# Seeing through Transparency ![rw-book-cover](https://readwise-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/media/reader/parsed_document_assets/175215853/pR-DAywSAYRUwYVDaup90cWugsTap93hNtqATHGZnkw-cove_ngqMDXq.png) ## Metadata - Author: [[Davide Bordini]] - Full Title: Seeing through Transparency - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Summary: The text discusses the concept of transparency in the philosophy of mind. It explores different perspectives on whether introspection reveals only external objects or includes aspects of the experience itself. The debate involves distinguishing between different levels of transparency and how it impacts our understanding of consciousness. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/175215853 - Source File: Seeing through Transparency by Davide Bordini.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > (Strong Transparency) Some features of the experience (other than what it is of) are introspectable, but it is impossible to introspectively attend to them without (or in isolation from) attending to what the experience is of. > (Weak Transparency) Some features of the experience (other than what it is of) are introspectable, and it is not impossible (though it might be difficult) to introspectively attend to them without (or in isolation from) attending to what the experience is of. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hy7xmyjz6eckgtjwyb2maacd)) > However, other externalists (representationalists of a different sort or naïve realists) can accept Strong Transparency. For example, Soteriou (2011, 2013; but see also: Martin 2004; Richardson 2010, 2014) claims that, by attending to the objects of the experience, we can introspectively discern certain invariant structural features, such as the visual field or its boundaries, which remain constant as objects and properties change. > Such structural features are modality-specific and are responsible for how we experience things within that modality. Consequently, they are not properties of what we experience but of the experience itself.9 And indeed, according to Soteriou, we do not seem to be aware of them in the same way we are aware of the objects of our experiences—they cannot be targets of independent attention or scrutiny. Nonetheless, they are constituents of phenomenal character, and we can notice them by performing proper introspective reflection on the ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hy7ynn6bkn8bdat4typyhxbm)) > objects of the experience and their properties. A ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hy7yntg2qjjvt543htnzn0fd))