## Abstract [[Conscious experience]] plays a central role in [[aesthetic appreciation]]. Our appreciation of an object typically involves our having a conscious [[perceptual experience]] of that object. [[The objects]] we perceive might also elicit in us certain types of aesthetic conscious states, such as a feeling of [[aesthetic pleasure]]. Here, my focus is on another possibility: can conscious states *themselves* be objects of [[aesthetic appreciation]]? Such an idea is at least prima facie plausible: we think of [[conscious experience]] as something that can be beautiful, rich, wondrous even. Imagine someone threatening to turn you into a philosophical zombie, you would still perceive the world, think thoughts, etc. but, [[the idea]] that the light of consciousness might some how be 'turned off' would be terrifying.[^1] However, it is unclear the degree to which [[the appreciation]] of conscious states can be modelled on the perceptual appreciation of [[the objects]] we perceive. Here, I suggest a model on which, at least in some respects, the [[aesthetic appreciation]] of conscious states can be modelled on visual perception. My starting point is [[the idea]] that our experiential states have varying degrees of transparency. There has been a long running debate in [[the philosophy]] of perception as to whether [[perceptual experience]] is ‘transparent’. If, say, [[visual experience]] is entirely transparent then it would only make us phenomenally aware of the properties of the objects that we are seeing. If it were less transparent and more ‘opaque’ we would also be phenomenally aware of some of the properties of the experience itself (e.g. Martin 1992).  Other philosophers  (e.g. Letheby 2021 Lyon and Farennikova 2022; Metzinger 2003) are much more liberal when it comes to transparency, arguing that it is a mistake to think that perception is either transparent or not, and have suggested that how transparent or opaque an experience is is not determined, at least not entirely, by the type of experience that it is. Moreover, different perceptual states can have different degrees of opacity: if during a guided meditation you are told to focus on your visual experience, your visual experience will become opaque in the sense that it becomes apparent to you that *it is* an experience; your visual experience while you are walking down a quiet street, on the other hand, may be entirely transparent in that you it is used for navigation but are not consciously focussing on it as a representation..  I suggest that if the transparency of experiential states does vary in this way, then the best candidates for those conscious states that can be appreciated are those that are *somewhat* opaque. The reason for this is that experiencing both vehicle and content properties allows one to experience how the two relate to one another. Consider the following toy example (inspired by Lyon and Farennikova 2022). Imagine looking through a completely clear window. Whatever is on the other side of that glass could be a candidate for aesthetic appreciation. Next, imagine a very thick layer of frost has settled on the outside of the window, completely blocking out your view. In this case you would have a different candidate for aesthetic appreciation: the frosty window.  Now consider a third possibility. Thick layers of ice are covering your window and distorting what you see through it. In this case, arguably, you have three potential candidates: not only are you aware of the properties of whatever is on the other side of your window, and some properties of the icy window itself, but also how those two sets of properties relate to each other. Consider, for example, how the window’s uneven surface would bend and stretch whatever is behind it when you move your head. This awareness of this interaction – seeing how the scene beyond the window is affected by the ice – seems like a good candidate for aesthetic appreciation: it reveals our awareness of a property of the perceptual medium – the glass – and the complicated ways in which it relates to the scene outside.   This analogy provides a useful way of modelling how we might aesthetically appreciate our own conscious experiences.  A somewhat opaque perception allows for awareness of how its vehicle realises the content it represents and that realisation is something that can be aesthetically appreciated. Consider how a fan gradually accelerating reveals the threshold at which our visual perception transitions from recognising individual blades to perceiving a continuous blur, thereby drawing attention to the depth of vision's temporal resolution, or the way gestalts will fluctuate when looking at figures like the duck rabbit, demonstrating how the same figure can be experienced by the visual system in two different ways. It is situations such as these, in which the content and vehicle come apart at the seams, that we are best placed to aesthetically  appreciate our own conscious states.** ### The Mind Revealing Itself to Itself [Maj. Garland Briggs](https://m.imdb.com/name/nm0204493/?ref_=ttqu_qu): "Bobby, may I share something with you? A vision I had in my sleep last night-as distinguished from a dream, which is a mere sorting and cataloguing of the day's events by the subconscious. This was a vision: fresh and clear as a mountain stream, the mind revealing itself to itself." #### Footnotes ^1 Arguably, this wondrous aspect of consciousness is part of the reason why philosophers and scientists find the question of how consciousness relates to the material world so fascinating (how could a computer/bacterium/quark possess consciousness?).