# Slides ## Introduction - Artifacts are a fundamental part of [[human culture]] - Many artifacts are variations or modifications of existing ones - However, some artifacts are genuinely novel, lacking clear precedents ## The Phenomenon of Novel Artifacts - Novel artifacts are original creations, [[not just]] iterations on established designs - They may represent new solutions to old problems or address entirely new needs - Examples of novel artifacts throughout history: - The wheel, the printing press, the light bulb, the smartphone > "We can all think of paradigmatic examples of innovations, outcomes of intentional creation that lack recognized lineages, such as the light bulb, the electric motor, or the microchip." Discussion question: What are some more recent examples of novel artifacts? ## The Metaphysical Significance of Novel Artifacts - Novel artifacts raise important questions about [[the nature]] of artifacts in general - They challenge theories of artifact kinds and identity conditions - Understanding how novel artifacts come into existence can shed light on human innovation > "A complete and plausible philosophical theory of artifacts and artifact kinds cannot ignore this fact of [[human culture]]." ## The Creation Requirement - The Creation Requirement (CR): theories of artifacts must account for the ontological nature of genuinely novel artifacts resulting from creation - Novel artifacts mark the beginning of new artifact kinds - CR poses a challenge: how to determine identity conditions without reference to existing kinds? Discussion question: Why is the Creation Requirement a significant issue for theories of artifacts? ## Functional Theories of Artifact Kinds - One approach: define artifact kinds by shared function - [[Proper function]] is determined by the causal history of successful use - This potentially allows for novel artifacts through the introduction of new functions > "Functional theories assert that sameness of function is the relevant criterion for kind membership. [[Artifactual kinds]] are primarily functional kinds, and, thus, the creation of a new artifact entails the creation of a new functional kind." ## Strengths of Functional Theories - Function is often a key factor in artifact categorization and use - Many artifacts are designed and created to serve specific functions - Shared function can explain similarities between artifacts across time and cultures Discussion question: Can you think of examples where function seems to be the primary defining feature of an artifact kind? ## Limitations of Functional Theories for Novel Artifacts - It is difficult to assign a [[proper function]] to an artifact with no prior history of use - Distinguishing [[proper function]] from accidental function requires an established pattern of [[use over time]] - Some artifacts, like works of art, may not be primarily functional at all > "It becomes very difficult to attribute a [[proper function]] to new artifacts, the first members of a new artifactual kind, because this attribution must depend on a causal and reproductive history." ## Intentional Theories of Artifacts - An alternative approach: define artifact kinds by the intentions of their creators - On [[this view]], novel artifacts can be explained by novel intended functions - [[The unity]] of an artifact kind comes from the shared creative intention behind it > "What confers unity to the members of an artifactual kind? The answer is: the intention under which they have been produced." Discussion question: How might focusing on intentions help to address the limitations of purely functional accounts? ## [[The Role]] of Concepts in Intentional Theories - Intentional theories often hold that the creator of an artifact must have a concept or "description" of the artifact they intend to create - This concept guides the production process and determines the essential properties of the artifact - Without a sufficient concept, it is unclear whether the creator's intentions can establish a new artifact kind > "The emergence of a new artifact depends on the possession of a new concept of that artifact, a concept that guides the production of that sort of object." ## Challenges for Intentional Theories - Can creators really have complete concepts of novel artifacts prior to their existence? - Mere ideas of possible artifacts may not be sufficient to establish new kinds - There is a distinction between an idea of an artifactual possibility and a sortal concept that picks out essential properties - Intentions can fail to match up with the actual results of the creation process > "If this is so, then the intentional theorist faces a further dilemma: either she has to excessively weaken the conditions for possessing a concept of an artifact or she needs to concede that the constitution of the newly created kind cannot depend completely and effectively on [[the concept]]." Discussion question: How might intentional theorists respond to these challenges? ## Alternative Approaches: Hybrid Theories - Some theorists propose combining functional and intentional elements - For example, the "pluralistic approach" of [[Beth Preston]]: - Artifacts have both "proper functions" (based on causal history) and "system functions" (based on capacities) - Novel artifacts arise through a process of "exaptation" - acquiring new system functions which then stabilize into proper functions - This aims to capture the interplay of intentions, functions, and actual use in artifact evolution ## Problems for Hybrid Theories - Hybrid theories still face the "novelty problem" to some extent - If novel artifact kinds are established by intentions, this undercuts a purely historical theory of proper functions - But if intentions aren't sufficient, then we still lack an account of how novel artifacts gain their identity conditions Discussion question: Can hybrid approaches fully resolve the tensions between functional and intentional theories? ## Conclusions and Open Questions - Both functional and intentional theories face challenges in accounting for novel artifacts - Further work is needed to clarify the respective roles of intentions, concepts, functions, and histories in artifact metaphysics - The key question remains: what ultimately determines kind membership for novel artifacts? > "We claim that there is a clear-cut distinction between mere ideas of