# The Aesthetics of Design  ## Metadata - Author: [[Forsey, Jane.]] - Full Title: The Aesthetics of Design - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Tags: [[favorite]] - Summary: The text discusses the need to include design within philosophical aesthetics, developing a theory of aesthetic judgment specific to design. It explores Kant's aesthetic theory and distinguishes judgments of design from judgments of fine art and craft. The text argues for recognizing design as a legitimate object of aesthetic attention in human life. - URL: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/143575675 - Source File: THE AESTHETICS OF DESIGN by Jane Forsey.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > THE AESTHETICS OF DESIGN ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvk2dedvgb2zm9paxkqmd9rd)) > Chapte r III ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j0n83x60bjdwabapdc2mpmga)) > Here the debate about §16 is at its most acute. Kant claims that judge- ments of dependent beauty “presuppose” a concept of the purpose that determines what a given thing is and “consequently of its per- fection” (§16, 67). It is these two elements—the presupposition of a purpose and the idea of perfection—that must somehow be reconciled with what we already know of aesthetic judgement to render that judgement one of dependent beauty. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1vpf0sj6fg86j7f240yjc4g)) > to ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hvkpfz90kzfwa0x9frnzhsb4)) > Our judgement of the perfection of an object, by contrast, is that it is a good thing of its kind: it involves empirical reason instead of practical reason, and is disinterested in the way that all cognitive judgements are. Th at is, we can make a cognitive judgement that an object fulfi lls its purpose without wanting the thing for ourselves, or having any interest in its actual good for us. Th e purpose of an object is the realization of a given function or concept that precedes its existence; it needn’t be a function that we want it to perform. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24rd8m5b6cyn08ab4nce7nq)) > Th us while I seek a more positive role for function and perfection in our judgements of beauty, Guyer’s interpretation does provide a cautionary note to my search: if two objects both equally satisfy the requirements of their pur- poses—if indeed both do so perfectly—on what grounds will we ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j530vrr16hten7srkmhkphtg)) > fi nd one more beautiful than the other except according to their nonessential, formal qualities? ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j530vz90ykq3vbfm2rdkgpwv)) > Th ere are two routes I can take to respond to Burns’s concern. Th e fi rst is to distinguish ornamentation from the essential ele- ments of an object’s purpose and claim either that ornament is extraneous to our judgements of dependent beauty (but relevant to free beauty), or att empt to include it as part of an object’s overall ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j530y8qkwp6ee7322xh498qr)) > aesthetic merit. 33 > Th e former is unsatisfactory because the style > of its fi ns is one of the reasons we merit the Studebaker above > the Chevy and cannot therefore be omitt ed in our appraisal of > it as dependently beautiful. But if I claim the latt er, my account > looks either formalistic, along the lines of Guyer’s claim that even > dependent beauty stems from the inessential formal properties of > objects, all other requirements being met, or my account bifurcates > judgements of dependent beauty into two separate types—of util- > ity and ornamental beauty—in a way similar to Allison’s additive > account. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j530yz58qdkpsn6wz2mzr2bp)) > It is not simply that we take the church with the cruciform > fl oor plan, or the bicycle with its two wheels and so on, as being > purposive and then go on to appraise its inessential or merely for- > mal qualities—its appearance to us—as that which constitutes its > unique beauty. Instead, the object’s purposive structure directly > contributes to our fi nding it beautiful when we “refl ect upon the > contingency of the object’s systematicity in view of other imagined > confi gurations.” 37 > A bicycle may or may not have brakes or gears, > for example, and these factors are not directly constitutive of the > bicycle’s function as something that will transport us. But they are > directly constitutive of this bike’s dependent beauty, Wicks would > claim, because they are the (contingent) ways in which it realizes > its purpose and so must be part of our appraisal of it. H ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j0658w5fnm64x186dpccxe2g)) > In general, he notes, “there is no ‘defi nitive’ way to realize any given purpose” ( pace Guyer): the purpose of an object like a church or a bicycle “is an abstract concept,” and for that reason we can “never fully determine every contingent detail of its concrete instantiation,” which keeps our judgements from becoming deter- minant and cognitive. 4 ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1vpmrn21zzm3xaabx8gh4k6)) > But further, in dependent beauty it is not only that we play upon the many ways to realize a given purpose, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1vpkhz0a1k6n6j3yn2zhnrm)) > But further, in dependent beauty it is not only that we play upon the many ways to realize a given purpose, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1vpnx19fnqr5dezhk2hjxph)) > but that we directly “appreciate how the actually presented object > realizes the given purpose in its specifi c way” 41 > when we judge it to > be beautiful. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1vpkvqag8ap6vny6b7ynrma)) > But his coff ee-pot, I want to claim, has fl aws that are hidden behind that newness and shine, that detract from its beauty. First, brass conducts heat, and each time you reach for the handle, or put your fi nger on the lid, you burn yourself. Bakelite remains cool. Second, the sleek rounded design makes it very hard to unscrew ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j2dvtq2gyjz1fxatezc4cjc9)) > the two halves, especially if you already have soapy hands. My octagonal pot turns as easily as a nut in a wrench, whether wet or dry. Th ird, the conical shape of his means the opening of the top pot is too narrow to fi t even a small hand in to clean it, whereas mine, as wide at the top as at the bott om, welcomes a quick scrub. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j2dvvv2tvakg93kh6tvqkx35)) > When it comes to judging the aesthetic merit or beauty of these two pots, their similarities and diff erences tell us a num- ber of important things about the nature of our approbations of design: 1. We have to know what they are, and what they are meant to be. For those who do not drink coff ee, or have never made it, these litt le pots will be mystifying, and a judgement without this conceptual content cannot be a judgement of design excellence (although it could be one of free beauty). But this means that the necessary conceptual knowledge that underpins our judgements will be quite culturally and historically specifi c: there are also many ways to make cof- fee, from a drip fi lter maker to throwing grounds in the bott om of a cup and pouring boiling water over them. Not only must we be coff ee drinkers, but coff ee drinkers of a certain kind. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01hyx01gk2e5cb5dvhp76bwpg4)) > Th is judgement of perfection cannot be made by looking at the coff ee-pots alone. Designed objects are meant to work, but to ascertain whether they do, and whether they are good things of their kind, requires us to use them or put them to the test: is the coff ee any good? Can we lift the lid to serve it? Does the pot leak or the metal corrode? Some of these vir- tues and defi ciencies will not be apparent to the eye alone, and this means that judgements of design excellence, fi rst, require more than observation and, second, are more inte- grated into our everyday lives and activities than aesthetic judgements of fi ne art. T ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24pxgzm3030rptdrt3jj108)) - Note: Very useful quote for showing that Forsey makes room in her account for use. > t. To judge a design by its formal quali- ties alone, even with the minimal conceptual content from (1) above, is to approach it as an object of contemplation or mere visual appreciation, and not as a functional object meant to be used. Th e true beauty of design requires per- fection in fulfi lling its function, to more than a minimal standard of managing to squeeze out a cup of coff ee, or appearing to manage it. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24pzk4fd2q0f9zrvezz9tkm)) - Note: excellent quote for more showing that she makes room for use. > Certainly the Vev Vigano needed no detailing on the handle to perform its function, but this is part of the way in which his pot was realized as the particu- lar thing it is. Form and function are symbiotically related in our judgements of design, and both contribute to a given object’s beauty. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24rhspp335spepm04p1n3hh)) > Th is means that in order to judge design as beautiful it must also be familiar to us, part of the everyday, and part of the things we interact with in our quotidian lives. Without being a botanist, I cannot judge a fl ower to be dependently beautiful; without being a rocket scientist, I cannot appraise the excellence of a rocket. But we are, in fact, “specialists” in living out our lives and days, and we do have the expertise to appraise a mop or broom, teapot or bicycle, as depend- ently beautiful provided that these are objects with which we regularly and actively engage. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24rkj2z6zwsgqk3jb481pen)) > Diff erences between objects—and innovations to objects—can be both formal and functional, and both ele- ments contribute to their beauty, not separately but in the fully integrated teleological style that they display in the contingent way that their purposes are realized. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24rn6bb0w2mntt37t3g2yce)) > Th e beauty or excellence of a given object produces a pleas- ure that is disinterested, and must be distinguished from other kinds of judgements we make about the same thing, including both those of the pleasant and the good. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j24rq92e8vqy3zy9h97yz67q)) > Focus on the proximal senses is relevant to design, too, because > while we need to actively use designed artifacts to appreciate and > appraise them, this engagement will involve more than sight and > sound, as we saw with Saito’s example of the chair, above. Our > appreciation of a fl oral display cannot be complete without the > aroma of the fl owers, and even our appreciation of (or distaste > for) the air fresheners that dangle from cars’ rearview mirrors— > as designed objects—requires smell as perhaps the primary sense > with which we appraise them. Saito claims that the aesthetic value > of a knife, for instance, “consists not only of its visual qualities but > also of its feeling in my hand . . . [and] how smoothly and eff ort- > lessly I can cut an object.” Th e “sensuous aspects converge and > work together to facilitate the ease of use,” 38 > and our full aesthetic > experience of the knife requires us to hold it and cut with it; we > cannot fully determine its design excellence if we do not perform > these actions and engage at least some of our proximal senses when > we do. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j065j3h2ygda6yxy1fed6kjq)) > I would like to conclude this chapter with a suggestion: the theory of design I have constructed can itself stand as a contribution to an aesthetic of the everyday, albeit one that is perhaps more cautious than these theorists might wish. Cautious it may be, but I would also like to suggest that it is more fully developed than what this movement has so far off ered, and thus bett er able to withstand critical anal- ysis. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1yfmesmftyak73dp2kx67bf)) > To begin with, while design is clearly part of the everyday, it admitt edly does not encompass all that the movement wished to include in its theoretical scope. Yet casting their net as wide as they have has led to ontological confusion: the colours of dirt on a road, ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1yfnf3e3avj02hm3875apj1)) > or the feel of the sun are equally part of natural beauty and not spe- cifi c to the everyday; cleaning, chopping, and repairing are clearly quotidian but not clearly objects of any kind. With design as I have defi ned it, we have a set of objects that have everyday uses, and that can be distinguished from art, craft , and nature by their functional qualities: quiddity and immanence are central to design from its very inception. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01j1yfntjkh7r6v89e90d2gpr3)) ## New highlights added June 1, 2025 at 11:13 AM > Th is judgement of perfection cannot be made by looking at the coff ee-pots alone. Designed objects are meant to work, but to ascertain whether they do, and whether they are good things of their kind, requires us to use them or put them to the test: is the coff ee any good? Can we lift the lid to serve it? Does the pot leak or the metal corrode? Some of these vir- tues and defi ciencies will not be apparent to the eye alone, and this means that judgements of design excellence, fi rst, require more than observation and, second, are more inte- grated into our everyday lives and activities than aesthetic judgements of fi ne art. T ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jwn9f8d45md8p9r3z6xf2enh))