# Notes from Transcript ## Thomasson's Theory of Artifact Existence ## Introduction - Paper by Amy L. Thomasson (possibly Scandinavian) - Main claim: Artifacts can be said to exist, and we can provide existence conditions for them - Goal: Allow discussions of artifacts back into metaphysics, arguing they've been neglected - Focus: Arguments for thinking that artifacts exist ## Objections to Artifact Existence ### 1. Co-location - Classic philosophical problem: lump of clay vs. statue made from it - Argument: Artifacts (e.g., statues) don't really exist because they're co-located with more fundamental objects (e.g., clay) - Metaphysical principle: Two objects can't occupy the same space simultaneously - Proposed solution: Clay has the property of "statueness" rather than a separate statue existing ### 2. Causal Redundancy - Argument: Objects that don't cause anything or can't be caused by anything else don't exist - Example: Invisible, intangible person - no reason to believe they exist - Applied to artifacts: Their causal powers can be reduced to their constituents - Example: Table holding cups - explained by hardness of wood and verticality of legs - Similar to arguments against God's existence in atheist discourse ### 3. Vagueness - Metaphysicians prefer clear distinctions between what exists and doesn't - Vague objects are problematic for precise ontology - Example: When does a damaged table stop being a table and become just wood? - Allowing vague things seems metaphysically contentious ### 4. Lack of Uniform Composition - Echoes van Inwagen's argument about sand castles - Natural kinds (e.g., electrons) might exist in a way artifacts don't - Artifacts can always be broken down into smaller components - Argument: Only fundamental particles truly exist; everything else is just arrangements ## Thomasson's Response ### Existence Conditions - Proposes analyzing what it means for something to exist and empirically verifying it - Example: For unicorns to exist, we should be able to see and interact with them - Artifacts meet their existence conditions: we can use them and interact with them ### Types of Existence - Natural kinds: Don't require human intentionality or minds - Artifacts: Require human intentionality and physical realization - Imaginary objects: Require only human intentionality ### Role of Human Intentions - Artifacts are existentially dependent on human intentions - Designer's intentions determine function, structure, and aesthetic features - Collective intentions of a community also play a role in defining artifacts ## Challenges to Thomasson's View ### Essence of Artifacts - Unclear if Thomasson truly establishes an "essence" for artifacts - Comparison with natural kinds (e.g., tiger's DNA) problematic - Possible solution: Essence of artifacts distributed across maker's and community's intentions ### Persistence of Artifact Essence - Question: If humanity is wiped out, do artifacts lose their essence? - Possible answer: Essence depends on past human intentions, allowing for non-synchronous existence ### Vagueness of Artifact Essence - Scientific essences (e.g., chemical composition) are precisely defined - Artifact essences based on intentions may vary between individuals and cultures - Example: Chopsticks in Western vs. Eastern cultures - different cultural significance and use ## Evaluation of Thomasson's Argument ### Strengths - Provides a framework for discussing artifact existence in metaphysics - Accounts for the mind-dependent nature of artifacts - Allows for different types of existence (natural, artifactual, imaginary) ### Weaknesses - Struggle to establish a clear, non-vague essence for artifacts - [[Potential issues]] with persistence of essence [[over time]] - May lead to distributed, non-synchronous essences ### Possible Modifications - Adopt a weaker version of Thomasson's view, focusing on existence conditions rather than essence - Acknowledge the vagueness of artifact essences while maintaining their existence - Further explore [[the relationship between]] function, use, and essence in artifacts ## Conclusion - Thomasson's theory provides a novel approach to artifact existence in metaphysics - Challenges [[traditional views]] by incorporating human intentions and collective understanding - Raises important questions about [[the nature]] of existence and essence in human-made objects - Further work needed to refine [[the concept]] of artifact essence and address remaining objections