# Slides ## Slide 1 - **Title:** The Metaphysical Puzzle of Artifact Kinds - **[[Key Question]]:** What grounds the existence and identity conditions of artifacts and artifact kinds? - Artifact kinds (e.g. ships, computers) seem to lack clear identity criteria. - Threatens their objective reality - are they "really real"? ## Slide 2 - **Title:** Contrast with Natural Kinds - Natural kinds (e.g. tiger, mountain) seem to have objective identity criteria. - Governed by [[natural laws]] specific to the kind. - Laws specify generation, development, destruction of kind instances. - "There are laws governing the persistence of monkeys, telling us how they are generated, develop, and ultimately die." ## Slide 3 - **Title:** Artifacts and Mind-Dependence - Artifacts seem to be mind-dependent in a way natural kinds are not. - Depend on intentional human "artificers and utilizers." - But only causally mind-dependent, not constitutively. - "An artefact could survive the demise of all intelligent life, but no artefact could come into existence without intelligent life existing." - **Discussion Q:** How might causal mind-dependence still threaten the objectivity of artifacts? ## Slide 4 - **Title:** Against "Conceptualist Realism" About Kinds - View that Ks exist iff we have a coherent, satisfied concept of Ks. - This leads to a regress or global anti-realism: - Satisfying a concept presupposes determinate identity facts. - So it can't explain identity facts without circularity or regress. - "But that presupposes that the things in question have existence and identity conditions too, which need to be explained and grounded in turn." ## Slide 5 - **Title:** Problems with Persistence Conditions for Artifacts - Artifacts of one kind seem easily changeable into another. - Example: A table morphing into a chair or stool. - Does it cease to be a table, or become both at once? - "Can a table 'morph' into a chair? It seems so – in fact, it can do so very easily." - **Discussion Q:** To what extent does this problem generalize to all [[material objects]]? ## Slide 6 - **Title:** Failures of Sortal Essentialism for Artifacts - Even denying artifacts have essential kinds doesn't help much. - Living things retain identity through "sameness of individual life." - But no clear, uniform cross-kind identity criterion for artifacts. - "It is far from clear that there is any single comparable equivalence relation that can be appealed to in the case of all individual artefacts." ## Slide 7 - **Title:** A Special Case: Machines - Some artifact kinds, machines, seem to avoid the identity problems. - E.g. engines, clocks. - Machines embody a "distinctive unifying principle of activity." - This activity governed by objective "[[engineering laws]]." - **Discussion Q:** What is [[the key difference]] between machines and other artifacts like tables? ## Slide 8 - **Title:** The Martian Thought Experiment - Imagine a Martian discovering a machine after humans are gone. - The Martian could recognize its inherent functional nature. - "A Martian, visiting Earth after all human life had been extinguished, could surely recognize in a working piston engine an object that does something, by its own very nature." - In contrast, a table or hammer would be a mere inert object to the Martian. ## Slide 9 - **Title:** Machines vs [[Mere Instruments]] - Machines seem to be "subjects of" special [[engineering laws]]. - Tables, hammers are merely "subject to" general [[physical laws]]. - Machines have a real "nature" and principle of activity. - Instruments are merely structured for our use - they "do nothing at all by their own very nature." - **Discussion Q:** Is this a clear and defensible distinction? ## Slide 10 - **Title:** Breakdowns and Malfunctions - Further evidence that machines have a genuine functional nature: - We can sensibly discuss machines and their parts malfunctioning. - I.e. failing to fulfill their proper role in [[the machine]]'s overall functioning. - "Thus, just as organisms can suffer from diseases, so machines can suffer from breakdowns." - Not so for a merely broken instrument. ## Slide 11 - **Title:** The Fuzzy Line Between Machines and Instruments - Admittedly, there may be borderline cases. - As with living vs. non-living things. - But this doesn't undermine a real distinction in the clear cases. - "We should not allow the existence of borderline cases to undermine our belief in real distinctions." ## Slide 12 - **Title:** Lowe's Moderate Realism About Artifact Kinds - Some artifact kinds (machines) are plausibly real and objective. - In virtue of having genuine, law-governed natures. - But not all - many are just mind-dependent human classifications. - "The metaphysics of artifacts is a subtle domain mixing realist and anti-realist elements." - An important test case for general theories in metaphysics. # [[Speaker Notes]] ## Slide 1 - **Lowe is probing the metaphysical status of artifacts and artifact kinds:** - What makes it the case that an artifact exists, persists, and is the very artifact it is? - In virtue of what are two artifacts the same or different? - Many familiar artifact kinds (ships, computers, tables) seem to lack firm identity criteria: - When does an arrangement of parts become or cease to be a ship or table? How much can one change while remaining the same ship or table? - This calls into question whether artifacts enjoy a mind-independent, objective existence: - Perhaps they are just subjective human classifications, not objective features of reality? - Quine's famous dictum: "No entity without identity" - indeterminate identity threatens real existence. - Investigating artifacts is important for applying and testing general theories in metaphysics: - Theories of objects, persistence, essence, kinds, mind-dependence, etc. - Artifacts are ubiquitous in human environments, so their status has major practical implications. ## Slide 2 - **Natural kinds like biological species and geological formations seem to differ from artifacts:** - Their instances seem to have objective, mind-independent identity criteria. - Plausibly grounded in the [[natural laws]] governing the generation, development, and destruction of kind members. - E.g., there are specific biological laws defining monkey life cycles and identity conditions: - When a new monkey comes into existence, how it develops [[over time]], when it ceases to exist. - These aren't just arbitrary human classifications - they track real, independent features of monkey nature. - So the identity of natural kind instances isn't just "up to us" in the way artifact identity might be: - We can't decide by fiat or convention when a new tiger comes into existence or ceases to exist. - This is determined by objective, empirical, species-specific biological laws and processes. - The contrast with the seeming flexibility and mind-dependence of artifact identity is striking: - There don't seem to be artifact-kind-specific laws dictating table or ship identity conditions. - Their identity boundaries seem much more dependent on shifting human concepts and practices. - So natural kinds provide an illuminating contrast case in considering the metaphysics of artifact kinds. ## Slide 3 - **A key apparent difference between artifacts and natural kinds is mind-dependence:** - Artifact kinds seem to constitutively depend on human concepts, intentions, and practices. - Their existence and identity conditions make essential reference to human "artificers and utilizers." - After all, ships and computers are human inventions, not independent, natural parts of the world: - We created them to serve our purposes, and defined what counts as a ship or computer. - Their identity seems intimately tied to our shifting conceptual schemes and conventions. - However, Lowe argues that on closer examination, the mind-dependence of artifacts is more nuanced: - They are clearly causally mind-dependent, but not necessarily constitutively so. - I.e., they counterfactually depend on minded beings to bring them into existence. - But once in existence, they might be able to persist in the absence of any minds. - Consider a world where all intelligent life is wiped out, but the artifacts remain: - The human-created artifacts would still seem to be there, even without us around. - The pyramids, if they outlasted us, would still be pyramids - that doesn't require our active conception. - So perhaps artifacts have a kind of hybrid status: - Their existence counterfactually depends on minded artificers, but not their continued identity. - They are created by, but not constituted by, human [[intentional states]] and practices. - This opens up some space for a moderate realism about artifacts, navigating between two extremes: - A strong anti-realism on which they're purely mind-dependent fictions. - A simple realism ignoring their close connection to human interests and conventions. ## Slide 4 - **Lowe critiques a view he calls "conceptualist realism" about kinds:** - On [[this view]], to be a real kind just is to be the referent of a coherent, satisfied concept we possess. - E.g., 'computer' refers to a real kind iff we have a coherent concept of computers that some actual entities fall under. - The view is realist in holding that our concepts can genuinely carve nature at its joints: - When our concepts are satisfied, they successfully track real, mind-independent kinds. - But it makes the existence of kinds constitutively dependent on our conceptual schemes: - Kinds are only real insofar as they answer to our current concepts. - Whereas a stronger realism would allow for real kinds that outrun our concepts or that we fail to recognize. - Lowe's key objection is that conceptualist realism leads to a problematic regress or anti-realism: - For our concepts to be "satisfied by the world", there must be determinate facts about the identity of entities. - I.e., there must already be a fact of the matter about whether a given entity falls under a concept. - But then these prior identity facts can't themselves be grounded in our concepts without circularity. - So conceptualist realism can't provide a complete, non-circular metaphysical explanation of identity. - The regress worry is that it keeps deferring [[the question]] of identity conditions: - If we try to explain the identity of Xs in terms of the identity of Ys, and Ys in terms of Zs, etc. - Without an end to the chain, no real explanatory ground of identity facts is ever reached. - The other horn is an anti-realist one: - To end the regress, one might hold that identity facts "bottom out" in a conceptual scheme. - So there are no scheme-independent facts about what entities exist or their identity conditions. - This is, in effect, a kind of anti-realist "conceptual relativity" about ontology. - So Lowe contends that conceptualist realism is an unstable position: - It keeps deferring the question of identity conditions, never reaching an explanatory ground. - Or it collapses into an anti-realism that gives up on mind-independent ontological facts. - A modest mind-dependence may be acceptable, but one that still allows for objective, conceptually-invariant identity facts. ## Slide 5 - **Lowe highlights how radically flexible the persistence conditions of artifacts can seem:** - Compared to the more stable persistence conditions of natural kinds governed by kind-specific laws. - Consider how easily a table could be transformed into a chair or stool: - Just by changing how the very same parts are arranged and used. - There's no clear, objective, table-specific law dictating when an arrangement of parts is or ceases to be a table. - And the change seems to be largely a matter of shifting human purposes and conventions: - In effect, we can decide by fiat to turn a table into a chair or stool just by resolving to use it that