# Introduction - [[The idea]] that [[perceptual experience]] is transparent has been used by philosophers who hold an externalist account of the metaphysics of [[perceptual experience]] - naïve realists and externalist representationalists - We must distinguish between phenomenological transparency and metaphysical transparency - [[Perceptual experience]] is phenomenologically transparent iff the properties we are aware of during a [[perceptual experience]] all seem to us to be externally located - [[Perceptual experience]] is metaphysically transparent iff all the properties we are aware of are in fact externally located > The difference between these two kinds of transparency should be per- fectly obvious, and yet, as we will see, they have often been conflated. It is essential that we keep these two notions distinct since introspection could only ever reveal phenomenological transparency, and yet the externalist needs to establish metaphysical transparency. (p. 724) - Even if we allow [[perceptual experience]] is phenomenologically transparent, there is no good reason to think we can transition from this to metaphysical transparency - The notion of transparency turns out to be a "free-wheeling cog" in the debate about the metaphysics of [[perceptual experience]] ## The standard internalist qualia theory response - Qualia theorists claim introspection reveals properties which seem to be (and in [[fact are]]) properties of our own experiences - Surprisingly, the qualia theorist's analysis allows that almost all phenomenal character depends essentially ([[not just]] causally) on externally located properties - This grants much of the externalist's metaphysical analysis - [[The author]] argues this response is far too concessive to the externalist > I argue that this response is far too concessive to the externalist. I describe an alternative response the qualia theorist can make to the externalist's transparency claim. They can claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is entirely internally constituted, and it just seems to us that the relevant phenomenal properties are externally located. Indeed, our awareness of properties which seem to be externally located is in fact an awareness of internally constituted features of our experience. (p. 724) # A distinction: phenomenological transparency and metaphysical transparency - The transparency claim should first be understood as a claim about the phenomenology of [[perceptual experience]] - Many philosophers appeal to transparency to make a claim about the metaphysics of [[perceptual experience]] (metaphysical transparency) - [[Naive realism]] and externalist representationalism make use of transparency in this metaphysical way - It is mistaken to assume metaphysical transparency can be directly revealed through introspection - Introspection is silent on the metaphysics of [[perceptual experience]] - Yet the conflation between phenomenological and metaphysical transparency is common in the literature, often going unnoticed - Examples are provided from the writings of Michael Tye, Amy Kind, Martine Nida Rümelin, Daniel Stoljar > It is rather worrying that this conflation of metaphysical and phenomeno- logical transparency, prevalent in the literature, has remained unnoticed. It is obvious after paying the matter a little consideration that introspection is not the sort of thing that could possibly reveal this kind of metaphysical truth about perceptual experience. (p. 729) - The transparency idea can only legitimately aim to establish phenomenological transparency, not metaphysical transparency # Is phenomenological transparency evidence of metaphysical transparency? - Assuming perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent, should we take this as evidence it is also metaphysically transparent? - It may seem natural to assume things are as they seem in the absence of reasons to think otherwise - However, illusions and hallucinations provide compelling reason to doubt whether all perceptual experiences involve externally located properties - We frequently ascribe to objects properties they do not in fact possess - When considering whether appearances reflect underlying metaphysical reality, our default position should be a skeptical one - A good argument is needed to credibly move from phenomenological to metaphysical transparency ## The argument that phenomenology reflects metaphysics - Some argue our metaphysical theory of perception should accord with the phenomenology to avoid convicting experiences of massive error - But success does not require accuracy - perceptual experiences can be useful without matching external reality - The key tenet of internalism is that phenomenal character is "in the head" - Internalists should not concede externalist analysis of most phenomenal character and only insist on a few internally-realized features - Disjunctivists reject introspective evidence that normal and hallucinatory experiences form a common kind - Asserting introspection is authoritative for transparency but not the common kind claim would be ad hoc ## The argument from the best explanation - Perhaps metaphysical transparency is the best explanation of phenomenological transparency - But externalists provide little detailed argument for this "best explanation" claim - Some key problems: - Success does not depend on accuracy, so evolutionary usefulness of experiences does not require them to be metaphysically transparent - In hallucinations, uninstantiated abstracta are problematic candidates for metaphysically transparent contents - How concrete, spatiotemporal experiences could depend on abstracta is unexplained - The nature of the awareness relation to abstract entities is unclear > Charles Siewert offers a positive reason for denying the very possibility of moving from phenomenological to metaphysical transparency on an external- ist representationalist's framework. Since externalist representationalists want to reduce phenomenal character to representational content, they need a way of specifying the latter that does not appeal to the former, for if it does their account will be circular. It is clear that introspection, which can only reveal how things seem phenomenologically, will not be able to provide this, and so Siewert argues that an appeal to phenomenological transparency will never deliver metaphysical transparency (2003: 30). (p. 735) # The internalist response to transparency - Internalists often deny phenomenological transparency because they think refuting metaphysical transparency requires this - But the two notions are independent - phenomenological transparency provides no evidence for metaphysical transparency - Internalists can accept perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent while denying this establishes anything about the metaphysics - Internalists should deny metaphysical transparency since it contradicts their fundamental tenet that phenomenal character is internally constituted - Yet many internalists concede much of the externalist analysis, localizing their disagreement to a few special cases like blurriness and afterimages - This concedes too much - a few internally realized features cannot redeem internalism > The standard qualia theorist response seems to be far too concessive to the externalist. The externalist deploys the transparency argument to motivate the idea that the phenomenal character of our experience depends essentially on externally located properties. In other words, the properties that charac- terize the phenomenal character of our experience—the redness, roundness, plumpness, smoothness, 'smallness' and so on, are all externally located, and it is these properties which account for our perceptual experience of a red cherry tomato. If internalists concede that externally located properties are essential for the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience of a red cherry tomato, and claim only that we can also be aware of other (internal) features, they seem to be focusing all their efforts on winning a battle when they have already let externalists win the war. (pp. 739-740) ## An alternative internalist response - Internalists should argue that all perceptual experience is awareness of internally constituted experiential features - Seeming to be aware of external properties is just being aware of internal experiential features - We are not aware of these internal features as internal - This explains why a microphysical duplicate would have identical perceptual experiences - To both perceivers it seems phenomenal character depends on external properties, but in fact they are aware of internally realized experiential features > Internalists can argue that the externalist who thinks that her experience is constituted by her standing in a two-place awareness relation to externally located properties (which we can all agree seems to be the case) has simply misjudged the metaphysical reality of her situation. We do not have to intro- spectively search our perceptual experience with the hope of finding a feature that does not seem to be externally located, in fact (or so the internalist can claim) our experience of every apparently externally located property is an example of being aware of an internally constituted feature of our experience. (pp. 741-742) # Concluding remarks - The author's claims are modest - not attempting a refutation of metaphysical transparency - Phenomenological transparency provides no evidence for metaphysical transparency - Internalists need not argue against phenomenological transparency - Internalism only requires rejecting metaphysical transparency - The internalist concession that much phenomenal character is metaphysically transparent is surprising and contradicts the core internalist tenet - Internalists can instead argue that seeming awareness of external properties is just awareness of internal experiential features