Here is the complete list of skeleton versions of the sentences from the text, categorized by sentence function type: Declarative: 1. [Topic] is [[the relationship between]] [concept 1] and [concept 2]. 2. According to [view 1], a view put forward by [author], [explanation of view 1]. 3. According to [view 2], [explanation of view 2]. 4. While [view 3] also holds that [shared aspect of views 2 and 3], it does not [differing aspect of view 3]. 5. The focus of this paper is on how best to understand [[the idea]] that [main concept]. 6. [View 1] is better supported by [supporting evidence]. 7. [View 2] fits better with our ordinary ways of speaking about [topic]. 8. [View 1] does not fit with our [[common sense]] ideas and ways of speaking about [topic]. 9. [View 2] avoids both of these problems. 10. One way of reading [phrase] is as meaning that [interpretation 1]. 11. A difficulty for such a strong interpretation is that it does not seem as though [counterargument]. 12. A less austere interpretation of [view] which avoids this worry, would be to say that [interpretation 2]. 13. [Concept 1] and [concept 2] are, in some way, inseparable, but [differing aspect]. 14. [Properties] do exist: we can say that [example 1], or that [example 2], and while each [concept] depends upon [related concepts], neither [property 1] nor [property 2] are properties of any of these particulars. 15. [View] still runs into difficulties when we consider the fact that, unlike [examples], [main concept] are normally thought to depend, or be identical to, features of the [[physical world]]. 16. [Uncontroversial statement] depend, respectively, on the physical instantiations of [related concepts]. 17. Exactly how [concept 1] depend upon [concept 2] will be determined by your views on what [main concept] are. 18. [Limited options] for the physical realisers of [main concept]. 19. [Concepts] are distinct from [main concept], and so are, according to [view], neither [consequence 1], nor [consequence 2]. 20. It would seem that the only remaining aspect of [domain] which instantiates [concept 1] and is suitably [descriptor] is [remaining option] itself. 21. The [aspects] that make up the constituents of [main concept] are identical to, or depend on, [physical realiser], and it therefore seems hard to deny that it is [physical realiser] that instantiates [main concept]. 22. The first reason is [type of reason 1]. 23. The second reason for [stance] is that such a view would cohere with an even wider range of [supporting evidence] than [alternative view]. 24. [Everyday phrase] should be "implicitly understood as elliptically picking out [concept 1] by picking out [concept 2] involved in it". 25. I consider it an advantage of the view that I put forward below that we do not need to add such a complication to [[our understanding]] of these everyday phrases. 26. [Statement] need not be taken as evidence that [conclusion 1], it could just as easily be understood as revealing that [conclusion 2]. 27. [Theory] posits a close connection between [concept 1] and [concept 2]. 28. Where their view differs from mine is the ontological category in which they place [concept]. 29. [Statement from theory] makes plain what category [main concept] belong to, as opposed to views that construe [main concept] generically as [alternative category]. 30. [Main concept] are either [category 1] or [category 2]. 31. [Main concept] start and cease. 32. [Main concept] are intrinsically temporal entities. 33. I do not deny that [agreed upon aspect 1], nor that [agreed upon aspect 2], but I do not think this forces us into categorising [main concept] as [category 1] rather than [category 2]. 34. [Main concept], I suggest, can be thought of as [new categorization]. 35. A [new categorization] is a [definition]. 36. There seems no reason to deny this. 37. [Common position] is to say that we do not perceive the world [manner 1], but rather [manner 2]. 38. If it is correct to say that [conditional statement], then it is possible that, just as [analogous situation 1], [analogous situation 2]. 39. Indeed, regardless of what one thinks are [debated aspect 1], or whether [debated aspect 2], the physical realisers of [agreed upon aspect] are themselves [property]. 40. It therefore seems plausible to imagine that they realise [consequence]. 41. More specifically, I think that [main concept] can be thought of as a type of [new categorization]. 42. At first this idea might seem quite bizarre: [common association 1], like [common association 2], does not seem to be the sort of [domain] that [related domain] is in the business of revealing. 43. The trick is, however, to think of [main concept] as a [new categorization]. 44. Imagine seeing [analogous situation]. 