## New draft of section 4 of [[the beauty]] in use paper #beautyinuse #latestdraft ### [[Agentive Phenomenology]] and [[Intentional Structure]] In Section 3, we explored how Nguyen's concept of harmony of capacity, while illuminating for game aesthetics, has limited application to [[the aesthetics of design]]. While harmony of capacity is specific to games, Nguyen also considers a third kind of harmony, namely, "harmony of action," which he describes as the aesthetic quality arising from how well an individual's actions fit the demands of a situation. He illustrates this concept: > "When you time a jump just so in _Super Mario Brothers_; or when you figure out, during a rock climb, that you need to slide your hips over just enough to balance on that tiny nubbin of rock, you're experiencing [[more than]] the harmony of solution. You're experiencing your agency and action as fitting the demands of the environment." (Nguyen, p. 108) Earlier, he provides a different real-world example: > "A car swerves into my lane and I react smoothly, dodging perfectly. Afterward, I am struck by the gracefulness of my own instinctive response." (Nguyen, pp. 101–102) Unlike the harmony of capacity, Nguyen believes that harmonies of action can be experienced both in games and in the real world. If this is correct, then it seems we have found another way of explaining or understanding the sorts of agentive aesthetic experiences that [[designed objects]] may elicit. Your car might make you experience yourself as gracefully swerving around an obstacle; my experience might be less of gracefulness and more of clumsiness or a lack of control. However, there is a crucial difference here. While it is reasonable to think that something like the harmony of action factors into both real-life and in-game interactions, the way in which actions fit the environment differs significantly between the two. In games like _Super Mario Brothers_, fitting the environment involves performing actions that align with the game's predefined rules and objectives. The environment is controlled and designed with clear challenges and rewards. Timing a jump perfectly to overcome an obstacle fits precisely within the game's immediate demands and offers instant feedback. In contrast, in real-life situations such as swerving a car to avoid an obstacle, 'fitting the environment' encompasses a broader and more complex set of factors. The environment is unpredictable and multifaceted, involving physical conditions, other drivers' behaviours, legal considerations, and personal safety concerns. Successfully navigating such a situation requires quick judgment and actions that fit into a larger context of societal norms and personal well-being. These differences in what counts as fitting the environment are reflected in our [[agentive phenomenology]]—that is, in the way we experience ourselves as agents acting in the world. Horgan identifies several facets of [[agentive phenomenology]]: **self as source**, **optionality**, **purposiveness**, and **means-ends teleology**. These are elements of our phenomenological experience that contribute to how we perceive our actions and their fittingness within the environment. For example, when someone decides to pick up a glass of water: - **Self as Source**: They experience themselves as the initiator of the action. - **Optionality**: They feel they could choose to pick up the glass or not. - **Purposiveness**: The action is done with the purpose of quenching thirst. - **Means-Ends Teleology**: Grasping the glass is a means to the end of drinking water. Crucially, these aspects of [[agentive phenomenology]] are [[not just]] abstract concepts but are integral to our lived experience—they are elements of phenomenology. However, the way these aspects appear in our [[conscious experience]] can differ between real-life and game situations. To understand how these differences manifest, we can turn to Horgan's notion of **[[chromatic illumination]]**. Although Horgan originally introduces [[chromatic illumination]] as one more aspect of [[agentive phenomenology]], it can be better understood as a way of explaining how the [[other aspects]] of agency appear in conscious experience. Chromatic illumination refers to the conscious appreciation of background information and its holistic relevance to a cognitive task, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. This concept captures how unrepresented information can shape conscious experience, affecting our perceptions and actions without being explicitly "before the mind." Horgan is explicit about "purposes" being chromatically illuminated in agentive experience. He states: > "Often, many of the purposes informing one's actions affect the character of one's agentive experience by being implicitly appreciated consciously without actually being represented in consciousness. These purposes are phenomenologically operative as reasons for one's actions, coloring the specific character of one's agentive experience without being overtly 'before the mind.'" (Horgan, p. 265) Similarly, aspects like means-ends teleology, self as source, and optionality can be understood as being chromatically illuminated. When we act, we typically have a sense not only of our immediate goals but also of the broader context, possibilities, and reasons for our actions. These elements may not be explicitly