## 1. Introduction * **Buddhism and the Illusion of Self**: * **Core Belief**: Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion. * **Root of Suffering**: This illusion is considered the fundamental cause of suffering inherent in the human condition. * **Velleman's Exploration**: The lecture aims to explore this Buddhist thought through the lens of [[analytic philosophy]]. * **[[Central Question]]**: [[How does]] the illusion of an enduring self lead to human suffering? * **[[Analytic Philosophy]]**: * **Definition**: A tradition in philosophy characterized by clarity, logical rigor, and argumentation, often focusing on conceptual analysis and logical frameworks. * **Velleman's Approach**: Using the tools and concepts of [[analytic philosophy]] to understand and articulate Buddhist ideas. * **Bridging Traditions**: Attempting to connect Eastern philosophical insights with Western analytical methods. * **Enduring Self**: * **Definition**: [[The concept]] of a self that persists as a numerically identical entity [[over time]], maintaining its identity through change. * **Illusion of Enduring Self**: The Buddhist idea that this sense of a continuous, unchanging self is a mistaken perception, not a reality. * **Contrast with Momentary Self**: Implies that the self might be better understood as a series of momentary experiences or states, rather than a single persistent substance. * **Illusion**: * **Definition**: A false perception or belief about reality; something that appears to be one way but is actually another. * **Epistemological Status**: In this context, the belief in an enduring self is considered [[not just]] a mistake, but a fundamental misapprehension of [[the nature]] of personal existence. * **Impact on Experience**: This illusion shapes our experience and understanding of ourselves and the world. * **Suffering**: * **Definition**: In Buddhist philosophy, *dukkha*, often translated as suffering, but encompassing a broader range of dissatisfaction, unease, pain, and unsatisfactoriness inherent in existence. * **Human Condition**: Suffering is presented as a fundamental aspect of the human condition, rooted in our attachments and misperceptions. * **Root Cause**: The illusion of an enduring self is identified as the primary root of this suffering, suggesting that dispelling this illusion is key to liberation. * **Passage of Time**: * **Illusion of Passage of Time**: Velleman introduces [[the idea]] that not only is the enduring self an illusion, but so is the common perception of time as something that "passes" or "flows." * **Interdependence of Illusions**: He argues that the illusion of an enduring self is intrinsically linked to and perhaps even generates the illusion of the passage of time. * **Static vs. Dynamic Time**: This challenges the intuitive sense of time as dynamic and moving, suggesting a more static or eternalist view. * **Velleman's Thesis (Abstract Summary)**: * **Enduring Self as Illusion**: The enduring self is indeed an illusion. * **Passage of Time as Illusion**: This illusion is intertwined with another – the illusion of the passage of time. * **Causality**: Seeming to be an enduring self (even though one is not) is what makes time seem to pass (even though it does not). * **Source of Suffering**: The appearance that time passes is the source of suffering. * **Alleviation of Suffering**: Dispelling both illusions alleviates suffering. * **Quote**: > Buddhists believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I want to explore whether this particular Buddhist thought can be understood in terms familiar to [[analytic philosophy]]. How might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering? After explain- ing the sense in which the enduring self is indeed an illusion, I argue that this illusion goes hand-in-hand with another – namely, the illusion of the passage of time. Seeming to be an enduring self, even though one is not, is what makes time seem to pass, even though it does not. And the appearance that time passes, I argue, is the source of the suffering that is allevi- ated when both illusions are dispelled. (J. David Velleman, "So It Goes," p. 1) * **Merleau-Ponty Epigraph**: * **Central Theme**: The quote from Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that time and events are not objective processes but are constituted by our subjective perspective and relation to things. * **Rejection of Time as a Flowing River**: Time is not like a river, a substance that flows independently. This metaphor, though persistent (Heraclitus to present), is misleading. * **Subjective Witness**: The river metaphor persists because we "surreptitiously" insert a witness into the river to observe its course, implying time is observer-dependent. * **Time Arises from Relation to Things**: Time is not a "real process" or "actual succession" to be recorded objectively, but "arises from my relation to things," emphasizing the subjective