45. On the view I am proposing here, [main concept] can be thought of as a fairly precise [domain] analog of this sort of case. 46. All [definition of concept] is is [elaboration]. 47. [Example object], like almost all everyday objects, will [exhibition of concept] simultaneously, with [aspect 1] and [aspect 2] of each of these [related concepts] varying over the course of their existence. 48. [Action] leads to [[the object]] taking on a series [description] before arriving back at its original, stable configuration. 49. This series is what I think we should identify with [main concept]. 50. According to [theory name], [main concept] is a [new categorization] consisting of [definition]. 51. On [theory name], the [related concepts] are not so much [relation 1] as [relation 2]. 52. We can see this by describing our [example object]'s [property] more precisely: [detailed description]. 53. Perhaps there are also some [[[additional detail]] 1], and that there are [[[additional detail]] 2]. 54. In virtue of [enabling factor 1] (as well as [enabling factor 2]), we are able to perceptually pick out these interwoven elements. 55. They are, however, nothing over and above certain features of the [object]'s [property]: all it is for the [object] to have this [property] is for it to have this [detailed aspect]. 56. Similarly, on [theory name] the physical realisers of [related concepts], are simply fine-grained aspects of an [object]'s [new categorization]. 57. In virtue of [enabling factor], as well as [related system]'s tendency to [exhibition of concept], we are able to pick out various [adjective] aspects of the [object]'s [property]. 58. A [main concept]'s [related concept 1], which – simplifying – depends on [definition], can be compared to [analogous situation]. 59. [Related concept 2] can be thought similar to [analogous situation]. 60. [Related concept 3] has a more complex relationship with [physical realiser] – arguably, it is a mistake to think of it as [oversimplification] – but it can be thought of as similar to various [description of analogous situation]. 61. [Theory name], then, follows [tradition 1] in saying that [main concept] are [categorization 1], but breaks with both by holding that [main concept] are [new categorization]. 62. Now that the view has been fleshed out, we can see how it stacks up against the [number] other views of [topic] we have seen. 63. In [previous section] we saw the [number] reasons for preferring [view 1] or [view 2] over [view 3] are that these views fit better with both [supporting evidence 1] and [supporting evidence 2]. 64. [Theory name] retains both of these advantages: it holds that [consequence 1], and [consequence 2]. 65. Arguably, it fits better with [supporting evidence 1] and [supporting evidence 2] by allowing [consequence 1] and [consequence 2], and not [avoided consequence]. 66. It also, like [similar view], [shared consequence]. 67. [Theory name] also retains [[the idea]] that [key concept]. 68. Showing why this is so will also go some way in explaining how [additional [[explanatory power]]]. 69. We can say that [causal explanation]. 70. Again an analogy with [analogous domain] will be illuminating. 71. First, [general principle explanation]. 72. Similarly, [application of general principle to main concept]. 73. In both cases, the precise [consequence] will be determined not only by [causal factor 1] but by [causal factor 2]. 74. Finally, it might be objected that while [theory name] explains [[[explanatory power]] 1], it still does not [lacking [[explanatory power]]]. 75. I have given a view of [domain] on which we [consequence 1], not one on which [consequence 2]. 76. To this I reply that [rebuttal]. 77. Consider how important [analogous situation] is for [related consequence]. 78. You [observe action 1], and recognise [[what you]] are [observing]. 79. Why? Because you [observation leading to recognition]. 80. If I were to [counterfactual action], you would still, in a sense, be [counterfactual observation 1], and probably [counterfactual observation 2], but you would not [lacking observation], because [reason]. 81. You [observe action 2], and recognise [[what you]] are [observing]. 82. Why? On [theory name] you [observation leading to recognition]. 83. If I [counterfactual action], you will [counterfactual observation 1]: you will be [repeat observation] the same [object], and probably [related observation], but you will not [lacking observation] because it does not have [lacking property]. 84. The degree to which [enabling factor 1] allow for [consequence 1] is equal, therefore, to the degree to which [enabling factor 2] allow for [consequence 2]. 85. One might try to argue that [objection 1], and that [objection 2]. 