#pinned # Dancing with Qualia ## 1. Introduction ### A. [[The idea]] of aesthetically appreciating consciousness - Consciousness is often seen as a mere means to appreciating external objects, not as an aesthetic object in its own right - However, the phenomenal character of experience seems inherently valuable and worthy of appreciation, beyond its practical or epistemic roles - This can be fleshed out by the following thought experiment: we would not want to be turned into a philosophical zombie - note that Dennett in sweet dreams makes it clear that one could still have thoughts, perceptions, desires etc. but simply with the ‘lights turned out’ - Quote needed - This also leads to the thought that our appreciation of consciousness is aesthetic as well as (?) pragmatic ### B. [[The question]] of how we can aesthetically appreciate consciousness - The standard perceptual model of [[aesthetic appreciation]], which focuses on external objects presented to the senses, seems ill-suited for consciousness itself - why? - A promising route that I won't explore very much here is to apply models from [[Aesthetics and the Environment]] by Carlson - Various [[alternative models]] might be considered, such as those derived from the [[aesthetic appreciation]] of nature (e.g., object model, landscape model, environment model) - These models differ in how they frame [[the appreciation]] of nature - as discrete objects, as scenic views, or as encompassing environments - Similarly, different models could be considered for [[the appreciation]] of consciousness, such as appreciating specific conscious states, the overall "landscape" of consciousness, or the encompassing "environment" of subjective experience - However, this paper will focus on a specific approach based on the interplay of transparency/opacity and agency ### C. [[The role]] of transparency/opacity and agency in [[this appreciation]] - [[The idea]] is this: - [[Mental states]] can have varying degrees of transparency/opacity. - If this is correct then we can experience some of the [[vehicle properties]] and content properties simultaneously. - It is plausible to think that if we are aware of both types of properties simultaneously we are aware of a relationship between the two. - Depending on what this relation is, it might allow for something akin to [[aesthetic appreciation]] of twofoldness. - Possibly understood in terms of Lopes' account of design seeing. - paraphrase about design seeing: 'How well they realise the content' [[Aesthetic Appreciation of Experience –Plans, scraps and Brainstorms]] ### D. Main Aim/Structure - The paper aims to argue that the aesthetic appreciation of consciousness involves an interplay of passive opacity and active "opacification" through attentional control - It will first introduce the idea that experiences can be partially transparent - Metzinger's theory of Transparency - It will then explore how this enables an appreciation of representational structure similar to appreciating design properties in art. - In the second half of the paper I will argue that as it stands the view is open to a challenge: the reification challenge - And argue that we meet this challenge by adding on the idea that we agentively experience ourselves as controlling our attention. ## 2. Transparency/Opacity ### A. Traditional conceptions of transparency - Moore (1903): When perceiving, we are not aware of any intrinsic features of our experience, only features of the external objects - Harman (1990): In perceptual experience, we are not aware of the "mental paint" by which the experience represents the world, only the world itself ### B. Key aspects of Metzinger's theory - some useful quotations about what Dereification >Another example is the idea of so-called dereification from the cognitive science of mindfulness (Lutz et al. 2015; Dunne, Thompson & Schooler 2019). Dereification concerns the state in which individuals come to experience their mental states less as a manifestation of reality and more as mental states. Dereification is described as ‘experiencing thoughts as mental events, and not as the things that they seem to represent’ (Dunne, Thompson & Schooler 2019: 307), and as the process where ‘thoughts lose their representational integrity and are experienced simply as mental events’ (Lutz et al. 2015: 644). Although thoughts are again the chosen example, it is clear from the context that these authors are committed to dereification covering also perceptual states. They describe dereification as a phenomenon applying to all kinds of mental states in which ‘phenomenal content is experienced as just a mental process’ (Lutz et al. 2015: 644). 