possible artifacts and those sortal concepts of artifacts that are needed to delineate a kind." - Answering this question may require new metaphysical frameworks beyond the current options - In the meantime, the phenomenon of novel artifacts remains a fruitful area for further research and debate # Speaker's Notes ## Introduction - Artifacts are objects made by humans to serve particular purposes - They are a ubiquitous and essential part of our lives and cultures - Studying artifacts can reveal insights about human cognition, values, and societies - While many artifacts are variations on established kinds, some are genuinely novel - These are artifacts that lack clear precedents or close relatives among existing kinds - Novel artifacts pose unique challenges for metaphysical theories about the nature and identity conditions of artifacts ## The Phenomenon of Novel Artifacts - Novelty in artifacts can be understood as a matter of degree - Some artifacts are only "relatively novel" - they belong to existing kinds but have been significantly modified or adapted - Other artifacts are "genuinely novel" - they represent substantially new kinds with few if any similarities to prior artifacts - Genuine novelty in artifacts is an important phenomenon for theories of artifacts to explain - It represents a key aspect of human creativity and innovation - Novel artifacts demonstrate the open-ended nature of artifactual possibilities - Examples of genuinely novel artifacts might include: - The first telescopes and microscopes, which extended human vision beyond prior limits - The first sound recording and playback devices, which transformed our relationship to audio information - The first programmable computers, which opened up vast new realms of information processing - Students can likely generate many other compelling examples from both history and their own lifetimes - Encouraging them to do so can make the abstract issue of artifact novelty more vivid and engaging ## The Metaphysical Significance of Novel Artifacts - At first glance, novel artifacts may seem primarily of practical or historical interest rather than metaphysical significance - But in fact, novel artifacts raise deep questions about the nature and identity of artifacts in general - The appearance of a genuinely novel artifact seems to mark the creation of a new artifact kind - This challenges theories to account for how artifact kinds come into being and what unifies their members - It also raises questions about the persistence conditions of artifacts over time - Can the first member of a kind be considered the "same" artifact as much later instances, and in what sense? - So while they may initially seem to be outliers, novel artifacts are actually central test cases for metaphysical theories of artifacts - Confronting novel artifacts requires theories to get clear on their core commitments about the nature of artifacts and artifact kinds ## The Creation Requirement - The Creation Requirement is a proposed constraint on theories of artifacts originally put forward by Marzia Soavi (2009) - It holds that any adequate theory must be able to account for the metaphysical status of genuinely novel artifacts resulting from acts of creation - The basic idea is that when we create something genuinely new, we also establish a new artifact kind in our ontology - And our theory of artifacts should be able to explain how this is possible - The Creation Requirement poses a challenge because it precludes certain ways of analyzing artifacts solely in terms of pre-existing kinds or templates - For example, a theory that held artifact identity to be entirely determined by resemblance to prior artifact kinds would fail to meet the requirement - Since genuinely novel artifacts by definition lack suitable prior kinds to establish their identity - The requirement thus constrains ontological theories of artifacts, but leaves open what positive account of novel artifacts should be given - As we'll see, both functional and intentional theories face some difficulties in fully satisfying the requirement ## Functional Theories of Artifact Kinds - Functional theories of artifacts are a major approach that analyzes artifact kinds in terms of the functions they serve - The core idea is that what unifies the members of an artifact kind is a shared function - For example, the kind "chair" would be defined by the function of supporting a seated human - Functional theories often cash this out in terms of "proper functions" - functions established by a history of successful use for a given purpose - This helps to distinguish between the intended function of an artifact and other capacities it might accidentally have - A key advantage of functional theories is that they can explain the intuitive functional basis of many artifact categorizations - In ordinary life, we do tend to group tools, vehicles, furniture, etc. by what they are typically used for - Functional theories can also draw illuminating parallels with analyses of biological functions - Just as the "proper function" of a bodily organ is often taken to be the activity it was selected for in evolutionary history - So the proper function of an artifact is the use for which it was selected or reproduced by intentional agents - So functional theories offer a prima facie promising approach to accounting for artifact kinds, and one that links artifacts to broader issues about function and selection in philosophy of science ## Strengths of Functional Theories - In addition to their intuitive appeal and links to wider issues, functional theories have some more specific strengths - One is that they can explain the stability and coherence of many artifact kinds over time - Insofar as the members of a kind continue to serve the same function, they remain unified even as their physical characteristics change - This fits well with the observation that artifacts can persist through part replacement, material changes, etc. as long as functional continuity is preserved - Functional theories can also make sense of how artifacts from very different cultural contexts can nevertheless belong to the same overarching kinds - For example, a functional theory can say that ancient pottery and modern Tupperware both belong to a broad category of "containers for food and drink" - Even though they may be quite distinct in