# [[engineering paper fullish draft]] 4 Jun 2025 # **[[engineering paper fullish draft]] 4 Jun 2025** ## [[Introduction Can]] we make sense of [[the idea]] of an aesthetics of engineering as separate from an aesthetics of design? Here, we argue that we can. Despite plenty of borderline cases, there are some objects which we would more naturally think of as engineered rather than just designed even if they have the same function: we are happy to call a wind up clock a product of engineering, but less so a sundial; similarly, ‘cars’ and ‘engineering’ go together in a way, that ‘sledge’ and ‘engineering’ do not. Two questions: Can [[the distinction between]] engineered and not engineered be made more robust? If it can, how could this feed into [[aesthetic appreciation]] of engineered vs. non-engineered artifacts? In the [[next section]] we will show how Lowe’s distinction between utensils and machines provides an answer to the first question, and then in the After that, we shall suggest that neither Carlson and Parson's [[Functional Beauty]] account of [[the aesthetics of design]], nor Forsey's Kant-inspired approach, how the [[aesthetic appreciation]] of machines might differ from the [[aesthetic appreciation]] of other [[designed objects]]. \- In Section 5, we suggest a way in which machines can be aesthetically appreciated... \[Note: Section number updated\] ## 1\. Utensils vs. Machines Lowe (2016) introduces a distinction between two types of artifact: utensils and machines. He defines utensils as artifacts that, by their own nature, do nothing; instead, they are configured to be suitable for human use (Lowe 2014, p. 24). As he states: > A table or a hammer, it seems, does nothing at all by its own very nature: it is only configured in a way that makes it apt for us to use, so that we can do something with it. In this case, we alone are the doers, not the table or hammer. (Lowe 2014, p. 24\) Consequently, for Lowe, utensils are not governed by any special, sortal-specific laws dictating their behaviour. This is beyond the general [[physical laws]] applicable to their constituent parts (Lowe 2014, p. 25). In contrast, Lowe characterises 'machines' as artefacts possessing an intrinsic principle of activity. These are governed by what he terms 'sortal-specific laws,' specifically [[engineering laws]], which are distinct from general [[physical laws]] (Lowe 2014, p. 24). He explains: > My answer is that the members of such machine kinds all seem to embody a distinctive unifying principle of activity which is constrained by sortal-specific laws. The laws in question are, moreover, distinctively laws of engineering, not mere laws of ‘natural science’ or ‘physics’, in the entirely indiscriminate sense in which the latter concern the behaviour of physical systems quite generally, at all scales of size and mass from that of fundamental particles upwards. (Lowe 2014, p. 24\) Machines are thus defined by their capacity for autonomous, law-governed operation. Lowe argues that this distinction is metaphysically significant. Because machines possess an internal principle of activity governed by engineering laws, they have a stronger claim to being ontologically robust, or 'real', than utensils. Utensils, he sees, are more passively dependent on human users and intentions (Lowe 2014, pp. 17, 25-26). While Lowe's overall argument is not our focus here, his way of differentiating two types of artifact is a promising starting point for an aesthetics of engineering. If machines seem to embody a unifying principle of activity, and utensils do not, then, potentially, this might allow for machines to be appreciated in a way that utensils cannot. Lowe acknowledges that the utensil-machine distinction may not always be sharp. He notes the existence of borderline cases but maintains this does not undermine the distinction's value. He states: > Of course, this then raises the question of how sharp the machine/utensil distinction can credibly be said to be. To which I reply that, while there may indeed be borderline cases, so too are there between living and nonliving things, and that we should not allow the existence of borderline cases to undermine our belief in real distinctions. (Lowe 2014, p. 26\) Lowe's analogy to living and non-living things is pertinent here. Just as we often aesthetically appreciate living organisms – for example, the form of a running animal – differently from non-living natural objects such as the structure of a crystal, the utensil/machine distinction might similarly ground distinct aesthetic approaches, despite its fuzzy edges. The conceptual separation can therefore remain a useful tool for analysing the aesthetic properties of designed objects. This claimed difference between utensils and machines suggests they might also be appreciated aesthetically in different ways. For example, we might aesthetically value a well-crafted knife – a utensil – for its balance and how effectively it extends our physical agency. In contrast, we might value a complex mechanical clock – a machine – for the ingenuity of its self-contained, law-governed movement, irrespective of our direct interaction with it. ## 2\. Existing Frameworks and the Distinctiveness of Machine Aesthetics