and relational nature of time experience. * **Perspective and Individuality**: Change presupposes a "position" of the observer, whose "finite perspective is the basis of [events'] individuality." Time itself "presupposes a view of time." * **Quote**: > Change presupposes a certain position which I take up and from which I see things in procession before me: there are no events without someone to whom they happen and whose finite perspective is the basis of their individuality. Time presupposes a view of time. It is, therefore, not like a river, not a flowing substance. The fact that the metaphor based on this comparison has persisted from the time of Heraclitus to our own day is explained by our surreptitiously putting into the river a witness of its course.… Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession that I am content to record. It arises from my relation to things. (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 411–12, as quoted in J. David Velleman, "So It Goes," p. 1) * **Motivation and Challenge to Western Philosophy**: * **Challenge to Self-Construction View**: Buddhist thought challenges philosophers like [[Christine Korsgaard]] and [[Daniel Dennett]] who believe self is constructed and a positive achievement. * **Korsgaard and Dennett's View**: Self-invention/construction is a "wonderful accomplishment," a source of pride. * **Buddhist View**: Self-construction is a "tragic mistake" to be undone. * **Question for Western Philosophy**: Can Western philosophers understand and make sense of this critical Buddhist attitude towards self-construction? * **Velleman's Goal**: To explore and bridge this gap in [[philosophical perspectives]] on the self. * **Reference to Korsgaard**: * **Christine M. Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (1996)** * **Christine M. Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution: Action, Identity, and Integrity," The Locke Lectures, 2002** * **Reference to Dennett**: * **[[Daniel Dennett]], "The Origins of Selves," *Cogito* 3 (1989)** * **Daniel Dennett, "The Reality of Selves," in *Consciousness Explained* (1991)** * **Daniel Dennett, "The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity," in *Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives* (1992)** * **Parfit's Neo-Lockean Theory and Buddhist Affinity**: * **Derek Parfit as Embracing Buddhist Attitude**: Philosopher Derek Parfit is presented as sympathetic to the Buddhist view, particularly in his reflections on personal identity. * **Locke's Memory Theory**: Locke argued past selves are those whose experiences we remember first-personally. * **Parfit's Critique of Locke**: Parfit extends Locke's theory but identifies problems. * **Brain Hemisphere Transplant Thought Experiment**: If brain hemispheres are transplanted into two bodies, memories of one past self could be in two present selves. * **Incompatibility with Identity Logic**: This scenario challenges the traditional logic of identity, as one past self would relate to more than one present self in a way identity doesn't allow. * **Memory Connections Not Sufficient for Enduring Self**: Memory connections, therefore, don't necessarily trace a single, enduring object (self). * **Parfit's Conclusion**: Memory is unsuited to be the basis of an enduring self. * **Beneficial to Give Up Belief in Enduring Self**: Parfit suggests it would be beneficial to abandon the belief in an enduring self. * **Parfit's "Glass Tunnel" Metaphor**: Describes his previous belief in endurance as feeling "imprisoned in myself," like moving through a "glass tunnel" towards "darkness." * **Liberation**: Changing his view led to the "walls of [the] glass tunnel disappear[ing]," and now he lives "in the open air," suggesting a sense of freedom and openness from abandoning belief in enduring self. * **Reference to Parfit's Works**: * **Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (1984)** * **Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," *The Philosophical Review* 80 (1971)** * **Quote 1 (Glass Tunnel)**: > Of the time when he believed in his own endurance, he says, “I seemed imprisoned in myself”: My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tun- nel disappeared. I now live in the open air. (Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 280, as quoted in J. David Velleman, "So It Goes," p. 2) * **Quote 2 (Egoism and Fear of Death)**: > Egoism, the fear not of near but of distant death, the regret that so much of one’s only life should have gone by – these are not, I think, wholly natural or instinctive. They are all strengthened by the beliefs about personal identity which I have been attacking. If we give up these beliefs, they should be weakened. (Derek Parfit, “Personal Identity,” *The Philosophical Review* 80 (1971): 27, as quoted in J. David Velleman, "So It Goes," p. 3) * **Similarity to Buddhist View**: Parfit notes the similarity between his view and Buddhist