way. - Whereas no perceptual or intentional change in us could turn a tiger into a different animal. - At the extreme, it can even seem indeterminate or ambiguous whether the table persists or is replaced: - Has the original table merely morphed into a chair, or has it ceased to exist and been replaced by a new chair? - Whereas there's arguably always a determinate fact about whether a given tiger continues to exist. - These cases suggest that artifact identity is much more dependent on vague, shifting human norms: - Rather than being an objective, mind-independent matter governed by stable artifact laws. - This threatens the idea that artifact kinds mark out genuine, human-independent ontological joints. ## Slide 6 - **Even giving up on artifacts having essential kinds doesn't fully resolve the identity problems:** - One might think artifacts can fluidly change their kinds while still determinately persisting. - Then the problems would only undermine artifact kinds, not the reality of individual artifacts. - But Lowe argues this is much more plausible for living things than artifacts: - There's a single, clear cross-species identity condition for organisms: sameness of biological life. - If an organism of one species could in principle metamorphosize into another species, - There would still arguably be a determinate fact about whether the same individual life persists. - But in the case of artifacts, we don't seem to have any clear identity principle that holds across kinds: - No obvious analogue of "same ongoing life" to ground sameness of artifacts across radical transformations. - Is there any clear fact about whether a specific table later becomes a particular chair? - Threatens a robust realism even about individual artifact persistence, not just artifact kinds. - So giving up on sortal essentialism for artifacts (i.e., denying they have essential kinds): - Doesn't give artifact realists the same resources as it does in the case of organisms. - Since artifacts don't seem to have a clear "bare particular" identity independently of their kinds. ## Slide 7 - **Despite the problems so far, Lowe thinks some artifact kinds, machines, are plausibly real:** - Machines like engines and clocks have a special metaphysical status among artifacts. - The key idea is that machines embody an objective "unifying principle of activity": - I.e., an inherent, stable tendency to behave in certain ways and perform certain functions. - This principle governs and explains the coordinated workings of the machine's parts: - And crucially, this principle is not just a human projection, but is grounded in objective laws. - Distinctively "engineering laws" that specify how the machine and its components behave: - These are a subset of natural laws, just ones specifically concerning functional artifacts. - So what unifies and identifies a machine is this law-governed principle, not just human intentions: - The principle is certainly the result of human design, but not merely "in the eye of the beholder." - It's an objective, mind-independent feature of a machine once it's up and running. - This contrasts with other artifacts like tables that seem to lack any comparable inherent principle: - The unity and identity of a table just seems to be a matter of our deciding to assign it a certain function. - But the table itself has no deeper, stable, law-governed tendency to behave in any particular way. ## Slide 8 - **Lowe invites us to imagine a Martian anthropologist studying human artifacts after our extinction:** - The idea is to separate artifacts' objective natures from our projections and classifications. - In the case of a machine like an engine, the Martian could recognize its inherent functional nature: - The Martian would see that the parts operate in a coordinated way to perform a clear function. - And that this functioning obeys certain regular, non-accidental principles (engineering laws). - So the Martian could grasp the machine's essential nature without knowing what we used it for. - But a simple tool like a hammer would present a very different picture: - The Martian would just see an inert hunk of wood and metal, with no evident inherent function. - The hammer's status as a hammer depends entirely on our using it that way, not any inner principle. - So the Martian could not recognize the artifact's kind or identity independently of grasping our intentions. - The thought experiment aims to show that machines, but not instruments, have objective functional essences: - These essences are grounded in inherent engineering principles, not just external human categorization. - And this suggests that at least some artifacts (machines) are genuinely real, objective kinds. ## Slide 9 - **The key contrast is between being "subject to" laws and being "subjects of" laws:** - Mere instruments like tables and hammers are just passively subject to general physical laws. - How a hammer falls when dropped is explained by gravity, mass, air resistance, etc. - But there are no hammer-specific laws governing its behavior qua hammer. - Machines, by contrast, seem to be subjects of special engineering laws: - Laws that specify how that kind of machine characteristically functions. - The laws governing an engine are not just the general laws governing its physical components. - But laws proprietary to that type of engine and its special functional organization. - Another way to put it: instruments don't seem to have real "natures", machines do: - Instruments only have a principle of unity and characteristic functioning relative to our classifications. - But machines have inherent, law-governed principles of activity independently of what we call them. - In this sense, machines have intrinsic functional essences, instruments only have extrinsic/relational ones. - We might say machines are "artifacts with natures" whereas instruments are "mere artifacts": - Both are