# 1. AI as (quasi) Agents #paper/environmentalaestheticsofai People treat and talk about LLMs such as OpenAI's ChatGPT, Anthropic's Claude, or Google's Gemini as if they were persons. We refer to them with personal pronouns like 'he' or 'she' without hesitation; when they do not do what we ask, we try to persuade or cajole, explain, or even 'shout' by typing in ALL CAPS. We thank them for their assistance and apologise when we phrase requests poorly, as though courtesy might affect their responses. Perhaps our everyday talk captures something true: LLMs might be agentive or person-like in some sense. If so, this allows for the possibility that they can be aesthetically appreciated in something like the same way that real people can be aesthetically appreciated (we shall see some examples of this in the [[next section]]). This section will sketch three different flavours of [[this view]]. The first sort of agent view that one might hold is _literalism_. If one is a literalist, then one thinks that LLMs are persons or agents in some substantial way. This does not necessarily mean thinking that LLMs are just like human persons; rather, it consists of a commitment that humans and LLMs have something person-like in common. [[David Chalmers]] argues that successors to current LLMs may be conscious (Chalmers 2024); [[Eric Schwitzgebel]] and [[Henry Shevlin]] argue we should be ready to extend personhood rights to AIs with a non-negligible chance of consciousness (Schwitzgebel & Shevlin 2023); and [[Jeff Sebo]] urges extending moral consideration and preparing for rights on precautionary grounds (Sebo 2023). A second position we might call the _pseudo-agent_ or _as-if participant_ view. On this account, without attributing literal beliefs or intentions to the model, we treat its stable interactional regularities as practically agent-like for purposes of coordination and collaboration. The stance is pragmatic rather than ontological and concedes the prediction-and-training story; nonetheless, it licenses participant or collaborator talk. Cross (2024), writing on AI art, exemplifies [[this approach]] when he argues that prompting, iteration, and sampling structure a dialogue where value lies in the interaction itself. "By adjusting inputs, iterating, and sampling," he writes, "an AI artist is engaged in a process of mapping – and perhaps interrogating – the way that the algorithm sees and understands" (Cross 2024, 7–8), although he concedes that "[[the analogy]] with performance art isn't a perfect one" (Cross 2024, 9). Anscomb could also be thought of as endorsing a pseudo-agent view. She denies literal mentality and creativity in present systems – "we are not yet at the stage where an AI can formulate intentions … I argue that AI agents cannot be artistically creative" – and adopts a procedural label for "AI agent" as "a self-contained ('autonomous') procedure". Yet she also holds that an AI "may work iteratively without human intervention to non-accidentally generate the formal features of an image" and that it can merit "some share of production credit", which positions her as treating AI as a pseudo-agent, an as-if collaborator rather than a mind-bearing agent. Nonetheless, her vocabulary pressures toward minimal literalism: AICAN is said to be "able to self-assess these products", and "an AI agent arguably deserves credit for its contribution to the production of a work qua art" – locutions typically reserved for bearers of credit rather than [[mere instruments]]. A third approach is _chatbot fictionalism_, according to which human interaction with an AI chatbot is analogous to engaging with a work of fiction in the Waltonian sense of make-believe. Users knowingly participate in a game of imagination, treating the chatbot as if it were a sentient agent with thoughts and feelings. This position has been developed by Mallory (2023), Krueger & Roberts (2024), and Krueger & Osler (2022), whilst Friend & Goffin (2025) discuss the view without endorsing it. As Friend & Goffin observe, prop-oriented make-believe explains ordinary exchanges with Alexa and ChatGPT, where users converse "as when we say 'thank you' … while knowing that there is no real agent producing the replies" (Friend & Goffin 2025, 9). By contrast, content-oriented make-believe clarifies richer, empathetic uses where "it is the interaction itself that matters", with users imaginatively treating the chatbot as a person within the ongoing exchange. # 2. Appreciating LLMs as agents People, and perhaps other conscious beings (see Marchetti?), seem like a sort of thing that can be aesthetically appreciated. Most importantly for our interests here, [[this appreciation]] is not limited to physical beauty. If LLMs are a type of agent or quasi-agent, this might well allow for them to be aesthetically appreciated in a somewhat similar manner. In this section, we look at two ways in which this idea might be elaborated. The first route treats the system as a participant within an artist-structured interaction. On [[this approach]], the evaluative focus shifts away from freestanding outputs toward what the duo does together through prompting, iterating, and mapping the system’s _way of seeing_. As Cross observes: > By way of their selection of prompts, they elicit a sort of "participation" on the part of the AI … This participation allows them to interrogate the algorithm's [[latent space]]. (Cross 2024, 8) According to Cross, the interactional performance is primary; the