perspectives on personal identity. * **Critique of Parfit's Consolation and Underestimation of Buddhist Revolution**: * **Underestimation of Radical Change**: Velleman suggests Parfit underestimates the profound shift in attitude that can result from this view. * **Philosophical Argument vs. Meditative Practice**: Parfit believes philosophical arguments are sufficient for obtaining consolation, while Buddhists believe long, arduous meditation is required. * **More Radical Consequences**: Velleman argues shedding belief in enduring self has far more radical consequences than Parfit imagines, beyond just "breaking out of a glass tunnel." * **Need for More Than Argument**: Implying that intellectual acceptance is not enough for the kind of transformation Buddhists seek. * **Endurance vs. Perduration (Initial Distinction)**: * **Ontological Status of Enduring Self**: To understand how belief in enduring self leads to suffering, we need to understand the "ontological status" of this self. What does it mean for the self to endure? * **Metaphysical Conceptions of Persistence**: Metaphysics defines two main ways objects persist through time: endurance and perdurance. * **Reference to Haslanger**: * **Sally Haslanger, "Persistence Through Time," in *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics* (2003)** ## P. Endurance vs. Perduration (Detailed Explanation) * **Perduration**: * **Extension in Time Like Space**: Objects are extended in time as they are in space. * **Temporal Parts**: Just as spatial parts are portions of an object at different locations in space, temporal parts are portions of an object at different moments in time. * **Object Fills Time with Temporal Parts**: An object perdures by having a series of temporal parts, one after another, analogous to spatial parts side by side. * **Analogy to Spatial Extension**: Similar to how an extended object occupies space with different spatial parts at different spatial points. * **Endurance**: * **Distinct Temporal Extension**: Object's extension in time is different from spatial extension. * **Wholly Present at a Time**: Object can be entirely present at a single point in time, unlike spatial parts where only a portion is at a point in space. * **Not Temporal Parts**: Enduring objects are conceived as being fully present at each moment of their existence, not composed of temporal parts. * **Mystery of "Wholly Present"**: What does it mean to be "wholly present" at a time? * **Spatial Parts Still Present**: All spatial parts can be simultaneously present at an instant in both perdurance and endurance views. * **Not All Temporal Parts Present**: "Wholly present" cannot mean all temporal parts are present at one time, as this is logically contradictory if the object exists at multiple times. * **Objections to Endurance and Suspicion of Incoherence**: * **No Temporal Parts View**: Some philosophers define endurance as meaning objects have no temporal parts at all. * **Possibility of Abstracting Temporal Parts**: Velleman argues against this. If an object is extended in time (a divisible dimension), we can conceptually abstract "temporal parts" by considering the object within specific time regions (hours, minutes, seconds). * **Mysterious Nature of Endurance**: The nature of endurance becomes mysterious and difficult to conceptualize coherently. * **Suspicion of Incoherent Idea**: Raises the suspicion that the idea of an enduring self is fundamentally incoherent. * **Could We Believe in Incoherence?**: Poses the question: could we actually believe in something incoherent? * **Illusion and Incoherence**: Suggests that if the enduring self is an illusion, then perhaps an incoherent idea is sufficient to explain the illusion's nature and origin. * **Focus on Illusion's Origin**: Instead of pursuing a coherent definition of enduring self, Velleman proposes to explore how the illusion of such a self arises. * **Reference to Hofweber and Velleman**: * **Thomas Hofweber and J. David Velleman, "How to Endure" (MS)** - developing objections to endurance. * **Note on Presentism**: Mentions that these objections to endurance might not apply under presentism (theory of time), which is briefly discussed later. ## P. Origin of the Illusion of Enduring Self (Experiential Memory) * **Locke's Suggestion Revisited**: Velleman returns to Locke's idea that the idea of self arises from experience and memory. * **Experiential Memory**: Emphasizes *experiential* memory, memory that includes sensory and affective content, re-experiencing aspects of the original event. * **Egocentric Representational Scheme**: Memory has an egocentric structure, representing the world as experienced from a specific point of view – the past self. * **Perspective of Past Self**: Memory recalls the world as it appeared to the person who had the original experience. * **Spatio-Temporal Distance**: This past standpoint is located at a spatio-temporal distance from the present "now" of remembering. * **Conflation of Subjects**: The mind tends to blur the distinction between the subject of the past experience and the present subject of memory. * **Birthday Cake Example (1957)**: * **Experiential Image**: Memory of blowing out candles includes an experiential image of the scene as seen by a 5-year-old. * **Imagination Exercise**: Inviting someone (Jane Doe) to imagine being that birthday boy. * **Report of Imagination**: Jane Doe might say, "I’ve just imagined that I am the birthday boy at David Velleman’s fifth birthday party." * **Pronoun 'I' Analysis**: * **First 'I'**: Refers to Jane Doe (the one imagining). * **Second 'I'**: Does it refer to Jane Doe or the 5-year-old David Velleman? * **Not Identity**: Jane Doe isn't imagining being *identical* to the 5-year-old David Velleman. It's not a bizarre scenario of identity between unrelated individuals. * **Imagining *Being* the Birthday Boy**: She is imagining *being* in the position of the 5-year-old, experiencing the party from his perspective. * **Experiential Image Content**: The imagined content is like the statement "I am the birthday boy" uttered *within* the imagined scene by the 5-year-old. * **'I' in Imagined Scene**: Refers to the 5-year-old, the one experiencing the scene, not Jane Doe. * **Interpretation of Report**: "I’ve imagined that I am the birthday boy" should be interpreted as: "I (Jane Doe) have imagined an experience with the content ‘I am the birthday boy’," where the first 'I' is Jane Doe and the second is the 5-year-old. * **Reference to Williams**: * **Bernard Williams, "The Imagination and the Self," in *Problems of the Self* (1973)** - making a similar point about imagination and self. * **Reference to Castañeda and Perry**: * **Hector-Neri Castañeda, Quasi-indicator**: Second 'I' functions as a quasi-indicator (pronoun in indirect discourse representing first-person pronoun in direct discourse). * **John Perry, "Belief and Acceptance," in *The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays* (1993)** - clearer explanation of quasi-indicators. * **Experiential Memory and Conflation (Self-Superimposition)**: * **Memory Report**: When Velleman says, "I remember that I was the birthday boy," it's a similar report to Jane Doe's imagination report. * **Content of Memory**: Reporting an experiential memory with content "I am the birthday boy," as if uttered by the 5-year-old in the remembered scene. * **Difference from Imagination**: Unlike Jane Doe who knows she's not the birthday boy, Velleman is inclined to think he *is* remembering *his* being the birthday boy. * **Conflation of Selves**: Velleman conflates his *remembering self* (present subject of memory) with the *self of the experience remembered* (past self). * **Superimposition**: The "I" who remembers and the "I" of the experience become superimposed, creating the illusion of a single self present in both moments. * **Double Reference to Present Self**: In "I remember that I was the birthday boy," Velleman takes himself to be referring twice to his *present* self, mistakenly extending present self to past experience. * **Reference to "Self to Self"**: * **J. David Velleman, "Self to Self," *The Philosophical Review* 105 (1996)** (reprinted in *Self to Self: Selected Essays*) - detailed argument summarized here. * **Contingent Truth Condition of Memory (Footnote 13)**: Addresses potential objection about memory's truth condition and reference of "I." * **Indexical Reference**: Memory refers to the subject of the remembered experience indexically, pointing to "him" at the origin of the experience, by pointing to "him" in the memory-image. * **Veridical Memory**: If the image is a copy of an experience, indexical reference to "me" of that experience succeeds, and remembering is veridical. * **Illusory Memory**: If not a copy, reference fails, memory is illusory. * **Condition for Veridicality**: For veridical memory, remembered experience must be undergone by "me," subject accessible to indexical reference as "me." * **Jane Doe's Image vs. Memory**: Jane Doe refers to birthday boy as "me" through stipulation (referring by name first), not genuine indexicality. Memory allows direct "me" reference based on causal history of the image. * **First-Personal Access**: This is the sense of first-personal access to past self in memory. * **Incoherence of Superimposed Momentary Selves**: * **Momentary Subjects**: The selves being superimposed are momentary subjects: * **Present Self**: "I" as subject of memory *now*, existing only in the moment of remembering. * **Past Self**: "I" of the remembered experience, existing only in the moment of that experience. * **Wholly Present at a Time (Again)**: Both are conceived as "wholly present at a single point in time." * **Me-Here-and-Now**: Present self remembering. * **"Me"-There-and-Then**: Past self experiencing. * **Illusion of Numerical Identity**: Superimposition creates