represented in our conscious thought, but they inform and color our experience. In real-life actions, the web of purposes, means-ends relationships, and options is typically much richer and more complex than in games. Our actions are often embedded in multi-layered intentional structures, encompassing immediate objectives, long-term goals, social norms, and personal values. For instance, swerving to avoid an obstacle not only serves the immediate purpose of preventing an accident but is also connected to broader concerns like personal safety, legal responsibilities, and the well-being of others. These layers of meaning and purpose are chromatically illuminated in our experience, contributing to a rich phenomenological texture. In contrast, game actions usually occur within more constrained intentional frameworks. The purposes, options, and means-ends relationships in games are often more limited and clearly defined by the game's rules and objectives. While still engaging, the intentional structure is less complex, and the chromatic illumination is correspondingly narrower. The game's environment is framed and bounded, creating a "magic circle" that distinguishes play from ordinary life—a concept introduced by Huizinga (1955). Within this magic circle, actions are self-contained, and their meanings are confined to the game's context. These differences in the richness and complexity of chromatic illumination lead to variations in our agentive phenomenology between real-life and game situations. In real life, the chromatic illumination of our actions encompasses a broader array of purposes and meanings, contributing to a more nuanced and layered experience of agency. In games, the chromatic illumination is more focused, aligning with the game's specific goals and rules. Understanding how chromatic illumination shapes our experience of the other aspects of agency—self as source, optionality, purposiveness, and means-ends teleology—enhances our appreciation of design aesthetics. Well-designed objects facilitate pleasing experiences not just through their visual or tactile properties but by enabling us to act in ways that harmoniously fit the complex demands of our real-world environment. They allow our actions to be chromatically illuminated by rich backgrounds of purpose and meaning, contributing to an aesthetically satisfying user experience. This deeper, more contextually embedded form of aesthetic appreciation sets design apart from games and other more constrained forms of aesthetic experience. The continuity with the real world, as opposed to the framed nature of games, means that design aesthetics can tap into the richness of our everyday experiences—a theme we have developed throughout this paper. Ultimately, the notion of chromatic illumination enables us to phenomenologically interpret Evnine’s (2016) hylomorphic account of actions as constituted by an intentional form impressed onto a matter that consists of bodily movements. Relying on Kriegel’s (2015) “conative phenomenology,” one might add that actions impress the phenomenological form of “deciding-cum-trying” onto bodily movements. We can further characterize the action’s phenomenological form through Horgan’s notion of chromatic illumination, just as we can characterize the action’s phenomenological matter in terms of proprioception (including kinaesthesia) by appealing to Montero’s aesthetics of dance. Moreover, if we want to make room for the sort of mental actions that are crucial to aesthetic appreciation of games such as chess and of artifacts such as timetables, we must consider actions that have an intentional form involving chromatic illumination but whose matter does not consist of bodily movements but rather of changes in the content of the relevant mental states. This expands our understanding of how designed objects can facilitate not just physical interactions but also cognitive engagements that are rich in phenomenological content. To conclude, the aesthetics of design can fruitfully be compared to both the aesthetics of dance and the aesthetics of games. Aesthetically appreciating design is, in this sense, a sort of playing with or dancing with a technical artifact. Yet, the aesthetics of design differs from the aesthetics of dance since the former may also consist of mental actions while the latter is based on bodily movements. Technical artifacts are closer to games than dance in this respect since the aesthetic appreciation of them both can be centered on actions whose hylomorphic matter consists of changes in mental content rather than bodily movements. However, the aesthetics of design differs from the aesthetics of games in virtue of the depth and complexity of its chromatically illuminated form. Games are similar to dance in this respect since they both involve framed actions. Design, instead, leads us to aesthetically appreciate actions intertwined with our life. By recognizing that differences in the experience of "fitting the demands of the environment" are realized in the phenomenological aspects of means-ends teleology and purposiveness, and understanding how chromatic illumination enriches these experiences, we can better appreciate the unique aesthetic qualities that well-designed objects bring to our everyday experiences and the profound ways in which they shape and enhance our interactions with the world.