# What Is Philosophical Progress?  ## Metadata - Author: [[Finnur Dellsén]] - Full Title: What Is Philosophical Progress? - Category: #articles - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Tags: [[generating philosophy paper]] - Summary: Philosophical progress involves helping people better understand the connections between different ideas. An effective account of this progress should clarify what counts as valuable achievements in philosophy. The paper proposes a view that aligns philosophical progress with cognitive improvement, while acknowledging the differences between philosophy and science. - URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067 - Source File: What is philosophical progress by Dellsén et al.pdf ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights >  ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jfce6nzc95das8y06emgg4fa)) > So there are at least three important reasons that motivate the development of our account of philosophical progress. To a first approximation, our account holds that philosophical progress consists in putting people in a position to increase their understanding, where ‘increased understanding’ is a matter of more accurately and/or more comprehensively representing the network of dependence relations between various phenomena, and where people are most commonly put ‘in a position’ to increase their understanding by way of philosophical ideas (theories, arguments, distinctions, etc.) becoming publicly available. We call the account ‘Enabling Noeticism’. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgzxm89fj9kmhh6kdxcaemhg)) > Differences between philosophical practice and scientific practice surely do invite the question of whether philosophical progress and scientific progress might be entirely different things. For example, scientists tend to focus on empirical observation and real-world experimentation whereas philosophers tend to focus on clarifying concepts and conducting thought experiments, along with all the other achievements discussed in §[2.1](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-sec-0030). By supposing that philosophy doesn't aim at the same kind of progress as science, exceptionalist accounts avoid the burden of accounting for these methodological differences between philosophy and the empirical sciences. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhqbdd0yhz5r9xt9bspwyrwa)) - Tags: [[generating philosophy paper]] > “is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jfht90yd4ppcpst3atdk785d)) > Kim's idea is developed by Dellsén ([2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0017)), who argues that understanding some X is not simply a matter of accurately representing how X depends on various other phenomena (or aspects thereof), and thus that understanding X is not simply a matter of having some or all explanations of X. Rather, argues Dellsén, understanding X is a matter of representing both how X depends on various other phenomena, *and* how further phenomena depend on X itself. In other words, the extent to which one understands X is a matter of how one represents the network of dependence relations running both to, and from, X.[10](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-note-0010_note_9) Furthermore, the relevant representations concern not only ‘positive’ facts about whether (and if so, how) X depends on other phenomena, or how other phenomena depend on X. Rather, they also concern ‘negative’ facts like X's lack of dependence on specific other phenomena, or indeed on any phenomena (Dellsén, [2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0017), 170–182). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jfjcq4mmewjpyr3v3mkfar5v)) > Understanding is taken by many to be a gradable notion, in that one may understand X to a greater or lesser extent (rather than just fully or not at all). By contrast, knowledge is usually taken to be non-gradable, in the sense that there are no degrees of knowing a given proposition P; an agent either knows P or doesn't know P. We will follow Dellsén in supposing that the extent to which one understands X is determined by two separate criteria, *accuracy* and *comprehensiveness*. Accuracy concerns the extent to which one's representation *correctly* represents that X does or does not depend on various other phenomena (and how), and that various other phenomena do or do not depend on X (and how). Comprehensiveness concerns the extent to which one's representation includes all the phenomena on which X does and does not depend, and which do or do not depend on X. As Dellsén ([2020](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0017), 167) notes, these criteria may come into conflict in certain cases, leading to idealization (sacrificing accuracy for comprehensiveness) or abstraction (sacrificing comprehensiveness for accuracy). ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgzzaqr7kkrzq7g9t1wqtnmh)) > In sum, then, on our explication of understanding, an agent S understands X to the extent that S accurately and comprehensively represents the network of dependence relations in which X stands, or fails to stand, to other things. This need not include having any specific beliefs about X or its associated network of dependence relations, nor does it require S to have epistemic justification for their doxastic attitudes towards X or its associated network of dependence relations. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jffkeb3xqr8t4xc60brnrswh)) - Tags: [[generating philosophy paper]] > Enabling Noeticism is a *monistic* account, in the sense that it holds that it is a single cognitive achievement, namely putting people in a position to increase their understanding, that is constitutive of progress. As such, it may seem that our account is unable to accommodate the diverse ways in which philosophical research plausibly contributes to progress. This conclusion is premature, however, for two reasons. For one thing, various sorts of achievements can *put people in a position* to increase their understanding; for another, an even greater range of achievements can *promote* philosophical progress, even if they do not also *constitute* such progress, as we detail in what follows. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17ntehc6pkk6d6qby6pqm8)) > Importantly, putting people in a position to increase their understanding is a *broad category* of achievement that can be realized in a number of distinct ways. A paradigmatic example is the publication of a theory of some phenomenon that puts people in a position to more accurately and/or comprehensively grasp the dependence relations in which that phenomenon stands to other phenomena. Less obvious, perhaps, is that making new *arguments* for an existing theory publicly available can constitute progress. A published argument puts people in a position to increase their understanding of a phenomenon to the extent that the argument facilitates more accurate or comprehensive representations of how the phenomenon depends on various other phenomena. For example, the argument from evil – if successful – evidently shows that whether or not great evils exist *depends* – at least in part – on the whether or not there exists an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17pgsvs6b35bdpkjfez9jh)) - Note: A variety of ways of increasing understanding > Relatedly, making new *counterexamples* to a theory publicly available can put people in a position to increase their understanding of a phenomenon. As mentioned in §[3.2](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-sec-0100), Gettier's famous counterexamples to the tripartite theory of knowledge did not show what knowledge *is*. Rather, they illustrated that knowledge is not (merely) justified true belief. Nevertheless, Gettier's publication put people in a position to represent more accurately and comprehensively the dependence relations between knowledge and other phenomena. In particular, people were put in a position to (accurately) represent that someone's having knowledge does not merely depend on them having a true, justified belief, and thus were put in a position to increase their understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17ptmvxwj06t9yx4jfpfmf)) > Furthermore, making new *distinctions* publicly available can put people in a better position to understand by enabling them to represent the distinguished phenomena not as a single node in the network of dependence relations, but (more accurately) as two distinct nodes which may depend on different phenomena. Similarly, various other phenomena may then be taken to depend only on one of the two disentangled phenomena rather than on both simultaneously. In the other direction, publishing the discovery of *identities* – such as the mind-brain identity theory, if it is true – also constitutes progress, by enabling people to update their representations of dependencies in a way that conjoins two nodes that before were (inaccurately) represented to be distinct. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jhqcqk05zd3hccmvn0avw9kx)) > Gettier's counterexamples show how a ‘negative’ thesis can constitute progress by putting people in a position to update some inaccurate representations of dependencies, thereby putting them in a position to increase their understanding of the phenomenon in question. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17sqrkwpgwjeygd48pgdze)) > Ultimately, then, our account illustrates how appealing to a dichotomy between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ theses or solutions blurs the fact that the differences merely amount to different *degrees* of progress, thus constituting a continuum rather than dichotomy between different kinds of progress. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17tsx7jbfp91cqmh62fqmk)) > Recall that achievements promote progress if and only if they cause or probabilify the achievement(s) constitutive of progress. Developing new questions, tools, and conditional theses may promote philosophical progress, by causing the generation of publicly available content which puts people in a position to gain an increased understanding. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17w921txpvcv0zbj5g01t9)) > Each of these achievements can, say, direct someone's attention such that they develop and publicly defend a new, more accurate or comprehensive representation of the relevant dependence relations. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17wpmnz0ay4yckr973r7nx)) > Finally, an interesting class of cases is *defenses of radically mistaken views*.[14](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-note-0014_note_13) Our account does not give a unified verdict regarding such cases; the devil is in the details. For example, a defense of a mistaken view may feature one of the achievements outlined above – perhaps a counterexample to the received view, or a helpful distinction. In this way, even if the view defended is radically mistaken, its defense will constitute progress. More typically, perhaps, defending a mistaken view will not constitute but will rather serve to promote progress. A careful presentation of the view, showing the commitments and baggage that come along with it and the moves that have to be made in response to various objections (and so on), may serve to reveal the implausibility of the view, thereby paving the way for further work that puts people in a position to increase their understanding of the phenomenon in question. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj17y91474wsmj3bbs2mc8q8)) - Note: How defending radically mistaken views can help philosophy > Our account is in line with the noetic account of scientific progress defended by Dellsén ([2016](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0015), [2021](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0018), [2022](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0019)) and thus allows for a *unified* account of philosophical and scientific progress, according to which both consist in putting people in a position to increase their understanding. Thus this desideratum can be satisfied by supposing that there is complete continuity between scientific progress and philosophical progress, due to a common achievement that constitutes progress. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jj186gpghgv2nca7xeqx9bt0)) - Tags: [[generating philosophy paper]] - Note: a unified account of philosophical and scientific progress > understanding a phenomenon – and, in particular, having a high degree of understanding – involves a representation of a much broader structure that captures how the target phenomenon is connected to a plethora of other phenomena (see, e.g., Elgin [2007](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0026), Zagzebski [2019](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0077)). To put it in Sellarsian terms: to understand is to see how things *hang together*. Regarding factivity, when understanding of some phenomenon is increased, we represent the dependence relations in which that phenomenon stands to other phenomena more accurately and/or more comprehensively. On our account, then, one's degree of understanding is determined by the extent to which one represents how things, *as a matter of fact*, hang together. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jgzzh6g4amffwpp6rs75wrnp)) ## New highlights added February 6, 2025 at 4:14 PM > Beebee's ([2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0001)) equilibrist account (see §[2.3](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-sec-0050)) provides a different response to pessimistic concerns by allowing that adopting entirely false answers to philosophical questions can constitute progress, and indeed that progress might be exhibited by episodes in which our philosophical theories become radically less accurate. In our view, this move to a non-factive account throws the baby out with the bathwater. We are not alone in thinking this. According to the results of the 2020 PhilPapers survey, an overwhelming majority of philosophers think the discipline aims at truth, knowledge, or understanding (Bourget and Chalmers, [2023](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0008)) – where truth and knowledge are clearly factive notions, and understanding is generally taken to require at least some basis in facts, i.e., some degree of accuracy. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jkdprys19rhy2qadaevtjyw9)) > The fourth point concerns the distinction between that which *constitutes* and that which *promotes* progress. Roughly following Bird ([2008](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0004)), those achievements which are *in themselves progressive* are said to constitute progress, while activities which *cause or probabilify* progressive achievements are said to promote progress. (Of course, the very same event can both constitute and promote progress.) In discussions of scientific progress, this distinction has been used to clarify that accounts of scientific progress are meant to be accounts of what constitutes progress. For example, although experimentation is clearly crucial to scientific progress, no extant account of scientific progress directly identifies progress with experimentation. Instead, proponents of these accounts typically suggest that the role of experimentation is to promote some other scientific achievement, such as the development of more accurate theories.[8](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-note-0008_note_7) Similarly, what we propose below should be read as an account of what constitutes progress rather than of what promotes it – although we shall also draw out some plausible implications regarding what would promote progress given this account. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jkdqkzq83tcj73nw3nhfxcvr)) > As Dellsén, Lawler and Norton ([2023](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-bib-0022)) have argued, justification is best seen as something that promotes, rather than constitutes, progress – e.g, in the way that argumentation and evidence frequently leads us to accept better theories.[11](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.13067#phpr13067-note-0011_note_10) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jkdse0cyr00p1dedckyzaw6e)) > even if having justification (or knowledge) doesn't constitute progress on Enabling Noeticism, it nevertheless greatly *promotes* progress in all but the most outlandish circumstances. Put differently, justification is instrumental for progress – so much so, indeed, that it would only be a slight exaggeration to say that justification is *the instrument* for achieving progress. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jkdsgybht7500gp6g9syz3ds)) > This objection misunderstands the role that our explication of understanding plays in our account. To reiterate, we are not purporting to provide the ‘one true analysis’ of the notion of understanding as it is commonly used, e.g., in science and everyday life. Rather, our focus is on clearly defining a notion to be deployed in an account of something else, viz. philosophical progress. Readers who find it implausible that this notion captures a common meaning of ‘understanding’ may simply mentally replace every instance of ‘understanding’ (both above and below) with, e.g., ‘understanding*’, and think of Enabling Noeticism as an understanding*-based account of philosophical progress. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jkdpq9jjtdwyvh4qcsvq82m2)) ## New highlights added April 13, 2025 at 1:53 PM > [Philosophy and Phenomenological Research](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19331592) > [Volume 109, Issue 2](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/19331592/2024/109/2) p. 663-693[](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/19331592)var image = new Image(); image.onerror = function() { // if the image does not exist //document.getElementById("journal-banner-text").style.marginBottom = "15px"; document.getElementById("journal-banner-text").style.fontSize = "22px"; document.getElementById("journal-banner-image").style.display = "none"; } image.src = "/pb-assets/journal-banners/19331592-1518177644350.jpg"; > ORIGINAL ARTICLE > Open Access > [](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) > What is philosophical progress? > [Finnur Dellsén](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Dells%C3%A9n/Finnur),  > Corresponding Author > Finnur Dellsén > • [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) > • [orcid.org/0000-0003-4989-4204](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4989-4204) > University of Iceland, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, & University of Oslo > **Correspondence** > Finnur Dellsén, University of Iceland, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, and University of Oslo. > Email: [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Dells%C3%A9n/Finnur) > [Tina Firing](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Firing/Tina),  > Tina Firing > University of Iceland > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Firing/Tina) > [Insa Lawler](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Lawler/Insa),  > Insa Lawler > University of North Carolina at Greensboro > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Lawler/Insa) > [James Norton](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Norton/James),  > James Norton > • [orcid.org/0000-0003-3029-1788](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3029-1788) > University of Tasmania > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Norton/James) > [Finnur Dellsén](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Dells%C3%A9n/Finnur),  > Corresponding Author > Finnur Dellsén > • [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) > • [orcid.org/0000-0003-4989-4204](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4989-4204) > University of Iceland, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, & University of Oslo > **Correspondence** > Finnur Dellsén, University of Iceland, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, and University of Oslo. > Email: [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Dells%C3%A9n/Finnur) > [Tina Firing](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Firing/Tina),  > Tina Firing > University of Iceland > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Firing/Tina) > [Insa Lawler](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Lawler/Insa),  > Insa Lawler > University of North Carolina at Greensboro > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Lawler/Insa) > [James Norton](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Norton/James),  > James Norton > • [orcid.org/0000-0003-3029-1788](https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3029-1788) > University of Tasmania > [Search for more papers by this author](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/authored-by/Norton/James) ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01jrqbpbfsavnh61d0bmjjd5dk))