86. Fine, but in that case [rebuttal]. 87. [Theory name] retains all [[the advantages]] that [view 1] has over [view 2] and [view 3] but improves on it by [improvement]. 88. I have also argued that even though [concession], this is no reason to give up the idea that [main concept]. 89. Although [common description 1] it seldom engages directly with [understudied area 1], nor with [understudied area 2]. 90. Doing so, I think, will help us better determine more precisely the similarities and differences between [comparison 1]. 91. The view I have outlined here can be considered a first step in this direction. Interrogative: 1. What is the relationship between [concept 1] and [concept 2]? 2. Are there such things as [concept]? 3. Why think that we [action related to main concept]? 4. What reasons, then, might there be for rejecting the idea that [main concept]? Conditional: 1. If [physical realiser] is instantiating the physical realiser of the qualities which constitute [main concept], then how can the claim that [main concept] are [property] of [related concept 1] "rather than" [related concept 2] be justified? 2. If the above considerations are correct, and we want to hold on to the idea that [main concept] are [property] of [related concept], then it seems as if we must say that [main concept] are [property] of [specific related concept]. 3. If it is correct to say that [conditional statement], then it is possible that, just as [analogous situation 1], [analogous situation 2]. Comparative: 1. [View 1] seems to allow that [main concept] can be perceived through other perceptual modalities. 2. [Consequence 1] seems that we cannot also say that [consequence 2]. 3. Neither, however, is it phenomenologically obvious that [observation 1] is any less direct than [observation 2]. 4. [Observation 1] can be compared to [analogous situation 1]. 5. [Observation 2] can be thought similar to [analogous situation 2]. Evaluative: 1. I will not focus here on the nature of the relation between [concept 1] and [concept 2]. 2. I consider it an advantage of the view that I put forward below that we do not need to add such a complication to our understanding of [topic]. 3. What I take to be the most pressing difficulty for [type of view] is how to explain [difficulty]. 4. Simply saying that [oversimplification] seems inadequate if we want to explain, for example, [more complex situation]. 5. I do not deny that [agreed upon aspect 1], nor that [agreed upon aspect 2], but I do not think this forces us into [unwanted categorization]. 6. The trick is, however, to think of [main concept] as a [new categorization]. 7. Arguably, it fits better with [supporting evidence 1] and [supporting evidence 2] by allowing [consequence 1] and [consequence 2], and not [avoided consequence]. 8. Doing so, I think, will help us better determine more precisely the similarities and differences between [comparison 1]. 9. The view I have outlined here can be considered a first step in this direction. Explicative: 1. Whether [possibilities for the relationship between concepts], an account of [main concept] turns upon the kind of role it ascribes to [related concepts] in determining when [condition] is instantiated. 2. As [author] puts it: [quote explaining concept in more detail]. 3. [Main concept] has just one [property]: [detailed description]. 4. [Example object] has just one [main concept], its own [new categorization]. 5. [Related concept 1], which – simplifying – depends on [definition], can be compared to [analogous situation]. 6. [Related concept 2] – arguably, it is a mistake to think of it as [oversimplification] – but it can be thought of as similar to [detailed description of analogous situation]. 7. You [observe action 1], and recognise what you are [observing]. Why? Because you [observation leading to recognition]. 8. You [observe action 2], and recognise what you are [observing]. Why? On [theory name] you [observation leading to recognition]. Conclusive: 1. It would seem that the only remaining aspect of [domain] which instantiates [concept 1] and is suitably [descriptor] is [remaining option] itself. 2. It therefore seems plausible to imagine that they realise [consequence]. 3. This series is what I think we should identify with [main concept]. Concessive: 1. [Theory name], then, follows [tradition 1] in saying that [main concept] are [categorization 1], but breaks with both by holding that [main concept] are [new categorization]. 2. I have also argued that even though [concession], this is no reason to give up the idea that [main concept]. Imperative: 1. Imagine seeing [analogous situation]. 2. Consider how important [analogous situation] is for [related consequence].