1. Transparency/opacity as a graded property linked to attention - Core claim: "For every phenomenal state, the degree of phenomenal transparency is inversely proportional to the introspective degree of attentional availability of earlier processing stages." (Metzinger, p. 356) - Transparency: When earlier processing stages are attentionally unavailable, experience seems to directly present external objects/properties - Opacity: When earlier processing stages become attentionally available, experience is revealed as a representational process - Transparency/opacity exists on a continuum, depending on the degree of attentional availability of earlier processing stages 2. Rejection of a clear vehicle/content distinction - Traditional view: Transparency arises from access to content but not vehicle properties - Metzinger's view: Attentional availability of earlier stages blurs the vehicle/content distinction, making both accessible - "A representationalist analysis of the phenomenology of visual experience can therefore not simply claim that we are only aware of the content properties of visual representations, but never of vehicle properties." (Metzinger, p. 358) 3. Transparency/opacity as a feature of all mental state types - Traditional views associate transparency primarily with perceptual states - Metzinger extends the opacity framework to cognitive and emotional states as well - "Phenomenally opaque representations do exist as well. Here are some preliminary examples of opaque state-classes: Most notably consciously experienced thoughts [...]" (Metzinger, p. 360) ** ### C. How can we make sense of transparency/opacity? 1. READ THIS PAPER: https://readwise.io/reader/document_raw_content/144819597 > [!quote] > Take the depressive thought of ‘my life is hopeless’. This thought involves multiple sensory qualities like inner speech, mental imagery, or some kind of bodily-affective feeling. Introspecting this thought as opaque would then involve that these sensory qualities genuinely appeared to the subject as non-object properties. That is, the properties would not appear as properties of the objects represented by these sensory states. Hence, the conflict between MOH and TT does not presuppose that MOH accepts cognitive phenomenology. MOH is consistent with the phenomenology of thought being explained both by a proprietary cognitive phenomenology or by sensory phenomenology, as long as the phenomenal properties of the cognitive process can appear as non-object properties > [!quote] > We might initially ask, if experience can be opaque under mindfulness introspection, what kind of change in consciousness does mindfulness introspection involve? One answer would be that mindfulness involves a change in perspective such that (some) phenomenological properties that prior to mindfulness introspection appeared as properties of the objects represented now appear as properties of the experience—that is, properties that appeared as object-properties transform into appearing as non-object properties. Notice that most mindfulness researchers and practitioners view mindfulness as an introspective skill (Wielgosz et al. 2019). We expect that this transformation of the appearance of properties would demand practice and sufficient skill level in mindfulness. 2. Potential Examples: - Perceptual: Necker cube - brief opacity during gestalt shifts may reveal constructive *processes* - Cognitive: Inner speech - attending to auditory-verbal qualities can make the representational vehicles salient - Emotional: Emotional states fluctuate between transparency and opacity based on attentional focus ## 3. Aesthetic implications of Metzinger's view 1. Opacity enables the appreciation of representational structure - Attending to earlier processing stages makes the representational vehicles and dynamics available - Allows for appreciating how the "medium" of experience shapes and constrains the "message" - Analogous to appreciating the design properties of an artwork, not just the depicted content 2. Challenges the perceptual model of aesthetic appreciation - Metzinger's analysis undermines the idea of experience as a transparent window onto content - Shifts focus to the multilevel interplay of representational processes and products - Enables an aesthetics of process, transformation, and realization, not just of static content ## 4. The Immersion Challenge ### A. The objection from environmental aesthetics 1. Carlson's critique of approaches that ignore immersive experience - Frames and static viewpoints fail to capture the dynamic, multi-sensory engagement with environments - Aesthetics of nature should focus on the immersive, interactive character of environmental appreciation 2. Analogous worry for the "opacified" approach to consciousness - Does focusing on the representational processes underlying experience neglect the immersive phenomenology of consciousness? - Might "stepping back" to appreciate experiential dynamics disrupt the engaged, first-person character of conscious experience? ### B. Response: Agentive attention enables "immersed opacification" 1. Attentional control as a form of immersive interaction with consciousness - Actively modulating the focus and structure of experience is a way of engaging with consciousness from within - Phenomenology of attentional control: Fluidly shifting between different aspects and levels of experience - Analogy to active exploration of an environment: Attentional modulation as a kind of "mental navigation" 2. "Immersed opacification": Appreciating representational dynamics while preserving phenomenal immersion - Attentional shifts can highlight representational processes without fully disrupting immersion - Opacity and immersion are not mutually exclusive: We can appreciate experiential dynamics while remaining engaged - Key is the interplay of passive opacity and active attentional control, enabling a fluid and integrated appreciation > [!info] some potentially useful stuff here for the whole text but especially in terms of transparency and attention > Aesthetic Appreciation of Experience –Plans, scraps and Brainstorms