the illusion they are numerically identical – same subject existing in two different moments. * **Incoherence**: Already incoherent if one thing can't have existence confined to two different moments. * **Compounded Incoherence**: Further compounded by thinking this momentary subject persisted through the interval, existing in entirety at *each* intervening moment. * **Experiential Anticipation**: * **Same Effect as Memory**: Experiential anticipation (prefiguring future experience) produces the same illusion. * **Future Perspective**: Anticipation is from the perspective one expects to occupy in the future experience. * **Self-Superimposition in Future**: Present "I" anticipating and future "I" of anticipated experience become superimposed. * **Single Self in Present and Future**: Illusion of a single self having full existence both now and in the future. * **Spatial Analogy: Woody Allen as Spermatozoon**: * **Incoherence Illustrated**: Spatial analogy to further illustrate the incoherence of the enduring self idea. * **Woody Allen Scene**: Reference to Woody Allen scene playing a spermatozoon (from *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex*). * **Reality: Pervading Space**: In reality, a person pervades space, occupying different points with different spatial parts. No part is identical to another part or whole person. * **Woody Allen Analogy: Invading Space**: In the scene, Woody Allen "invades" space. He occupies different points with a smaller self playing the role of each spatial part of his own body. * **Invasion vs. Pervasion**: Invasion (Allen analogy) is incoherent, unlike pervasion (reality). * **Temporal Extension as Invasion**: Experiential memory leads to thinking of temporal extension as "invasion" rather than "pervasion" - composed of a single momentary self playing role of each temporal part. * **Temptation to Say "All Temporal Parts Present at Once"**: * **Self as Present Self**: Tempted to think of self as present self – momentary subject complete "here-and-now." * **Persistence Illusion**: Tempted to say self persists because we think of this present self as existing at other moments too. * **Complete Self at Each Moment**: Because of this, we conceive each moment as containing the *complete* self, not just a temporal part. * **Denial of Temporal Parts**: Temptation to deny we have mere temporal parts. * **Example Moments**: "There I am, all of me, at my fifth birthday party; here I am, all of me, remembering that party; there I will be, all of me, on my seventy-fifth birthday…" * **Single Momentary Subject Playing Multiple Roles**: As if one momentary subject can play all temporal roles (5-year-old, 53-year-old, 75-year-old). * **Analogy to Woody Allen Cells**: "I think of myself as all of me, all the time, just as Woody Allen is all Woody Allen in every one of his cells." * **Reference to Autobiographical Novelists (Footnote 14)**: Indirect evidence from autobiographical novelists like Laura Ingalls Wilder and Elspeth Huxley. * **Depiction of Childish Minds**: Able to depict past experience as registered by younger selves' minds. * **Contrast with Childhood Memories**: Contrast with ordinary childhood memories where psychological distance is "foreshortened." * **Current Consciousness Superimposed**: Past experience seems registered by current adult consciousness (remembering 'I' superimposed on 'I' remembered). ## P. Consequences of Shedding Enduring Self Illusion and Illusion of Time's Passage * **Perduring Self and Eternalism**: What if we shed the sense of enduring and conceived of ourselves as perduring? Velleman suggests shedding enduring self illusion leads to shedding illusion of passage of time. * **Eternalism**: Concept of perdurance fits best with eternalism, a conception of time. * **Temporal Relations**: Eternalism states all temporal facts are expressible in terms of temporal relations *between events*. * **Earlier/Later, Closer/Further**: Events are related as earlier/later and closer/further in time. * **Exhaustive Temporal Facts**: These relations exhaust all temporal facts - nothing more to time. * **No Passage of Time in Eternalism**: Implies time as a static structure of relations, not something that "passes." * **MacTaggart's Argument Against Eternalism**: * **Temporal Relations Insufficient**: Philosopher J. Ellis MacTaggart argued temporal relations alone are not sufficient for our concept of time (and ultimately, that time concept is incoherent). * **Unchanging Relations**: Temporal relations between events are unchanging/timeless. * **Cannot Account for Passage of Time**: Unchanging relations can't account for the "passage of time" - how future events approach, become present, and recede into past. * **Eternalist Explanation of "Drawing Near"**: Eternalists explain "future event drawing closer" as meaning the event is nearer to our *later* utterance of "closer" than *earlier* utterance. * **Timeless Relations**: These