: I seek *not just the words* for what I have thought, but *the thoughts to speak*; I have yet at most a “sense” of what I have to say; I “feel” I have something (more) to say, and I find just what I had to say *only in saying it*, what thought I had to express *only in expressing it.* What this—the experience of unpremeditated self-expression—is like for me, differs from what it’s like to experience either delayed expression or tip of the tongue. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k7fm2v9jch5fkq8hjk2kjrt6)) - Note: Q: explain this paragraph to me A: The paragraph summarizes the paper’s central move: it challenges an argument (from Tye and Wright, inspired by Geach) that claims conceptual thought must be excluded from conscious experience because thought supposedly unfolds differently in time than perception. The author argues that careful attention to how we comprehend and produce language—especially cases of unpremeditated self-expression—undermines key premises of that “temporality argument” and supports the view that thinking and understanding can be part of phenomenal experience.