Having established Lowe's distinction between utensils and machines – and thereby a more robust understanding of what constitutes a machine as an artefact possessing an internal principle of activity and governed by sortal-specific engineering laws – we can now examine whether existing prominent theories of functional aesthetics possess the resources to account for what might be aesthetically distinctive about machines, given these defining characteristics. This section will argue that neither Parsons and Carlson's Functional Beauty nor Forsey's Kant-inspired approach fully captures these machine-specific aesthetic dimensions. While these theories offer insights into how function broadly relates to aesthetic appreciation, they appear to lack the specificity required to fully articulate the unique aesthetic appreciation of machines *as machines*, particularly those qualities arising from their autonomous, law-governed internal operations. Consider first Parsons and Carlson's (2008) account of Functional Beauty. Core concepts such as an object ‘looking fit for function’ and the role of ‘knowledge of function’ in shaping perception can certainly be applied to machines. A machine’s static form, for instance, can suggest its intended purpose, and an understanding of its underlying engineering can inform its aesthetic appreciation. However, the limitation of this framework becomes apparent when attempting to isolate what is aesthetically specific to machines. For example, while criteria such as an object ‘looking fit for function’ or appearing ‘elegantly minimal’ can undoubtedly apply to a machine like a wind-up clock, they can equally apply to a utensil like a well-designed sundial. If both a clock and a sundial can ‘look fit’ for the purpose of time-telling or exhibit ‘elegance’ in their design, then these general aesthetic qualities alone do not explain the distinct aesthetic experience that might arise from the clock’s nature *as a machine*. This nature involves its autonomous, internally-driven mechanism, as opposed to the sundial’s passive reliance on external conditions. Functional Beauty, in its generality, describes functional aesthetic qualities that can be shared by various types of artefacts. It does not seem to isolate or give sufficient weight, however, to the aesthetic appreciation specifically tied to a machine’s internal principle of activity or its embodiment of engineering laws. The theory explains how function, broadly conceived, impacts aesthetics; it is less clear whether it can adequately differentiate the aesthetic appreciation of a machine, with its defining internal principle of activity, from that of a complex utensil where knowledge of function is also pertinent. The ‘specialness’ of the machine’s mode of being and operating – its autonomy and internal law-governed nature – might not be fully captured by a general theory of functional beauty. Similar difficulties arise when considering Forsey’s (2013) Kant-inspired approach to the aesthetics of design. On this view, aesthetic appreciation involves judging an object’s ‘perfection’ relative to its intended purpose, or its concept as a specific kind of artefact. This is pertinent to machines, as appreciating the successful realisation of a machine’s complex engineering design aligns with such an assessment. One can assess both a wind-up clock and a sundial based on their visual features to form an aesthetic judgement about their ‘perfection’ in fulfilling their function of time-telling. Forsey’s emphasis on ‘putting artefacts to the test’ to ascertain whether they work well, in contrast to a purely perceptual approach, also seems insufficient to differentiate the aesthetic appreciation of machines. Both a clock and a sundial can be ‘tested’ to determine their functional efficacy. However, the judgment of functional perfection that results does not, in itself, highlight aesthetic qualities that are unique to the clock *as a machine*. Such qualities might include, for instance, those related to the ingenuity of its internal mechanism or the character of its autonomous operation. The framework appears to assess functional success broadly, without necessarily isolating the aesthetic appreciation of the specific *mode* of that success when it comes to machines. The concern is that the aesthetic appreciation of a machine might involve more than judging its perfection against its concept. It might also involve appreciating the very *nature* of that concept as realised – that is, an autonomous, law-governed system – and the way this nature manifests aesthetically, particularly when the machine is in operation. In sum, it seems that both Functional Beauty and Forsey's Kantian approach, while providing valuable frameworks for understanding functional aesthetics in a general sense, may not possess the specific conceptual resources to isolate, fully explain, or give due weight to the aesthetic appreciation that is specifically tied to the defining characteristics of machines as identified by Lowe: theirautonomy, their internal principle of activity, and their governance by engineering laws. These theories can tell us how machines, considered as functional objects, might be aesthetically valued. They may