mind-dependent in originating from human design and intention. - But machines then take on a certain objective, mind-independent functional character. - Whereas instruments remain metaphysically dependent on us throughout. - So Lowe is proposing a major division within artifacts, not just a difference of degree: - Some (machines) have genuinely real kind-essences, others (instruments) are just human projections. - This supports a form of moderate realism, on which some but not all artifacts are truly real. ## Slide 10 - **Lowe offers another consideration favoring the machine/instrument distinction:** - We can meaningfully speak of machines and their components malfunctioning, not just breaking. - Malfunctioning involves failing to perform an intended function or role within a larger system. - It's more than just being physically broken - it's being functionally defective. - Consider a carburetor that is physically intact but isn't mixing fuel and air properly: - It's malfunctioning in the sense of not fulfilling its proper functional role in the engine. - This functional role is specified by objective engineering principles, not just human whims. - But it seems strained at best to say that a hammer's handle is "malfunctioning": - If the handle is broken off, we'd say the hammer is broken, not malfunctioning. - Since a hammer has no deep, objective functional nature, only a superficial human-assigned one. - The idea of malfunctioning seems to presuppose an inherent proper functioning: - And this in turn points to an intrinsic, objective functional nature. - The nature is still the product of human design, but is not constituted by human recognitions. - It's a mind-independent functional reality, as shown by the possibility of unrecognized malfunctioning. - Lowe sees this as analogous to the way organisms can objectively malfunction (be diseased): - Biological malfunctions point to an underlying objective, mind-independent biological nature. - Similarly, mechanical malfunctions point to an underlying real, mind-independent mechanical nature. - So the malfunction argument aims to show that machines have deeper objective natures than instruments: - These natures ground real kind-identities and support realism about at least some artifact kinds. ## Slide 11 - **Lowe acknowledges a potential weakness in his proposed machine/instrument distinction:** - There are likely to be unclear, in-between cases that don't neatly fit either category. - Not every artifact kind will be determinately either a machine kind or an instrument kind. - The boundary between the two categories is likely to be vague and contestable. - But he thinks this is not necessarily a threat to a robust distinction between clear cases: - Most important metaphysical distinctions involve some degree of vagueness. - E.g., the living/non-living divide is not perfectly sharp, but still marks an objective difference. - As long as there are paradigm cases on either side, borderline cases needn't undermine the distinction. - The point is not that there's a clear-cut mechanical test for sorting artifacts into two neat boxes: - But that the machine and instrument concepts point to very different metaphysical profiles. - One involving greater objectivity, mind-independence, and intrinsicness than the other. - Even if these come in degrees and involve unclear intermediate cases. - Additionally, vagueness may be more epistemological than metaphysical: - I.e., the indeterminacy may be in our concepts and knowledge rather than objective reality. - There could still be a precise fact about whether something has a genuine functional nature. - Even if it's not always evident to us where the line falls in hard cases. - So the fact that knives, say, seem to fall somewhere in between pure instruments and machines: - Doesn't necessarily undermine the idea that some artifacts have objective natures and some don't. - As long as the great differences between clear cases like hammers and engines remain. ## Slide 12 - **In summary, Lowe is advocating a moderate, selective realism about artifact kinds:** - Some artifact kinds, especially machines, seem to have real, objective essences and natures. - They embody mind-independent functional principles that ground their kind-identities. - So a realist view of these artifact kinds and their instances is justified. - But not all artifact kinds share this status - many are just relational, mind-dependent categories: - Their unity and persistence depends entirely on our shifting practices and intentions. - So an anti-realist view of these kinds, like mere instruments, is more appropriate. - On this view, artifacts are not metaphysically uniform, but a "mixed domain" of reals and non-reals: - This diversity results from artifacts' complex relations to human minds and practices. - Some achieve a genuine objectivity, but others remain entirely mind-dependent. - Appreciating these nuances is crucial for a clear view of the metaphysics of artifacts. - More broadly, artifacts provide a rich test case for applying general theories in metaphysics: - Theories of objecthood, persistence, essence, realness, mind-dependence, etc. - The complex middle ground artifacts occupy puts pressure on simplistic metaphysical frameworks. - Challenges us to recognize intermediate degrees of objectivity and mind-independence. - Artifacts are also of great practical and ethical significance in human life: - So getting clear on their metaphysical status is not just an abstract intellectual exercise. - But important for understanding the status of the artificial entities that shape our lives. - Further questions: how far can the machine/instrument distinction be extended beyond artifacts? - Are there other "functional object kinds" akin to machines outside the realm of human-made objects? - How much can we generalize Lowe's "moderate realism" to other philosophically contested domains?