# Representational Genera  ## Metadata - Author: [[John Haugeland]] - Full Title: Representational Genera - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: The text discusses the concept of representation, focusing on the relationship between representations and their contents. It explores different forms of representation, such as iconic representations and holograms, emphasizing the distinction between recording and representing. The discussion raises questions about the nature and essence of genetic representation. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/145706604 - Source File: Representational Genera by Haugeland.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > One cannot simply say, for instance, that linguistic tokens are essentially digital, whereas images are analog, since, in the first place, speech is to some extent analog, and in the second, images are often handled digitally. M ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqjspn8rsxvxvm61d682wmdk)) > o ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqjsx0y8n15k8cbanyqavg7c)) > Distributed representations are distinctive in that each portion of the token participates (in some broadly egalitarian way) in the repre- ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnc5w7n06ewapwg6fvfm97b)) > Re p r e s e n tat i o na l g e n e ra 1 7 5 senting of each portion of the represented contents. For this to make sense, there must be antecedent notions of portions, both of the to- kens and of the contents; and then the idea is that the representings of the content portions are all spread out over the token portions and superimposed on one another—whence the term “distributed”. What these respective portions are, and how various possible content por- tions can be (simultaneously) determined by various possible token portions, is, of course, settled by the particular scheme (which is arbitrary); but, given a scheme, it is not at all arbitrary what any particular token represents.4 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnc5s825pg576km14vjasy6)) > Re p r e s e n tat i o na l g e n e ra 1 7 5 senting of each portion of the represented contents. For this to make sense, there must be antecedent notions of portions, both of the to- kens and of the contents; and then the idea is that the representings of the content portions are all spread out over the token portions and superimposed on one another—whence the term “distributed”. What these respective portions are, and how various possible content por- tions can be (simultaneously) determined by various possible token portions, is, of course, settled by the particular scheme (which is arbitrary); but, given a scheme, it is not at all arbitrary what any particular token represents.4 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnc8ctnhh4ny9rh6dkzmfz6)) > senting of each portion of the represented contents. For this to make sense, there must be antecedent notions of portions, both of the to- kens and of the contents; and then the idea is that the representings of the content portions are all spread out over the token portions and superimposed on one another—whence the term “distributed”. What these respective portions are, and how various possible content por- tions can be (simultaneously) determined by various possible token portions, is, of course, settled by the particular scheme (which is arbitrary); but, given a scheme, it is not at all arbitrary what any particular token represents.4 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnc921yetjdx5cezz8gv1k3)) > What these irritating examples have in common is most evident in the case of a photographed inscription. While the result is, in one sense, clearly an image, it is equally clearly not an image of whatever the inscribed text was about; rather, it is an image of the inscription itself, but in such a way that (assuming the text is still legible in the image) the ability of the original to represent whatever it represented is preserved in the image. Obviously, however, that representing remains essentially logical in character. In other words, the logical Copyright © 1998 The President and Fellows of Harvard College ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqjtjhp7eemf7z40f5bcshyy)) > Evidently then, we must distinguish in this case between the logical representation and its iconic recording. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqjtk5wssf3qtfmv66q316ts)) > Consider once more a photo of an inscription: in favorable cases, it both represents and records that text; and, meanwhile, the text itself is a (different) representation of something else. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnaeragtxnm56f05ns1b3k7)) > What is the difference between recording and representing, and how is it that they are so readily confused? Fundamentally, I think, recording is a process of a certain sort; and to be a record is to be the result of such a process. By contrast, representing is a functional status or role of a certain sort, and to be a representation is to have that status or role. These are not the same because, in general, being the result of a recording process is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a representational status or role. On the other hand, the recording process does produce an out- put which is a record of its input; and representational status does involve one entity standing in for another. T ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqnkdk8eza1cztvs6dacc3e4)) > . What is the difference between recording and representing, and how is it that they are so readily confused? Fundamentally, I think, recording is a process of a certain sort; and to be a record is to be the result of such a process. By contrast, representing is a functional status or role of a certain sort, and to be a representation is to have that status or role. These are not the same because, in general, being the result of a recording process is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a representational status or role. On the other hand, the recording process does produce an out- put which is a record of its input; and representational status does involve one entity standing in for another. This formal relational paral- lel, plus the fact that, in certain cases (such as photography), the product of the recording process can also have the status of represent- ing the input, therefore being simultaneously a record and a represen- tation of it, is the basis of the confusion. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqn99bgbpq2h5qe3qs9zmb7k)) > What is the difference between recording and representing, and how is it that they are so readily confused? Fundamentally, I think, recording is a process of a certain sort; and to be a record is to be the result of such a process. By contrast, representing is a functional status or role of a certain sort, and to be a representation is to have that status or role. These are not the same because, in general, being the result of a recording process is neither necessary nor sufficient for having a representational status or role. On the other hand, the recording process does produce an out- put which is a record of its input; and representational status does involve one entity standing in for another. This formal relational paral- lel, plus the fact that, in certain cases (such as photography), the product of the recording process can also have the status of represent- ing the input, therefore being simultaneously a record and a represen- tation of it, is the basis of the confusion. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqn9e7z75jz6wgdrd769yb3k)) > As examples like these illustrate, connectionist networks contain two quite different candidates for status as representations. On the one hand, there are patterns of activation across various sets of network units—the input and output sets, obviously, but also perhaps others, such as intervening layers. So, in the ping-pong example, patterns might represent any number of concrete and abstract aspects of ball and racket motions, gathered and/or projected. On the other hand, there are patterns of connection weight among the units of the net. It is usually much more difficult to say what these might represent; but it is somehow they that encode the distinctive capabilities of each indi- vidual network. Thus, continuing the example, it would be the con- nection strengths (collectively) that “contain” the system’s know-how or ability to play ping-pong. In contrast to patterns of activation, which are ephemeral (changing with the play in real time, say), con- nection weights tend to remain constant, or to change only slowly (with experience and practice, say). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqn2cfr358ts4t9t141x2ea3)) > These constitute not occurrent or epi- sodic states that arise and pass away in the course of the net’s operations (“thoughts”), but rather its long-term functionality or competence (“know-how”)—which it is essentially impossible to ex- press in words, except as generalities. But the fact that the best verbal characterization of a skill is an imprecise hand-wave does not mean that the skill itself lacks delicacy and detail; on the contrary, it has a “complexity” and “precision” of its own. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqn6bxwdbeke800wk7sazyrs)) > Surely, in fact, this separation of recognitive and performative abilities is altogether artifi- cial: special cases aside, skillful performance is essentially adaptive to current circumstances, which is to say responsive to recognized rele- vant developments; and recognition in general can be nothing other than production of responses relevant to what is recognized. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hqn6egdt0r3rzxtx4zrj9db0))