# Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference  ## Metadata - Author: [[readwise.io]] - Full Title: Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Note: Interesting. Hopefully we’ll find out - Summary: Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference are explored in this paper. The author argues that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under a representationalist analysis. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified, and their relevance in understanding reflexive, cognitive subjectivity is emphasized. The paper discusses the phenomenology of transparency and introduces the notion of introspection as operating on first-order states. The author also examines the relationship between Cartesian thoughts and cognitive self-reference, highlighting the importance of integrating opaque mental representations into the existing transparent self-model. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/125640550 - Source File: Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference1 THOMAS METZINGER (2023-12-17 18-46-27).pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > In this paper I will argue that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under a representationalist analysis. In order to sketch such a representationalist analysis I will introduce two new concepts, the concept of “phenomenal transparency” and the notion of “attentional availability for introspection.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgtgpnpjrfygvw8chcdsg6k)) > In particular, I will point to potential equivocations between phenomenological and epistemic notions of “transparency,” arguing that certain Cartesian thoughts of the form [I am certain that I* exist] can be reduced to a specific form of phenomenal mental content, and hence do not per se support the conclusion that they present us with genuine self-knowledge. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgtxbbwyqb9s17069440kxc)) > One goal of this paper is to show how central, but frequently overlooked phenomenological constraints for representationalist theories of self-consciousness are, first, that phenomenally opaque states do exist, and second, that they are interestingly related to phenomenally trans- parent states (namely within one and the same “vehicle”). My more general aim in this paper is to draw attention to the fact that the concepts of “phenom- enal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpnxay5zjnj56s2qxrzha2f1)) > Today, a broad standard definition of phenomenal transparency, on which most philosophers would probably agree, is that it essentially consists in only the content properties of a conscious mental representation being available for introspection, but not its non-intentional or “vehicle-properties.” Introspec- tively, we can access its content, but not the carrier of this content. Typically, it will be assumed that transparency in this sense is a property of all phenom- enal states. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgtr753azd25zpj8kvyfh37)) > [. . .] that the moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. (Moore 1903, p. 450) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb22ndq6ac0432bxft14dh7)) > Transparency in this sense is a property of active mental representations already satisfying the minimally sufficient constraints for conscious experience to occur. Some of these constraints might even be necessary conditions. For instance, phenomenally transparent representations are always activated within a virtual window of presence and are functionally integrated into a unified global model of the world. Conscious content is always bound into an experiential “Now,” and functionally it is intimately connected with those mechanisms constituting short-term memory and the emergence of a psychological “moment” (see Pöppel 1988 for an accessible overview). In addition, in non-pathological configurations, the content of consciousness forms a single and integrated model of reality; phenomenologically, being conscious simply is to be in a world (e.g., Yates 1985; for an excellent recent collection of texts, see Cleeremans 2003). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpnxfk2xv62bdgrjc2qmgtar)) > The second defining characteristic of phenomenal transparency postulates that, on the functional level of analysis, what makes mental representations transparent is the attentional unavailability of earlier processing stages in the brain for introspection. Transparency results from a structural/architectonic property of the neural information-processing going on in our brains. The notion of “attentional availability for introspection” is here used with refer- ence to a special case, namely that of introspective attention (further analyzed below). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb2ab010sjb23s1sgp9vf5x)) > In this way, attention is a constructive form of representing another representation (or a set thereof) with the help of non-conceptual mental means, a subsymbolic kind of metarepresentation. Object perception never is a passively synthetic process, because many target stimuli can only be discovered after their elementary features have already bound into a whole. And this is another central function of attention: it identifies a certain characteristic combination of features within an ambiguous perceptual context. For example, visuo-spatial attention helps to segment a phenomenal scene and thereby contributes to a reduction of ambiguity. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpnxn07vtjtjnv5832e37k4s)) > The more earlier the processing stages, the more earlier aspects of the internal construction process leading to the final, explicit and disambiguated phenomenal content, are available for introspective attention, the more will the system be able to recognize these phenomenal states as internal, self-generated constructs. Full transparency means full attentional unavailability of earlier processing stages. Degrees of opacity come as degrees of attentional availability. > • DEF 2: For every phenomenal state, the degree of phenomenal transparency is inversely proportional to the introspective degree of attentional availability of earlier processing stages. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgvgc4ty2b1yr06m6jtsg25)) > Attention can also be directed inwards, for instance at the process generat- ing a mental self-representation, while continuously embedding it into our conscious model of reality. In this context, the following fact is of particular philosophical interest: The more earlier the processing stages, the more ear- lier aspects of the internal construction process leading to the final, explicit and disambiguated phenomenal content, are available for introspective atten- tion, the more will the system be able to recognize these phenomenal states as internal, self-generated constructs. Full transparency means full attentional unavailability of earlier processing stages. Degrees of opacity come as degrees of attentional availability. > • DEF 2: For every phenomenal state, the degree of phenomenal transpar- ency is inversely proportional to the introspective degree of attentional avail- ability of earlier processing stages. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb2jvchb4eqt3tqfmxnw3dv)) > Second, this definition departs from the classical vehicle-content distinc- tion. The standard way of defining transparency would be to say that only content properties of the phenomenal representata are introspectively avail- able to the system, and not vehicle properties. The vehicle-content distinction is a highly useful conceptual instrument, but it contains subtle residues of Cartesian dualism in that it always tempts us to reify the vehicle and the con- tent by conceiving of them as ontologically distinct, independent entities. A more empirically plausible model of representational content will have to describe it as an aspect of an ongoing process and not as some kind of ab- stract object. What we need is embodied content, as it were – or rather, not “a” content, but an ongoing and physically realized process of containing (see, e.g., Churchland 1998, [unpublished manuscript]; Clark 1997; O’Brien and Opie 2001). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb2qrpft4cajwe2j28hy7q9)) > Third, describing phenomenal transparency in terms of the attentional availability of earlier processing stages has the advantage of being able to develop many different, fine-grained notions of degrees of transparency and opacity. For different phenomenal state-classes resulting from different types of processing, it may also be possible to describe not only variable degrees, but distinct kinds of transparency and opacity. This allows for a much more realistic description of certain phenomenological features pertaining to different classes of conscious states. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgvmca0d80at7dv9f10k7yz)) > Transparency is a special form of darkness. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpgvp62grd1faam45zj42922)) > What is inaccessible to conscious experience is the simple fact of this experience taking place in a medium. Therefore, transparency of phe- nomenal content leads to a further characteristic of conscious experience, namely the subjective impression of immediacy. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb2vhfp88sgd1b9dwq8yb15)) > Of course, opaque phenomenal representations do exist as well. Here are some preliminary examples of opaque state-classes: Most notably consciously experienced thoughts, but also some types of emotions, pseudo-hallucinations or lucid dreams are subjectively experienced as representational processes. Such processes sometimes appear to us as deliberately initiated cognitive or representational processes, and sometimes as spontaneously occurring, limited or even global phenomenal simulations, frequently not under the experiential subject’s control. Lucidity, becoming aware that one is dreaming in a dream, is the standard example of a situation in which all of the conscious model of reality is suddenly experienced as a model (see Metzinger 2003, section 7.2.5). In such cases we know that they do not present realities to us, but only possibilities: the fact that they are representational processes, the ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpny23c0ndnr0p562a3f29q9)) > content of which may or may not properly depict an external reality, is globally available for attention, cognition and behavioral control (for the notion of “global availability,” see Baars 1988; Chalmers 1997; Metzinger 2000). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpny2vtbtr7wt3d6q5vms2w7)) > There are, however, examples of sensory opacity, for instance, during extremely short transition phases in bistable phenomena, e.g., if a consciously experienced Necker cube switches from one interpretation to the next and back, or during the phenomenon of binocular rivalry (see, e.g., Leopold and Logothetis 1999). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpny5qavkhg8pv4afpjq1c53)) > There are, however, examples of sensory opacity, for instance, during extremely short transition phases in bistable phenomena, e.g., if a con- sciously experienced Necker cube switches from one interpretation to the next and back, or during the phenomenon of binocular rivalry (see, e.g., Leopold and Logothetis 1999). O ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb3b0hm3ws61w1dn9gb8aqe)) > If a subject in a laboratory experiment and under the influence of a hallucinogenic psychoactive substance (say, LSD or 2-CB) observes abstract geometrical patterns on the wall, breathing, and slowly evolving into deeper and ever deeper forms of ineffable beauty, then she will frequently be aware of the representational character of her visual experience in that sub-region of her phenomenal space. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpny6fawe6jcbjrjj71x8qsf)) > My claim is that what this subject becomes aware of are earlier processing stages in her visual system. Visual pseudo-hallucina- tions – the breathing patterns on the wall – are such earlier processing stages. Today, we have the first mathematical models describing the self-organiz- ing dynamics characterizing such unstable states of the visual cortex (e.g., Bressloff, Cowan, Golubitsky, Thomas, and Wiener 2001). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb3mb6cwg3neakctvkprnve)) - Note: this references would be interesting to check? > More importantly, however, the paradigmatic examples for fully opaque state-classes are deliberately initiated processes of conscious thought. In these cases we really experience ourselves as deliberately constructing and operating with abstract representations, ones that we have generated ourselves and which can, at any time, turn out to be false ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpny8peg45sjed691w1frtk5)) > In emotions we frequently oscillate between certainty and uncertainty, between the immediacy of an obvious perception and doubts. This simple ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpnyde86hjfc8tswn50mmeaz)) > phenomenological observation points to another important characteristic of opaque phenomenal representations. They make the possibility that they actually might be misrepresentations globally available for cognition, attention and behavioral control. They allow a representational system to experience itself as a representational system. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hpnycy996sy9fxz12vb9wec1)) > Summing up, my three central claims about phenomenal transparency are: • Transparency is not a necessary condition for phenomenality, because opaque forms of phenomenal content do exist. > – Examples in the phenomenal world-model (of external reality): Pseudo- hallucinations, lucid dreaming. > – Examples in the phenomenal self-model: consciously experienced cog- nitive reference/self-reference. > • Transparency is a gradual property of phenomenal states, because the distribution of transparency/opacity in phenomenal space possesses vari- ance. > – Examples in the phenomenal world-model: Stress-situations, transitory states in psychiatric disorders. > – Examples in the phenomenal self-model: Emotions, transitions between reflexive thought and daydreaming. > • Any convincing theory of phenomenal transparency/opacity must be able to explain how we could, phylo- as well as ontogenetically, acquire this prop- erty in a series of steps. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqb4nvhhktjbybj2rvdtf6qm)) ## New highlights added March 16, 2025 at 4:32 PM > derealization ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jpfqxy43vhf9h6tsb83rwyyv))