Introduction The book aims to defend a robustly mimetic conception of pictures and an interactionist view of their [[aesthetic evaluation]]. - Accepting both mimesis and interactionism is possible given the right conception of each. Pictures are robustly visual because they sustain seeing-in, which facilitates the interaction [[between aesthetic]] and cognitive evaluations. - The book focuses on representational pictures, tactile pictures, and the [[aesthetic evaluation]] of pictures as vehicles for seeing-in, setting aside other types of pictures and evaluations. - The book does not offer a theory of [[the value]] of pictorial art, but focuses on the [[aesthetic evaluation]] of pictures, both artworks and non-artworks. Chapter 1: [[The Puzzle]] of Mimesis A Puzzle - There is a tension between the mimesis thesis (pictures elicit experiences resembling face-to-face experiences of the depicted scenes) and the pictorial evaluation thesis (evaluating pictures partly involves evaluating them as eliciting such experiences). - [[The value]] of seeing an ordinary scene in a picture often diverges from [[the value]] of seeing that scene face-to-face, creating a "puzzle of mimesis". - Solving [[the puzzle]] requires recognizing salient differences between the experiences involved in seeing in pictures and seeing face-to-face. Content, Design, and Subject - A picture's content is distinct from its design (surface properties in virtue of which it depicts) and its subject ([[the objects]]/scenes depicted). - The mimesis thesis does not entail a resemblance theory of depiction between a picture's design and subject. - Experienced resemblance theories go further, claiming [[the experience]] of seeing-in involves experiencing resemblance between design and depicted scene. Seeing Divided, [[Seeing Double]] - Design seeing (seeing [[the design]] as a design) is crucial to picture-making. The relation between seeing-in and design seeing is central to [[the puzzle]] of mimesis. - Gombrich's [[illusion theory]] holds that seeing-in is illusionistic and always divided from design seeing. However, some pictures allow simultaneous seeing-in and design seeing. - Wollheim's twofoldness theory holds that seeing-in always doubles with design seeing. However, naturalistic pictures seem to divide seeing-in from design seeing while avoiding trompe-l'œil. Ways of seeing-in - Seeing-in comes in varieties: trompe-l'œil, naturalistic, pseudo-twofold, twofold, actualist. Most pictures mix these varieties within a single work. - Experienced resemblance theories imply seeing-in never involves trompe-l'œil, naturalism or pseudo-twofoldness. A pluralist account better fits the phenomenology of seeing-in. Recognition and Recruitment - Seeing an object in a picture expresses knowledge of the object's appearance via a recognitional concept. - Picture-makers use the "resources of the pictorial medium" to "extend the thread of recognition in new and complex structures", showing how things look in ways that could not be seen face-to-face (Podro). - This begins to solve the puzzle of mimesis - the value of pictorial experience is not reducible to the value of face-to-face experience, as pictures show appearances in unique ways. Chapter 2: The 'Air' of Pictures Conceptions and Cases - Provides an overview of philosophical work on expression in the arts. Focuses on figure expression (attributable to depicted persons) and scene expression (attributable to depicted scenes/design choices). - Gives examples showing figure and scene expression are achieved depictively but do not always correspond. Design choices can also be expressive independently of depicted content. The Missing Person Problem - Scene expression raises a "missing person problem" - if expression requires attribution of emotion to a person, how can scenes express emotions? - Considers personalism (attributing scene expressions to picture-maker or hypothetical persona) and arousalism (expressions constitute the emotions aroused in the spectator). - Argues personalism fails to capture cases where creative process or narrative explanation conflict with attributed expressions. Arousalism fails to capture the variety of spectator reactions to expressive content. If Dogs can Smile - Defends an impersonal "contour theory" - a configuration expresses an emotion E if it is an "expression look" with the function, in context, of indicating E. This solves the missing person problem. - Discusses what it is for a configuration to have the function of indicating an emotion, and the mechanisms by which looks come to have those functions. Argues the contour theory need not identify specific expression mechanisms. - Extends the contour theory to figure, scene and design expression in pictures. Argues expressive content in pictures is often seen-in and that expressive seeing-in has both impoverished and enriched forms. Arousal and Evaluation - Pictures arouse emotions in viewers, but this arousal is explained by their expressivecontent rather than constituting it. Emotional responses to pictures can shape attention, motivation and understanding. - Rejects normative arousalism - a picture's expressiveness is only sometimes a merit in virtue of actually arousing an emotion. Simply seeing expressive content can be valuable. Chapter 3: Good Looking How Good, Good How - Evaluations represent something as good or bad relative to a purpose/kind. We have a special interest in evaluating things as instances of their kinds. - A picture is evaluated as a picture iff it is evaluated as sustaining seeing-in or the evaluation entails this. - To evaluate a K as a K is to evaluate it regarding properties necessarily possessed by Ks (essentialism), only possessed by Ks (exclusion), or most effectively realized by Ks (excellence). Aesthetic Evaluation - Rejects identifying aesthetic evaluation with art evaluation - not all aesthetic evaluations are of art, not all art evaluations are aesthetic. - Rejects defining aesthetic evaluation as attributing aesthetic value, since we lack an independent grasp of aesthetic value/concepts. - Considers the empiricist view that a work's aesthetic value lies in the intrinsic value of the experiences it