materials, manufacture, and cultural roles - Finally, functional theories highlight an important respect in which artifacts seem to differ from natural objects - Whereas the identity of a natural kind like "gold" or "tiger" is usually taken to be determined by intrinsic structural or genetic properties - The identity of artifact kinds seems more tied to extrinsic factors like typical use and selective history - So functional theories offer some powerful considerations in their favor as an approach to the metaphysics of artifacts - They still face challenges, especially with genuinely novel artifacts, but they capture important intuitive and theoretical desiderata ## Limitations of Functional Theories for Novel Artifacts - Despite their strengths, functional theories run into some limitations when it comes to accounting for genuinely novel artifacts - A key issue is that it's unclear how to assign a "proper function" to a novel artifact that lacks any prior history of use - Proper functions are supposed to be established by a pattern of successful selection for a given capacity - But a genuinely novel artifact, by definition, won't have such a history to draw on - In other words, the first instances of a novel artifact kind would seem to only have "accidental" functions, not proper ones - But then it's not clear how they could be unified into a new artifact kind, on a functional theory - Additionally, some have argued that there are important artifact kinds that aren't primarily functional in nature - For example, "artwork" or "memorial" might be artifact kinds unified more by representational or symbolic features than practical functions - Purely functional theories may struggle to account for these - Finally, a deeper worry is that even for artifacts that do seem functionally unified, proper function alone may not provide sufficiently robust identity conditions - Two objects could serve the same proper function but still fail to be the same artifact - If one was much less efficient or reliable, for instance - None of these points are necessarily fatal to functional theories - But they do pose challenges, especially when it comes to satisfying the Creation Requirement and accounting for the genuinely novel ## Intentional Theories of Artifacts - An alternative approach is to look to the intentions of artifact creators and users to ground artifact kinds - On an intentional theory, what unifies the members of an artifact kind are the intentions under which they were produced - Typically the intentions to produce an object of a certain functional or symbolic type - A key motivation for intentional theories is that they can offer a more direct account of how genuinely novel artifact kinds are established - The idea is that when an agent successfully produces an object with the intention that it be of a certain novel kind, that kind comes into existence - The creative intention itself, rather than a history of use, is what sets up the new artifact kind - Intentional theories also highlight the extent to which artifacts are mind-dependent objects - Their properties and kinds seem to depend not just on objective factors, but on the subjective intentions and concepts of agents - More specifically, intentional theories often hold that creators need to have a substantive concept of the artifact kind they aim to produce - It's not enough to just have a vague intention to make something new - The agent needs to grasp what essential features the new artifact kind should have - So in addition to providing distinctive resources for satisfying the Creation Requirement, intentional theories tap into some powerful intuitions about the nature of artifacts - Namely, that artifacts are in some sense products of minds and inherit aspects of their identity from the concepts and intentions of their creators ## The Role of Concepts in Intentional Theories - Many intentional theories place significant weight on the notion of a "concept" or "description" of an artifact kind - The idea is that to establish a new artifact kind, an agent must have a substantive concept of what that kind consists in - This concept then guides the production process and sets up identity conditions for kind membership - A key question is what it takes for an agent to have a sufficient concept of a novel artifact kind - It can't be that they must grasp every detail of the eventual artifacts - But it also can't be a mere openness to making something new - Striking the right balance here is challenging - The concept has to be robust enough to guide concrete production - But not so determinate that genuinely novel creation becomes impossible - One possibility is that the concept encodes certain key functional or symbolic features, but leaves others open - For example, the Wright brothers might have had a concept of "powered flying machine" that included capacities like lift, thrust, and control - But remained unspecified with respect to particular material or structural implementations - Another option is to understand artifact concepts as akin to "scripts" or "recipes" for generating the members of the kind - Less a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, and more a set of heuristics or construction principles - Importantly, the concept has to be accessible to the creator prior to the actual production of any instances - This is what allows it to guide the creative process and establish a new kind, rather than simply recording the features of already existing artifacts - Working out the details of artifact concepts thus becomes a key task for intentional theories, especially in handling novel artifacts ## Challenges for Intentional Theories - While intentional theories offer some distinctive resources for explain artifact novelty, they also face some significant challenges - One issue concerns the relationship between creator intentions and actual artifact properties - It seems possible for an agent to intend to make an artifact of a certain kind, but fail to do so in practice - If their skills, materials, or background knowledge are inadequate, for instance - In these cases, it's not clear whether the intended kind actually comes into existence or not - There are also questions about whether lone individuals can really establish new artifact kinds purely through their own intentions - Artifact kinds are often taken to be social