images or videos are often documentation of that practice rather than the locus of value. He argues that "what is centrally important … is that it is less centrally focused on the output of the AI image generator. Instead, [[what matters]] is the interaction between the artist and the algorithm" (Cross 2024, 8). The product can thus function as documentation of the interactional process. Cross calls this the “exploration paradigm”: artists “relate to AI as a participant” and “create a space for interaction … by way of their prompts,” shifting appreciation “towards the artist’s interaction with the AI and the way in which the artist structures this interaction.” The generated images “function as a kind of documentation or evidence” of that exploration rather than the locus of value (Cross 2024, abstract; 9). The agent‑based framing is explicit: the work lies in a temporally extended dialogue in which the artist elicits “participation” from the model to “interrogate the algorithm’s [[latent space]],” making the algorithm’s ways of seeing and representing [[the object]] of appreciation (Cross 2024, 8–9). Cross presents this as an as‑if stance and concedes that the performance‑art analogy “isn’t a perfect one” (Cross 2024, 10). The second route would be to appreciate the AI’s 'personality'. In ordinary life, we can enjoy the personality traits of others, things like quick wit, poise, intellect, modesty.  There seems little reason to deny that such enjoyment is aesthetic. Indeed it seems to be a good example of _everyday aesthetics_. It is plausible that this sort of personal aesthetics is the foundation of our appreciation of what we might call performance personalities. Appreciating the improvisational agility of a comedian or the gravitas of a great orator seems like an extension of our more personal aesthetic appreciation of each other. It is easy to see how these ideas can be applied to LLMs and appreciation. Rather than treating AI as participant, we meet them on a more level playing field, as interlocutor. It is also tempting to say that, if one has interacted with many models, they have different personalities. OpenAI’s GPT‑4.5, for example, was sold as having a better personality than its predecessor. Indeed, after OpenAI replaced GPT‑4o with GPT‑5 in August 2025, user backlash over GPT‑5’s tone and 4o’s perceived ‘feel’ led OpenAI to reinstate GPT‑4o for Plus users and to adjust its model‑retirement policy. [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/ai-intelligencer-art-chip-deal-2025-08-14/), [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/openai/758537/chatgpt-4o-gpt-5-model-backlash-replacement). Also in August, fans organised a mock ‘funeral’ after Anthropic retired Claude 3 Sonnet on 21 July 2025 ([WIRED](https://www.wired.com/story/claude-3-sonnet-funeral-san-francisco/)). # 3. ‘What it in fact is’ Allen Carlson's approach to aesthetic appreciation centers on a deceptively simple principle: to properly appreciate something aesthetically, we must appreciate it as what it in fact is, guided by knowledge relevant to its nature. While Carlson developed this idea primarily through his influential work on environmental aesthetics, the principle extends far beyond nature to provide what he calls "a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. (p. 12)" At its core, Carlson's position challenges two dominant approaches in aesthetics. Against formalism, which would limit appreciation to pure sensory properties divorced from context and knowledge, Carlson insists that we cannot properly appreciate even basic forms without understanding what we're looking at. Against radical subjectivism, which would make any response equally valid, he argues that appreciation must be "centered on and driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself." As he explains: > The natural environmental model, in rejecting artistic and other related models of nature appreciation in favour of a dependence on common sense/scientific knowledge, provides a blueprint for aesthetic appreciation in general. This model suggests that in aesthetic appreciation of anything, be it people or pets, farmyards or neighborhoods, shoes or shopping malls, appreciation must be centered on and driven by the real nature of the object of appreciation itself. In all such cases, what is appropriate is not an imposition of artistic or other inappropriate ideals, but rather dependence on and guidance by means of knowledge, scientific or otherwise, that is relevant given the nature of the thing in question. This principle operates through what Carlson, following Paul Ziff, calls "acts of aspection"—the various ways we attend to and appreciate objects. Different kinds of things demand different modes of attention. With artworks, we need to know not just that something is a painting, but what kind of painting it is. Carlson quotes Ziff's vivid examples: "I survey a Tintoretto, while I scan an H. Bosch... Look for light in a Claude, for color in a Bonnard, for contoured volume in a Signorelli." The key insight is that "in knowing the type we know what and how to appreciate." For artworks, this knowledge comes readily because, as Carlson notes, "Works of art are our own creations; it is for this reason that we know what is and what is not a part of a work, which of its aspects are of aesthetic significance, and how to appreciate them." We know to appreciate the piano's sound rather than the coughing that interrupts it, to recognize