## scrap removed on 30 Sep 2024 at 11:13:09 The structural explanation enthusiastically agrees that when we turn attention from the mind-independent objects of perception, to [[the experience]] we have of those objects, [[the objects]] remain the focus of attention. But in thus attending, according to the structural explanation, we find those phenomenological differences that can, we have argued, be understood as a matter of the form or structure of [[the experience]]. (p. 496) [[This view]] allows Richardson to maintain that when we introspect, we are still primarily aware of [[the objects]] in the world, not features of our experience. Furthermore, Richardson does not consider her account to be a version of qualia theory because she doesn't treat the [[visual field]] as an additional sensational property or a detachable quale. Instead, she argues that it is an intrinsic, organizing feature of [[visual experience]]: "Similarly, the [[structural feature]] of [[visual experience]] involved in seeing empty space is intrinsic to the qualitative character of [[visual experience]] generally, rather than some positive quality that each [[visual experience]] has and could lack. It is a feature of all [[visual experience]], and [[not just]] [[visual experience]] of empty space" (p. 12). By characterizing the [[visual field]] as a structural feature that organizes experience rather than an additional content or property, Richardson distinguishes her account from qualia theories of perceptual experience. # Enrico's Comments on VR paper ## Grainy Experience in Film - grainy experience of the scene vs surface. ## Configurational Fold - the lack of configurational fold leads not only to immersion but to this vehicle effect.