temporal relations are fixed and timeless, constituting time itself, not something changing. * **Time Requires Change**: MacTaggart argues time *requires* change – specifically, the change of events approaching, being present, and receding. * **Reference to MacTaggart**: * **J. Ellis MacTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," *Mind* 68 (1908)** * **MacTaggart's Paradox of Temporal Passage**: * **Paradoxical Change**: The change of future to present to past is paradoxical and seemingly impossible. * **Temporal Unfolding of Change**: This change itself must unfold *in time*. Event must be *first* future, *then* present, *then* past. * **Eternalist Reversion**: Adding temporal indices ("first," "then," "then again") to describe change reverts to eternalist idiom. * **Static Relations Again**: We end up describing change using *unchanging* temporal relations. Event is timelessly *later* than "first," *simultaneous* with "then," *earlier* than "then again." * **No Real Transit**: Transit from future to past appears to be just a set of *static* temporal relations. * **Description Fails to Capture Passage**: To describe time passing, we're forced back into terms that make time stand still. * **Attempted Solution: Moving Present (But Fails)**: * **Temptation: Moving Present**: Say what "moves" is not future/past but the *present*, or *property of being present*, which successively belongs to different events. * **Description of Moving Present Fails**: But describing how "present" moves also leads to eternalist language. * **Successive Belonging**: Saying "present" belongs *first* to one set of events, *then* another, *then* a third, as they occur. * **Redundancy**: This just restates that at the *time* of events, "present" belongs to them. Timelessly true of all events. * **No Real Movement of Present**: How can "present" be said to move? It's just a series of later and later events, each present when it occurs, each at a fixed distance from future/past. ## P. Presentism (Desperate Attempt to Solve) * **Presentism**: A "desperate" attempt to solve the problem of temporal passage, theory of time. * **Only Present Exists**: According to presentism, *only the present exists*. * **Past and Future as Tenses**: Past and future are not realms of existence, but merely tenses modifying facts about the present. * **Analogy to Modality and Actualism**: Best explained by analogy to modality and actualism. * **Reference to Bigelow**: * **John Bigelow, "The Passage of Time" (MS)** - source for Velleman's explanation of presentism. * **Modality and Actualism Analogy**: * **Kerry Might Have Won 2004**: Fact: "John Kerry might have won 2004 election." * **Possible History Interpretation (Loose)**: Could say this means a Kerry victory occurs in a *merely possible history* (alternative to actual history). But this is not "metaphysically strict." * **Actualism (Strict View)**: Strict view (actualism) only acknowledges *actual* events. Only Kerry's *loss* occurred in 2004 (actual event). * **Subjunctive Fact**: "Kerry might have won" is a *subjunctive fact* true of actuality. * **No Kerry Victory in Possible Realm**: No actual Kerry victory event existing in a realm of "mere possibility." * **Modal Realism (Contrast)**: Modal realists (like David Lewis) believe in events/things in possible realms, but most philosophers reject this. * **Presentism Extends Actualism to Time**: * **Rejects Past Events Too**: Presentism goes further than actualism. Rejects even Kerry's *loss* as existing in the past. * **"Kerry's Loss in Past" - Loose Talk**: Describing Kerry's loss as "occurring in the past" is as loose as describing victory in possible history. * **Only Present Events**: Only events that *are occurring now in actuality* exist according to presentism. * **Subjunctive and Past-Tense Facts About Present**: "Kerry might have won" (subjunctive) and "Kerry did lose" (past-tense) are both facts *about the actual present*. * **Present is All There Is**: The actual present is all there is for facts to be about. * **No Kerry Victory in Possibility, No Kerry Loss in Past**: Just as no Kerry victory in realm of possibility, no Kerry loss in realm of past. * **Presentism and Passage of Time**: * **Passage Represented by Tensed Facts**: Presentism claims to represent passage of time through tensed facts about the present. * **Event Occurrence and Future Past-Tense Fact**: Event's occurrence entails the future fact that it *will have occurred* (later a past-tense fact). * **Passage from Present to Past**: This entailment (occurrence -> future past-tense fact) is said to represent passage from present to past. * **Event Occurrence and Past Future-Tense Facts**: Event's occurrence incompatible with "it wasn't going to occur," compatible with "it was going to occur." * **Passage from Future to Present**: This entailment (prior future-tense facts -> present occurrence) represents passage from future to