not, however, fully explain how machines, *qua machines*, offer a distinct set of aesthetic experiences or qualities that derive directly from their unique mode of being and operating. This critique, therefore, establishes the necessity for the following section to propose a more specific account that does focus on these machine-specific aesthetic qualities, with the experience of seeing a machine working being central to appreciating these defining characteristics. ## 3\. The Perceptual Basis – Experiencing Causal Dynamics The account rests upon the following claim: that observers can perceptually experience the forces and causal interactions inherent in the functioning of such artefacts. Philosophical arguments for such ‘rich’ or ‘thick’ perceptual content, where perception is not confined to low-level sensory primitives like shape or colour, are reasonably mainstream in philosophy of perception. Susanna Siegel (2006; 2010), for instance, has argued that the content of visual experience can extend beyond such basic properties to include properties that are, in some sense, causal or relational, and even kind properties. Consider her well-known examples: one might visually perceive a knife *cutting* bread, not merely a knife and bread in successive, distinct states. Similarly, one might see a sleeping cat *weighing down* a hammock, experiencing the hammock’s deformation as a direct manifestation of the cat’s weight exerting a discernible force. In these instances, the causal interaction itself – the ‘cutting’, the ‘weighing down’ – appears to be part of the visual phenomenology, rather than an intellectual gloss added post-perceptually. Such philosophical positions are consistent with certain lines of empirical inquiry within cognitive science concerning human sensitivity to causal relations and physical interactions (cf. Michotte 1963; Ritchie et al. 2021). These suggest that if everyday events involving force and cause can be directly perceived, then the interactions within a working machine are also plausible subjects for similarly rich perceptual experience. When a machine operates, an observer is presented with interacting parts, energy transfer, and material responses. It is therefore plausible to argue that one perceives not merely shapes in motion. One might also perceive the ‘driving’ of one component by another, the ‘resistance’ of a part under load, the ‘transmission’ of force through a linkage, or the overall ‘causal efficacy’ of the machine’s components as they contribute to its function. The argument here does not entail that precise physical quantities, such as specific Newtons of force or joules of energy, are perceived in a scientific sense. Rather, the argument is that the causal roles played by different parts of the machine can be part of the content of the visual and auditory experience of the machine in action. Thus, there appears to be a defensible philosophical basis, with some convergent support from empirical studies, for the claim that causal dynamics and force interactions can be directly apprehended as part of the content of perception. These dynamics are pertinent to a machine's operation and to what Lowe (2014) describes as its ‘principle of activity’. This perceptual foundation is important. It allows the aesthetic appreciation of machines in operation, discussed in the next section, to be grounded in experiential qualities, rather than solely in intellectual understanding or post-perceptual judgement. ## 4\. The Aesthetic Potential of Perceived Causal Dynamics The preceding section argued for the perceptual availability of causal dynamics; that is, for the view that the experience of forces being marshalled, interactions occurring, and effects being produced can be part of the content of perception itself. Building upon this foundation, the present section explores how such perceived causal content can, on certain occasions, be aesthetically appreciated. The argument here is that the force-laden interactions and movements we perceive, both in skilled human actions and in the operation of machines, can possess distinct aesthetic qualities. This will involve drawing an analogy with the aesthetic appreciation of human skill, applying this to machines, and then noting a point of difference concerning the attribution of these aesthetic qualities. This difference then informs the positive account developed in the subsequent section. Consider, first, how we aesthetically appreciate expert actions. Our aesthetic appreciation is often directed not only at the outcome of such actions – a tennis ball landing in court, ingredients being perfectly sliced – but at the *way* in which the action is performed. This involves perceiving the interaction of forces: a tennis player’s timed application of force through the racket to the ball, or a chef’s controlled exertion of force through a knife. Qualities such as ‘grace’, ‘elegance’, ‘power’, ‘precision’, or ‘efficiency’ are frequently ascribed to these perceived causal events. The aesthetic appreciation, in these instances, seems tied to perceiving the causal efficacy and the masterful handling of forces integral to the action itself. A similar mode of aesthetic appreciation, we suggest, can be extended