where a painting ends at its frame, and to look at paintings rather than listen to them. This knowledge is built into what it means for something to be a painting, a symphony, or a sculpture. When we turn to nature and other non-art objects, however, the situation becomes more complex. Natural environments, unlike artworks, "typically are not the products of designers and typically have no design. Rather they come about 'naturally,' they change, grow, and develop by means of natural processes." Yet Carlson argues this doesn't leave us without resources for appropriate appreciation. Instead of knowledge about artistic traditions and intentions, we need knowledge about natural processes and environmental systems: > The fact that nature is natural—not our creation—does not mean, however, that we must be without knowledge of it. Natural objects are such that we can discover things about them that are independent of any involvement by us in their creation. Thus, although we have not created nature, we yet know a great deal about it. This knowledge, essentially common-sense/scientific knowledge, seems to me the only viable candidate for playing the role concerning the appreciation of nature that our knowledge of types of art, artistic traditions, and the like plays concerning the appreciation of art. This knowledge shapes not just what we notice but how we engage with it. Carlson offers a striking contrast between appreciating different natural environments: "It seems that we must survey a prairie environment, looking at the subtle contours of the land, feeling the wind blowing across the open space, and smelling the mix of prairie grasses and flowers. But such an act of aspection has little place in a dense forest environment. Here we must examine and scrutinize, inspecting the detail of the forest floor, listening carefully for the sounds of birds, and smelling carefully for the scent of spruce and pine." The principle of appreciating things as what they are thus provides a middle path between aesthetic approaches that are either too restrictive or too permissive. It acknowledges that aesthetic appreciation can be richer or poorer, more or less appropriate, without imposing a single rigid standard. It recognizes that different kinds of objects—whether natural environments, architectural works, agricultural landscapes, or everyday artifacts—each make their own demands on appreciation. And it insists that meeting these demands requires not the abandonment of knowledge but its proper employment: using the kind of knowledge relevant to the kind of thing we're appreciating. In this way, Carlson's approach offers both a critique of narrow formalism and a defense against "anything goes" relativism, grounding aesthetic appreciation in the objective features of things while acknowledging the active, informed role of the appreciator.\ not so good version below but might have somerthin interesting....\ Parts One and Two cleared ground: we bracketed audience‑relative modes of attention, insisted on non‑audience‑relative description, and argued that correct classification comes before any downstream work. This section now states the working notion of what‑it‑in‑fact‑is that the rest of the paper relies on. > "We must appreciate nature as what it in fact is, that is, as it is understood through the natural sciences, especially the environmental sciences." (Carlson 2000, 6) Read as a constraint on identification, this says: to take an item as what it in fact is, we must place it under the kind that truly applies to it using knowledge proper to that kind (for artworks: art‑historical and genre knowledge; for artefacts: design, production, and proper‑function knowledge; for natural items: the relevant sciences). The point is classificatory: it fixes identity conditions prior to anything evaluative or audience‑relative. A statement of what X in fact is should be a single, integrated characterisation. It says, in one breath, how X came to be (its generative history); what it is made of and how it is organised (its constitution); what counts as the whole rather than a mere fragment (its proper unit); how it is to continue and when it would cease to be the same thing (its persistence and change conditions); and, where the kind is functional, which capacities or roles belong to it. Boundaries with surroundings, and the stance X appropriately calls for, fall out of kind and constitution rather than being imposed by the audience. Two constraints follow. First, aptness of categories: do not import predicates belonging to a different sort unless warranted by genesis and constitution. Second, genesis priority: later uses or contexts by themselves do not change what the thing is; the making/formation story anchors kind and unity. These discipline misclassification without making positive aesthetic claims. So framed, the present notion does the work we need downstream. For Carlson, it enables us to say what a natural environment in fact is without smuggling in audience‑relative framing: the unit and boundaries are fixed by the true generative and organisational story of the relevant natural systems. For our later application to large language models, the same notion will let us say what an LLM in fact is—by its formation procedures, constitutive architecture, modal profile, and persistence conditions—before any appeal to evaluation or to environment. This section supplies the single, precise working notion that the subsequent sections will apply.