# 3. Design-Scene Properties and [[Psychedelic Aesthetics]] ## 3.1 Understanding Design-Scene [[Properties Drawing]] on Wollheim and Budd, Nanay develops [[the concept]] of design-scene properties to explain a central aspect of pictorial art appreciation. These properties emerge from [[the relationship between]] two elements: the physical marks on a surface ([[the design]]) and what those marks depict (the scene). When we look at a painting, we notice both the paint itself and what it represents. As Nanay explains: > "When we are admiring a Miró drawing and the way two simple curved lines somehow manage to depict an expressive human face, what we are attending to is exactly a design-scene property: the relational property partly determined by the shape property of the two-dimensional curved line on the canvas and partly determined by the three-dimensional depicted face." These properties differ from purely physical properties (the chemical composition of paint) and purely representational properties (what the painting depicts). They require both elements to be understood. In Budd's words, design-scene properties capture "the crucial characteristic of pictorial art, namely, the interrelationship between the marks on the surface and what is depicted in them." Examples make this concept clearer. In Cézanne's landscapes, we notice how individual brushstrokes create the impression of pine needles. In Turner's seascapes, we appreciate how layers of translucent paint capture the effect of mist over water. In both cases, we're attending to [[the relationship between]] physical marks and depicted content. ## 3.2 [[The Challenge]] for [[Psychedelic Aesthetics]] [[The challenge]] that design-scene properties present to our proposal can be put as follows: Design-scene properties emerge from [[the relationship between]] visible physical media (paint, ink, graphite) and what these media depict. We can see both the brushstrokes and the landscape they create. But what would be the analogous "design" elements in psychedelic experiences? Various philosophers have argued that perception is phenomenally transparent (e.g., Tye double check that Gow paper). According to this thesis, in [[perceptual experience]] we seem to be aware only of [[the objects]] and properties in the world, not of our experiences of them or the processes that generate them. When we see a tree, we don't seem to experience our perception as a model constructed by our brain; phenomenologically, we simply experience the tree itself. Our awareness appears to reach through the representational vehicle to grasp only its content. This transparency thesis presents a challenge to our comparison between pictorial and [[psychedelic aesthetics]]. While paintings have physical marks we can attend to alongside their representational content, mental processes would remain hidden from view if the transparency thesis is correct. The physical basis of experience—neural activity—isn't directly perceivable in the way that paint on canvas is. If experiential processes remain entirely transparent, then nothing like design-scene properties would be possible in psychedelic states because one half of the necessary relation—the "design" element—would remain inaccessible. Any attempt to suggest that we might somehow perceive our own perceptual processes also risks introducing a problematic homunculus conception of experience. If the transparency thesis is correct, then [[the analogy]] between pictorial and [[psychedelic aesthetics]] appears to break down. Design-scene properties require that we can attend to both medium and content, perceiving the relationship between them. But if experiential processes remain entirely transparent, then nothing like design-scene properties would be possible in psychedelic states. One half of the necessary relation—the "design" element—would remain inaccessible to experience. Any attempt to suggest that we might somehow perceive our own perceptual processes also risks introducing a problematic homunculus conception of experience. ## 3.3 Design-Scene Properties in Predictive Coding To address this challenge, we need to reinterpret design-scene properties within the predictive processing framework we've established. This framework offers a way to understand how mental processes might become partially accessible to experience without falling into the homunculus trap. Nanay doesn't discuss predictive coding in his account of design-scene properties. However, we can reinterpret his insights within this framework. In predictive coding terms, perceiving a painting involves making predictions about both its physical surface and what it depicts. When we look at Miró's curved lines, our visual system generates predictions about both the lines themselves (as physical marks) and a face (as depicted content). Design-scene properties emerge from the relationship between these two sets of predictions. Nanay argues that design-scene properties become accessible through what he calls "distributed aesthetic attention." We can extend this idea using the predictive processing framework. Recall that in predictive coding, attention is understood as precision-weighting of prediction errors. When we attend to something, we're increasing the precision-weighting on prediction errors related to that feature. In ordinary perception, we typically weight prediction errors about content (what something is) more heavily than prediction errors about perceptual processes themselves (how we see it). When reading, we focus on the meaning of words, not the shapes of letters or the process of recognising them. But in aesthetic appreciation of pictures, we distribute precision-weighting more evenly, attending to both medium and content. This precision-weighting explanation offers a predictive coding account of what Nanay calls "distributed aesthetic attention"—attention focused on a single object but distributed across various properties. According to our interpretation, this attentional pattern allows us to notice design-scene properties that might otherwise remain invisible.