to the observation of machines in operation. If, as argued in Section 3, we can perceive the causal dynamics within a working machine, then it is plausible that we can also find aesthetic qualities in these perceived dynamics. One might perceive ‘grace’ in the smooth articulation of a robotic arm. One might perceive ‘elegance’ in the intricate and efficient interplay of gears within a clockwork mechanism. ‘Power’ might be perceived in the forceful action of an industrial stamping press, or ‘rhythm’ in the cyclical operation of an engine. These aesthetic qualities are not attributed to static forms alone. They are tied to the perceived movements, the interactions between components, and the perceived forces being generated, transmitted, or controlled by the machine as it functions. However, a point of difference arises when considering how such aesthetic qualities are typically attributed in the context of human action versus machine operation. When we admire the grace of an expert tennis shot, or a chef’s skilful knife work, this quality is usually ascribed to the human player or chef, or at least to the human-agent-plus-tool system as an extension of their agency. Indeed, concerning such utensils, Lowe (2014, p. 24\) notes, "In this case, we alone are the doers, not the table or hammer." The utensil itself is not the primary locus of the action's grace. This contrasts with machines, which, as established in Section 1, possess their own principle of activity, raising questions about how analogous aesthetic qualities are to be attributed to their autonomous operations. One might, of course, straightforwardly assert that the perceived movements of machines can indeed be experienced as graceful, elegant, or efficient. There is nothing inherently implausible about such direct attributions to the machine's workings themselves; this certainly represents one possible way to understand the aesthetic appreciation of machines. Yet, for some, this direct attribution of aesthetic qualities such as grace or elegance to an inanimate, non-agentive machine – while not untenable – might seem less satisfying or explanatorily complete when compared to cases involving human agency. In those cases, such qualities are often understood in relation to skill, intention, or expression. If one finds this direct attribution a somewhat unsatisfying resting point for an aesthetics of machines, it then motivates a search for a deeper or alternative grounding for these perceived aesthetic qualities. The subsequent section will propose such an alternative. This alternative reframes the object of aesthetic appreciation in a way that seeks to address this potential dissatisfaction and more fully account for the distinctive aesthetic experience of machines in operation. ## 5\. Engineering's Dance with Nature: A Positive Account of Machine Aesthetics This section presents the paper's core positive thesis. It directly addresses and aims to resolve the potential dissatisfaction, noted at the end of Section 4, concerning the attribution of aesthetic qualities to non-agentive machines. The central idea proposed here is that the aesthetic qualities perceived in a machine's operation – such as grace, efficiency, or power – are not to be attributed to a non-existent machine-agent, nor are they merely subjective projections. Instead, such qualities arise from, and are properly attributed to, the engineered mechanism's successful, harmonious, and often elegant interaction with the natural world, specifically with fundamental natural laws and forces. This perspective offers a distinct way to ground the aesthetics of engineering. Machines, as Lowe (2014) characterises them, operate according to ‘sortal-specific engineering laws’. It is important to recognise that these engineering laws are themselves specific applications or instantiations of more fundamental natural laws, such as the principles of mechanics, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, or fluid dynamics. Engineering design, at its core, involves a deep understanding and skilful utilisation of these natural laws and forces to achieve a predetermined purpose. A well-engineered machine, therefore, is one whose design and operation are in profound accord with these underlying physical principles. This relationship forms the basis for its aesthetic appreciation. The metaphor of a ‘dance with Nature’ may serve as an explanatory concept here. The aesthetic qualities perceived in a machine's operation – such as ‘grace’, ‘efficiency’, or ‘power’ – are qualities *of its interaction* with the physical world. For instance, ‘grace’ in a machine might be the seamless way its design allows it to operate in conformity with physical laws, as exemplified by an aerodynamic wing generating lift. ‘Efficiency’ might be the perceived optimal harnessing of energy, reflecting a design that navigates natural constraints. ‘Power’ then becomes the visible mastery of natural forces, channelled through the engineered system. This "dance" is orchestrated by human ingenuity embedded in the engineering design; the design itself is the "choreography" that enables the machine to engage with natural laws in this aesthetically appreciable way. The role of knowledge in