affords. This highlights the role of experience in aesthetic evaluation. Experiential Internalism - Defends an experiential conjecture: an evaluation of P as F is aesthetic iff, were it accurate, (1) being F would be a merit in P, (2) a suitable observer's experience of P as F partly constitutes this, (3) the evaluation shares content with or is warranted by this experience. - A basic aesthetic evaluation is a suitable observer's accurate evaluative experience satisfying (1)-(2). Other aesthetic evaluations are warranted by basic ones. - This conjecture distinguishes central cases of aesthetic vs pragmatic, cognitive, moral and some hedonic evaluations. It allows that some concepts figure in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic evaluations. A Puzzle Reprised - Formalism denies the relevance of seeing-in to aesthetic evaluation, restricting it to formal features. This neutralizes the puzzle of mimesis. - Critiques formalist arguments from superessentialism, exclusion and medium-specificity. Argues they assume an overly narrow conception of seeing-in. - Argues Lessing's strong mimeticism (a picture is aesthetically good iff it depicts an aesthetically good scene) fails for similar reasons. Not all aesthetically relevant features are ones the picture depicts the scene as having. - Solving the puzzle of mimesis requires acknowledging the varieties of seeing-in. An aesthetic evaluation of a picture as a picture evaluates it as a vehicle for seeing-in, in all its varieties. Chapter 4: Drawing Lessons Cognitivism - Defends cognitivism - some cognitive and aesthetic evaluations of pictures as vehicles for seeing-in imply each other. Contrasts this with radical cognitivism, anti-cognitivism and autonomism. - Considers an argument that pictures lack non-trivial cognitive value since they cannot convey knowledge. Argues this relies on an overly narrow conception of cognitive value. Virtuous Vision - Introduces the notion of intellectual virtue - a cognitive agent's excellent trait, skill or disposition to achieve cognitive goals like knowledge, understanding, etc. - Argues pictures can be cognitively valuable by fostering intellectual virtues. For example, many pictures reward what the author calls "fine observation" - delicacy of discrimination, accuracy of perception, adaptability of perception. - Fine observation is partly constituted by conceptual/recognitional capacities, so pictures that reward it can reshape a viewer's concepts and recognitional abilities. Aesthetic Ascent - A picture's cognitive merits are sometimes "step-up" rather than "ground-level" - their status as cognitive merits partly depends on suitable observers experiencing them as such. - For example, a picture experienced as true to life or revelatory fosters fine observation skills, which the viewer recognizes as a cognitive achievement. - These "step-up" cognitive merits satisfy the experiential conjecture, so they imply aesthetic merits. This establishes a form of cognitivism. - Some straightforwardly "ground-level" cognitive evaluations (true to life, honest, insightful, chilling, etc.) also imply aesthetic evaluations, given the intimate connection between seeing-in and aesthetic evaluation. Chapter 5: Moral Vision Content and Evaluation - Moral evaluations can target the beneficial/harmful consequences of a picture's making/display (like other artifacts) or the moral status of the picture's content (like assertions). - However, not all moral assessments of content imply aesthetic assessments. Moral merits/demerits grounded in conveying moral knowledge are independent of aesthetic value. Mimesis and Moral Vision - Considers a skeptical argument that pictures cannot convey moral knowledge because (1) such knowledge requires narrative/theoretical form and (2) the "air" or look of a picture is non-narrative. - Argues depicting agents, actions and spaces can constitute a pictorial mode of narrative. Pictorial content can also prompt moral thinking without depicting actions. Moralism - Defends moralism - some moral and aesthetic assessments of pictures as vehicles for seeing-in imply each other. Contrasts this with scepticism and autonomism. - A moral evaluation of a picture is aesthetic when it targets the picture's fostering of moral understanding / moral perception. - For example, Daumier's Fatherly Discipline may be morally and aesthetically meritorious for prompting recognition of an oppressive mode of parental discipline. Degas's Nudes - As a case study, considers feminist critiques of Degas' nudes as objectifying women, pandering to the "male gaze". - Argues these critiques involve moral assessments of Degas' pictures as vehicles for seeing-in - they target the pictures' power to influence gender concepts and norms of looking. - On some views, the nudes reflexively expose and subvert the male gaze, so these moral assessments may imply positive aesthetic assessments after all. - This illustrates the compatibility of moralist feminist criticism and nuanced aesthetic evaluation, contra autonomism and global skepticism about the male gaze. Afterword - The book defends a mimetic conception of pictures and an interactionist view of their aesthetic evaluation. - This requires a rich conception of seeing-in (beyond illusionism) and of cognitive value (beyond knowledge). - If successful, the argument shows pictures are "not just proxies for the gaze" but "training wheels for the mind". Aesthetic and cognitive evaluation interact because pictures hone our recognitional abilities. </answer> In summary, Sight and Sensibility argues for a mimetic conception of pictorial representation and an interactionist account of how aesthetic, cognitive, and moral evaluations of pictures relate. Key moves include disambiguating varieties of seeing-in, highlighting pictures' power to extend everyday recognition and perception, and identifying forms of cognitive and moral value that constitutively depend on pictorial experience. This establishes an intimate link between the representational, aesthetic, cognitive and moral dimensions of pictures. The argument aims to vindicate the aesthetic value of pictures while acknowledging their status as visual representations.