categories, constituted by collective practices and understandings - So even if a single agent has a clear concept of a novel kind, that may not be enough to make it a real, socially recognized kind - More fundamentally, one might worry that intentional theories risk a form of circularity or bootstrapping - How can an agent have a determinate concept of an artifact kind that doesn't yet exist? - Where does the content of that concept come from, if not from prior exposure to instances of the kind? - Finally, some have argued that even for existing artifact kinds, intentional factors aren't always necessary for kind membership - For example, a natural object like a piece of driftwood might come to function as a seat without any agent intending it to - So intentional theories may have trouble fully capturing the extension of some artifact concepts - Of course, intentional theorists have responses to these challenges - They might seek to refine the notion of artifact concepts, or combine intentional and functional factors in more nuanced ways - But the challenges do point to some important puzzles that intentional approaches must grapple with ## Alternative Approaches: Hybrid Theories - Given the limitations of both purely functional and purely intentional theories, some have proposed hybrid approaches that integrate elements of both - One influential example is Beth Preston's "pluralist" theory of artifact functions - Preston distinguishes "proper functions" based on historical selection from "system functions" based on current capacities - She sees artifact innovation as involving the gradual stabilizing of system functions into proper functions through ongoing use and reproduction - This kind of view has the advantage of capturing the interplay over time between intended design and actual use - Artifacts are originally produced with certain intended functions, but these can be reinforced, altered, or replaced as users interact with them in concrete contexts - The "exaptation" of existing structures or capacities for new functional roles also becomes key to understanding artifact innovation - Just as biological evolution often recruits existing traits for new adaptive purposes - Preston sees artifact innovation as a process of intentionally leveraging existing systemic functions for new socially recognized proper functions - Another type of hybrid view combines a basic functional account of artifact kinds with an intentional account of how those kinds are originally established - The idea is that novel artifact kinds are founded by creative intentions, but are thereafter sustained by functional reproduction and selection - So hybrid theories try to merge the most promising elements of functional and intentional approaches while avoiding some of their respective pitfalls - They aim to achieve a balance between the objective and subjective, mind-independent and mind-dependent factors that shape artifact metaphysics ## Problems for Hybrid Theories - While hybrid theories are an attractive option, they still face some difficulties in fully accounting for artifact novelty - One issue is that if intentions play a key role in establishing novel artifact kinds, this can seem to undermine a functional account of the persistence conditions for those very same kinds - Why should the original intentions be given special weight, if what sustains the kind over time are functional rather than intentional factors? - Conversely, if we hold that novel artifact kinds are genuinely defined by their functions, it can be hard to see how a purely intentional act could succeed in establishing those kinds in the first place - Intuitively, a merely intended function is not yet a real, efficacious function - More generally, any hybrid view will have to negotiate the tensions between its functional and intentional components - Too much emphasis on intentions risks disconnecting artifact kinds from their actual histories of use and reproduction - But too much emphasis on functions makes it harder to explain the genuinely innovative character of novel artifacts - There is also a risk that hybrid theories end up as ad hoc or unstable compromises rather than principled integrations - Combining elements from different frameworks is not always as simple as it might seem - The pieces have to be fitted together in a coherent and mutually reinforcing way, not just stuck together arbitrarily - None of this means that hybrid theories are unworkable or not worth pursuing - They remain a highly promising avenue for further development - But more work is needed to resolve some of the tensions and challenges they face ## Conclusions and Open Questions - Ultimately, the problem of novel artifacts remains a difficult and unresolved issue in the metaphysics of artifacts - Both functional and intentional theories offer important insights, but also run into limitations - Functional theories struggle to account for the original establishment of artifact kinds and their mind-dependent aspects - Intentional theories have trouble ensuring that newly intended kinds line up with the actual features and causal powers of their instances - Hybrid theories that try to combine functional and intentional elements are an attractive alternative - But they too face challenges in coherently integrating their different components and avoiding ad hoc compromises - More work is needed to adequately characterize the nature of artifact concepts and how they guide the production of novel artifacts - We need a better understanding of what makes a concept sufficiently substantive and well-articulated to ground a new artifact kind - The relationships between designer intentions, user practices, and objective functional capacities also need to be further clarified - A fully satisfactory theory will have to harmoniously integrate the roles of each - Finally, the social and conventional aspects of artifact kinds deserve more attention - How do the creative intentions of individuals interact with larger processes of collective practice and reproduction? - In the end, the ontology of artifacts remains a fertile domain for philosophical investigation - And the problem of novelty and innovation is central to that domain - By wrestling with these issues, we stand to learn much about the complex interplay of mind, matter, and culture that shapes the artifactual world