appreciating this interaction can be illuminated by drawing an analogy with Allen Carlson’s (2000) ‘natural environmental model’ for the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Carlson argues that appreciating nature aesthetically requires appreciating it *as it is*, informed by scientific knowledge of ecology, geology, and so forth. Similarly, a deep aesthetic appreciation of a machine's "dance with nature" is significantly enhanced by, and often dependent on, knowledge of the relevant engineering principles and physical laws it employs. Such knowledge allows the observer to see beyond mere surface movements to the underlying principles being masterfully engaged. As Carlson suggests for nature, this "knowledge, essentially common-sense/scientific knowledge... \[makes\] raw experience... determinate, harmonious, and meaningful." Understanding the thermodynamic cycle of an engine, for example, transforms the perception of its operation from mere mechanical motion to an appreciation of a sophisticated energy conversion process. Carlson’s dictum that "appreciation must be centered on and driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself" is pertinent; for a machine, its "real nature" is its engineered capacity to interact with physical laws. This perspective allows us to understand the aesthetic appreciation of machines, in part, as a ‘disguised aesthetics of the environment’ or, more precisely, an aesthetics of nature’s laws made manifest. In aesthetically appreciating the machine's interaction with these fundamental forces and laws, we are, in a sense, aesthetically appreciating aspects of nature itself – its inherent order, power, and principles – as they are revealed and channelled by the human-made artefact. It is not an appreciation of pristine, untouched nature, but of nature as actively engaged, utilised, and rendered intelligible through the medium of engineering. The machine thus acts as a kind of lens or stage for the display of these natural principles, and this helps to ground the aesthetic value: the beauty is not just in the artefact, but in the successful and insightful way it relates to and operates within the fundamental framework of the natural world. This account thereby resolves the attribution problem noted earlier. The aesthetic qualities are not attributed to a fictional machine-agent. Instead, they are attributed to the *quality of the designed system's interaction with natural laws and forces*. The ‘grace’ is in the harmony of this interaction, an interaction made possible by human engineering. Consequently, the human designer's intelligence and skill are indirectly appreciated through the machine's successful "performance" in its engagement with nature. This entire aesthetic appreciation, it must be reiterated, is grounded in the perceptual experience of the machine's operational dynamics – we *see*, in the rich sense established in Section 3, the forces being marshalled, the laws being adhered to, and the resulting harmonious or powerful interaction that constitutes its "dance with nature." This "dance with nature" account, grounded in the perception of causal dynamics and informed by knowledge of engineering and physical principles, offers a robust and distinctive way to understand the unique aesthetic appeal of machines in operation. It forms the core of a specific aesthetics of engineering. ## 6\. Conclusion – Towards an Aesthetics of Engineering \[this needs to be rewritten\] * **Summary of Argument:** Briefly recap the paper's main line of reasoning: the utility of Lowe's distinction for differentiating artefacts; the limitations of existing functional aesthetic theories in fully accounting for the unique aspects of machines; the establishment of a perceptual basis for experiencing forces and causality in machine operation; the argument that these perceived dynamics can be aesthetic, leading to the disanalogy objection; and finally, the resolution through the "engineering's dance with nature" thesis, potentially enriched by Carlson's insights. * **Reiteration of Thesis:** Reaffirm that a significant and distinct component of the aesthetics of engineering lies in appreciating machines as they operate, grounded in a rich perceptual experience of their dynamic, forceful interaction with natural laws, an interaction orchestrated by human design and often best appreciated with relevant knowledge. * **Broader Implications:** * Suggest how this perspective enriches our understanding of human-artefact relationships, particularly with complex technology. * Highlight that engineering, often viewed primarily through a utilitarian lens, possesses a rich and specific aesthetic domain worthy of philosophical attention. * Briefly touch upon how this view contrasts with the "beauty in use" more characteristic of utensils (as a final differentiating point, if space allows, but keep the focus on machines). * **Concluding Thought:** Offer a final reflection on the nature of engineered beauty as revealed through the dynamic life of machines, perhaps emphasizing the unique interplay of human ingenuity, abstract principles, and concrete performance, made accessible through a perceptually rich engagement with their "dance with nature."