# PHIL_D24_Document_01114  ## Metadata - Author: [[139]] - Full Title: PHIL_D24_Document_01114 - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Tags: [[refereeing]] - Summary: This paper challenges experiential passage realism, the idea that we accurately perceive the robust passage of time. It suggests that we might either not experience time's passage or that time does not pass robustly at all. The author argues that the experiential passage realist cannot adequately explain why many people report different experiences of time. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/253963166 ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > To make their explanation plausible, the experiential passage realist needs to tell a story about how it could be that so *many people* are passage blind, and, in addition, how it can be that these people are passage blind in a way that results in them having *no detectable deficits*. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvj3jk1mkmyte18gbqfn1ny)) > The difficulty with this response is that it makes it mysterious why humans evolved the ability to detect passage *at all*. So, instead of being faced by the problem of passage blindness, the experiential passage realist is now faced with the problem of *veridical detection*. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvj8g8xhat9b2rp644naq1r)) > Spandrels are phenotypic traits that are the byproduct of the evolution of some other characteristic, rather than a direct product of selection. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvj9sn6vcq043674eaarwrn)) > Now, at this point the experiential passage realist might argue that things are not so bleak. It could be that the ability to detect passage is a spandrel that is grounded in several different perceptual adaptations. For instance, suppose there are four different perceptual adaptations which, *jointly*, confer the ability to detect passage, and that in the absence of any one of them, that ability is absent. Then it only needs to be that for any one of these capacities, about 8% of people lack that capacity, since then (as long as the probability of lacking each capacity is probabilistically independent) we would expect ~35% of people lack *at least* one of them, and hence lack the ability to detect passage. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjcnd9a3yv1w8ck7xcfywn)) > That leaves the experiential passage realist with another option, according to which there is little to no difference in perceptual *content* amongst people. Rather, (almost all12) people veridically experience robust passage, but some people *misreport* the content of those experiences as not being of passage. *13* This is the misreporting explanation. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjfpr8eq96z5wa7f7magme)) > Empirical evidence suggests that people do interpret their own experiences through the lens of their beliefs, and Miller Holcombe and Latham (2020) present a compelling case that this might be true when it comes to people’s beliefs about time and their descriptions of their temporal experiences. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjk3nkv0230g1a7kswdya3)) > The agentive explanation is motivated by several proposals by deflationists, which aim to explain why despite not experiencing robust passage some people report that they do. The idea, first presented in Young (2022), ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjmckf2z5nmr0hwcnb2m3x)) > This sort of explanation has since been expanded by Bigg, Latham, Miller and Yechimovitz (2024a)). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjmpv27vqfgr2fwsqz0aqz)) > Recent empirical evidence finds some support for the broad idea that people who more strongly experience agency are more likely to report that it seems as though time robustly passes. Using a standardised Sense of Agency Scale (Tapal, Oren, Dar and Eitram 2017), Bigg, Latham, Miller, and Yechimovitz (2024a) found that people who reported having stronger agentive experiences were more likely to report, and reported with greater strength, that it seems as though time robustly passes. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvjsharhxtfk6fzdpwrtxee)) > A third version of the misreporting explanation appeals to the idea that people are differentially able to vividly imagine events as past or future (Vannucci et al. 2016; Dawes et al. 2022), and that > the more vividly people can imagine such events, the more likely they are to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes. Bigg, Latham, Miller and Yechimovitz (2024b) originally propose this hypothesis. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvk1aw87xdrnwn19xswb0v2)) > So far, I have spelled out several variants of the misreporting explanation and reflected on the extent to which there is empirical evidence in favour of each. In what follows I argue that *even if the predicted associations were to be discovered*, between the relevant factor at issue and variation in people’s reports regarding their temporal seemings, the resulting explanation offered by the experiential passage realist would be inadequate. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgvk70bpqcm6twttsk7n15zy)) > Why is there a disposition to report that it seems as though time robustly passes? Well, here is what I think is at least a stab at some of that story. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgycm6dcweh3g85rj2bfdcz3)) > In fact ,though, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jh7pjf1cjwk7pavv1mwvjd1m)) > Why is there a disposition to report that it seems as though time robustly passes? Well, here is what I think is at least a stab at some of that story. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jh7p7g7c4bxrwe0ggg6wd902))