### Introduction: Consciousness seems like something we can aesthetically appreciate. Plan for the talk. 1. Intuitively we think of consciousness as something worthy of [[aesthetic appreciation]]. 2. This can be fleshed out by the following thought experiment: we would not want to be turned into a philosophical zombie –note that Dennett in sweet dreams makes it clear that one could still have thoughts, perceptions, desires etc. but simply with the ‘lights turned out’ 3. This also leads to the thought that our appreciation of consciousness is aesthetic rather than pragmatic (sidenote how would this connect up with morality) >Consider once again our pointillist gentleman and ask if we can tell from the picture whether he’s a genuinely conscious being or a zombie—a philosopher’s zombie that is behaviorally indistinguishable from a normal human being but is utterly lacking in consciousness. Even the zombie version of this chap would have a head full of dynamically interacting data-structures, with links of association bringing their sequels online, suggesting new calls to memory, composing on the fly new structures with new meanings and powers. Why? Because only a being with such a system of internal operations and > Chalmers 1996, esp. chapter 7. activities could nonmiraculously maintain the complex set of behaviors this man would no doubt exhibit if we put him to various tests. If you want a theory of all that information- processing activity, it will have to be a computational theory, whether or not the man is conscious. According to Chalmers, where normal people have a stream of consciousness, zombies have a stream of unconsciousness, and he has argued persuasively that whatever explained the purely informational competence of one (which includes every transition, every con- struction, every association depicted in this thought balloon) would explain the same competence in the other. Since the literal truth about the mechanisms responsible for all the sworls and eddies in the stream, as well as the informational contents of the items passing by, is—ex hypothesi—utterly unaffected by whether or not the stream is conscious or unconscious, Steinberg’s cartoon, a brilliant metaphorical rendering of con- sciousness, is exactly as good a metaphorical rendering of what is going on inside a zombie. (See, e.g., the discussion of zombie beliefs in Chalmers 1996, pp. 203–205.) 4. Next question: how can we appreciate consciousness? 5. Most commonly, we think of objects in the world as being candidates for [[aesthetic appreciation]] –artworks, the natural world 6. Other things that we can aesthetically appreciate: our own actions (e.g. Nguyen) and [[conceptual art]]/ideas. 7 At least when it comes to our appreciation of objects, aesthetic experiences are perceptual ### 1. Through A.R. Glasses Darkly Would it be right to say that when it comes to [[the aesthetics]] of consciousness, transparency is the enemy. That is, [[mental states]] need to be somewhat opaque before they can be aesthetically appreciated. This could be compared with what Carlson is talking about when he criticises the emersion model of environmental appreciation, we need to have a second step before we can be in the position of aesthetically experiencing something. This can be made more concrete with an example: imagine an trompe eyes VR scene. One in which the VR system is so unobtrusive as to be entirely transparent: if you were to wake up in the system then you would not realise you were in it. Imagine what is being displayed to you is a piece of art or a landscape etc. In this case the only thing that you would be able to appreciate is the thing that you are seeing through the VR headset. This, I want to say, suggests that if consicous [[perceptual experience]] were entirely transparent we would not be able to aesthetically appreciate it. Now, consider a different VR headset, one which presents you scenes in an entirely stylised way. Similar to the moments when we look out of the eyes of robocop or the terminator. Let’s actually think if this in terms of rotoscoping. You look through these glasses and you see everything as having been drawn over in some way. In this case, we might well think that the medium, the means through which we see the world is worthy of [[aesthetic appreciation]]. We experience not only experience aspects of the scene itself, but also aspects in the way that the scene is *realised*. If we want to explain how we aesthetically appreciate consciousness itself, as opposed to what aspects of the world we are conscious of, [[conscious experience]] needs to be at least somewhat opaque. What do I mean by opaque consciousness? [[The question]] of whether or not [[perceptual experience]] is transparent is well-known, what is less well know are the ideas: We might even think of this being a new form of art. Glasses which can be worn anytime, anywhere, and which stylise the look of whatever is seen through them. This actually not that far fetched. There are AR devices (and phone apps) that can add virtual objects into a real environment. It doesn’t take that much of a leap of imagination to think that there might be a similar thing which simply stylises the whole scene. Robocop, terminator, waking life. This sort of an art from would rely on the fact that that the glasses are somewhat opaque, if a device were made in which [[the experience]] was just like looking at the world normally, it would not be appreciated in the same way. This I suggest, is a good way of thinking about what is required for [[conscious experience]] to be appreciated as [[conscious experience]]. If experience were completely transparent, it would not be possible to aesthetically appreciate it. Questions as to whether [[perceptual experience]] is transparent in this way are well known. But, I am going to help myself to a couple of ideas from Metzinger here: - there are degrees of transparency/opacity - it is [[not just]] perceptual states that are transparent/opaque Think of thoughts: certain types of meditation training push the meditator to not get lost in thought, by recognising thoughts as thoughts. That is, not letting a depressive thought, or an anxious thought draw you in. Also reference the Lethby idea about psychedelics being good for therapy because they allow one to avoid getting lost in thought. Two questions arise: - how can we talk about appreciating partly opaque mental states without invoking homuncli looking at these states? That is, there are limits to the AR analogy. - Do mental states have to be completely opaque, in order to be appreciated? ### 2. Attention and Phenomenal Structure - From Watzl: >Attention structures consciousness into what is more central and what is more peripheral. Unlike spatial structure, the center-periphery structure of consciousness is not a structure of how the world appears to the subject through her conscious perspective. It is the structure of her perspective itself. >According to this view there is a symmetry between phenomenal qualities and phenomenal structure: neither contributes to what it is like for a subject without the other. Qualities and structure need to be put together to yield conscious experi- ence. On the resulting view, conscious experience consists in the subject’s engaged perspective on an apparent world. Centrality structure is the form ofthat perspective. Phenomenal qualities are its matter.