# Too Far, Too Close? The Self-Representationalist’s Intimacy Dilemma  ## Metadata - Author: [[Davide Bordini]] - Full Title: Too Far, Too Close? The Self-Representationalist’s Intimacy Dilemma - Category: #books - Summary: insert summary - My notes: - Document Tags: [[refereeing]] - Summary: Bordini explains Kriegel’s move to treat inner awareness as a constituting representation. He argues this creates an intimacy dilemma: you cannot have both intimacy and a naturalistic representational explanation. He concludes that constituting representation cannot reconcile intimacy with naturalistic self-representationalism. ## LLM Chats ## NotebookLM ## LLM Audio ## Highlights > Kriegel’s solution leads to the Intimacy Dilemma: either the self-representationalist accommodates intimacy by appealing to constituting representation; or they provide a naturalistic explanation of consciousness in terms of mental representation. But they cannot do both. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6g6rrpwzaqbhf8pgwyah5wv)) > Toward the end of the paper, I highlight some broader lessons that we can draw from the discussion. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fasdhh0qrnseqvbwt4d83e)) > “have the cake and eat it.” ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fay157ks7bbhajk5pgbm1p)) > The former is often referred to as qualitative character; the latter is often referred to as subjective character. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fb3bz09vnsg46z2b55hhvd)) > Subjective character is the feature in virtue of which the world-directed representation that constitutes qualitative character is somehow given to me, qua the subject of the experience. So, subjective character is not a matter of outer awareness, but of inner awareness—i.e., awareness of one’s own mental states. Such inner awareness is thought to be “special,” and it is often described as basic, non-introspective (i.e., non-reflective and involuntary), non-effortful, etc. At the heart of this picture is the idea that inner awareness, so understood, (henceforth, inner awareness simpliciter) is the consciousness-maker—that which makes a mental state conscious. Qualitative character, alone, thus, does not suffice for phenomenal character. For the latter to arise, qualitative character needs to be somehow “in the scope” of inner awareness. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fb5fssv880csydnjan7bc0)) > the runner-up ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fb86q6f8zdp1d4n0d7gtsn)) > Second, it can misrepresent the very existence of the conscious state. That is, it can tell me erroneously that I am, say, in a reddish state when in fact there is no such state. ([View Highlight](https://read.readwise.io/read/01k6fbdetje8rek9zj9cxh1b1v))