present. * **Open Future to Fixed Past**: Occurrence also compatible with "no fact of matter whether event would occur" previously, but entails "determinate fact of having occurred" later. * **Future Open, Past Closed**: Constellation of facts represents open future closing into fixed past. * **Presentism and Endurance**: * **Solving Endurance Problem**: Presentism claims to solve endurance problem too. * **No Kerry in Possible History, No Kerry in Past**: Just as no Kerry in possible history where he won, no Kerry in past where he lost. * **Present Kerry is All of Kerry**: All there is of John Kerry is the *present* John Kerry. * **Tensed Properties of Present Kerry**: Present Kerry has past-tense properties (existed in 2004, lost election) and subjunctive property (might have won). * **Properties Belong to Present Self**: Presentist insists these properties belong to Kerry's *actual present self*. * **Denial of Perduration**: Presentism denies perdurance by denying temporal parts. * **Existence Confined to Present**: Kerry's existence is confined to the present moment. * **Endurance in Trivial Sense**: Presentism describes endurance only in a "trivial sense" – objects are wholly present at every moment of their existence, but exist only at one moment (present). * **No Persistence**: Objects don't actually persist or endure in a meaningful way, just have tensed properties in the present moment. * **Drawbacks of Presentism**: * **Present Bears Witness to History**: Present must bear enough features to make *all* past-tense facts true. Present must "bear witness to all of history." Overburdened present. * **Reference to Keller**: * **Simon Keller, "Presentism and Truthmaking," in *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1* (2004)** - objection cited by Bigelow. * **Doesn't Solve Endurance/Passage Problems**: More serious problem is presentism doesn't *really* solve problems of endurance and passage. * **Static Structure of Tensed Facts**: Describes a *static structure* of tensed facts about present, not dynamic passage. Tensed facts entail other tensed facts, but nothing *moves*. * **Trivial Endurance, No Persistence**: Describes objects as "wholly present" at each moment *but* only existing in the present. Trivial endurance, no real persistence. ## P. Illusions of Endurance and Temporal Passage are Interdependent * **Hoping for Intuitive Solution**: We should hope for a more intuitive solution to endurance and temporal passage. * **Solution: Both are Illusions**: Velleman's solution: both endurance and temporal passage are *illusions*. * **Interdependent Illusions**: These illusions are *interdependent*. * **Enduring Self Illusion -> Temporal Passage Illusion**: Illusion of enduring self gives rise to illusion of temporal passage. * **Origin of Enduring Self Illusion (Reiteration)**: Already suggested origin of enduring self illusion from first-personal memory and anticipation (self-superimposition). * **Passage of Time Arises from Enduring Self Illusion**: Now suggests illusion of enduring self *creates* illusion of movement in time. * **Movement Requires Enduring Object**: * **Problem of Characterizing Movement**: Difficulty in characterizing temporal movement was focusing on *events*. * **Event Identity Dependent on Time**: Event identity depends on *when* it occurs. Event can't "move" in time without becoming a *different* event. * **Solution: Something Enduring to Move**: Whatever future draws nearer to or past recedes from must be something that can exist at different times while retaining identity. * **Enduring Self as Candidate**: The "enduring self" (or illusion of it) fits this role. * **Enduring Self and Passage of Time**: * **Suppose Enduring Self (Incoherent Sense)**: Suppose we have the incoherent enduring self from memory/anticipation illusion. * **Self Moves Through Time**: In that case, "I" (enduring self) exist in entirety at successive moments, thereby *moving* in entirety with respect to events. * **Events Draw Near/Recede to Self**: As "I" move through time, future events draw nearer to "me" and past events recede. * **Time Truly Passes**: Time truly passes, in the sense that it passes *me* (the enduring self). * **Perduring Self and No Passage of Time**: * **Perduring Self is Stationary**: If I merely perdure, "I" do not move with respect to time. * **Temporal Parts Stationary**: I extend through time with newer temporal parts, but all parts remain stationary. * **Analogy to Symphony Performance**: Perduring self like symphony performance. Performance doesn't move in time, just extends temporal parts to fill moments. * **Midnight and Performance Example**: Last note of symphony closer to midnight than first, but we don't say *midnight and performance move closer*. * **Timeless Interval**: Midnight and performance separated by timelessly fixed interval (vague, but precise for parts – first note, second note, etc.). * **Ceiling and Body Parts Example**: Like ceiling and body parts. Ceiling doesn't get closer to "me" from feet to head. Fixed distance to body parts. * **Enduring Self and Midnight Example (Contrast)**: * **Enduring Self Moves**: If "I" am enduring, then *midnight and I* get closer. Not just temporal parts, but *I* as a whole. * **Existence at 9pm and 10pm**: "I" exist entirely at 9pm, and again entirely at 10pm. Same entity existing at different times. * **Different Distances to Midnight**: Midnight at different distances from "my" fully constituted self (further at 9pm, closer at 10pm). * **Perspective of Drawing Near**: From "my" perspective (enduring self), midnight draws nearer. * **Illusions Interdependent**: * **Enduring Self Illusion -> Passage of Time Illusion**: If enduring "me" is illusion, so is passage of time. * **Shedding Enduring Self -> Shedding Time Passage**: Ceasing to think of self as enduring should lead to ceasing to experience passage of time. * **Perduring Self -> No Passage Experience**: Coming to think of self as perduring should lead to experiencing different temporal parts at different moments, but *no enduring self* for moments to flow past. * **Experiencing Successive Moments Without Enduring Self**: * **Successive Moments as Notes**: Imagine experiencing moments of consciousness (now, now, now) as successive notes in a performance. * **No Enduring Listener/Self**: No enduring listener or self-identical subject *for whom* these moments are "now and then and then again." * **Distinguishing "I" in Memory/Anticipation**: In remembering/anticipating, distinguish between "I" who remembers/anticipates and "I" who experienced/will experience. * **Present Self Cognizant of Distinction**: Present self aware of being distinct from past/future subjects. * **No Single Subject for Temporal Relations**: No conception of a single subject events bear different relations to over time. Nothing to draw near to or recede from. * **Each Subject Sees Own Present Moment**: Each momentary subject (present, past, future) just sees its own present moment. No succession of moments seen as present by a single self. * **Result: No Sense of Time Passing**: * **Time No Longer Seems to Pass**: Time would no longer seem to pass. * **No Subject of Passage**: No subject of time's passage in experience - just successive momentary subjects. * **Timelessly Entrenched**: Each momentary subject timelessly entrenched in its own temporal perspective. * **Filling Time, Not Passing Through**: Think of self as "filling time" like a rooted plant in space, growing extensions without moving *in relation to* space. * **Shedding Enduring Self -> Losing Time Passage Sense**: Shedding enduring self illusion leads to losing any sense of time passing. * **Evidence: Losing Self-Awareness and Time-Awareness**: * **Losing Self-Awareness and Time-Awareness**: Evidence: when we "lose self-awareness" in engrossing activities, we also lose awareness of time's passing. * **"Losing Myself" in Activities**: "Losing myself" in sports, reading, writing. * **Drawn Out of Self and Time Passage**: Drawn out of self and, seemingly, out of passage of time. * **Reference to Csikszentmihalyi**: * **Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (1990)** - "flow" experiences involve loss of self and time awareness. * **Boredom and Time-Awareness**: Conversely, when bored, attention returns to self, and time passage becomes painfully salient. * **Self-Awareness and Time-Awareness Linked**: Self-awareness and time-awareness seem to go hand-in-hand. * **Difficulty of Lasting Change and Need for Meditation**: * **Not Near Lasting Change**: Velleman admits not close to "losing myself" lastingly, even though intellectually convinced of perduring self. * **Radical Experiential Changes Needed**: Truly assimilating implications requires radical experiential changes. * **Arguments Not Enough**: Arguments alone can't produce these changes. * **Buddhist Meditation**: No wonder Buddhists believe dispelling enduring self illusion requires "arduous regimen of meditation." ## P. Parfit, Tralfamadorians, and Consolation (Revisited) * **Parfit's Consolation Re-Examined**: Velleman re-examines Parfit's claim that shedding enduring self belief is consoling. * **Parfit's View of Suffering Origin**: Parfit blames belief in enduring self for existential suffering: grief over past, anxiety about death. * **Proprietary Interest in "Only Life"**: Emotions get sting from proprietary interest in "one and only life" - glass tunnel idea. * **Consolation from Non-Identity**: Parfit's consolation comes from no longer viewing relation to past/future selves as identity. Escaping "imprisonment" of enduring self. * **Critique of Parfit's Consolation as Insufficient**: * **Why Consolation in Alienation?**: Velleman questions *why* less robust relation to past/future selves is consoling for Parfit. * **Relief or Bereavement?**: Why relieved, not bereft, at partial alienation? * **Not "Not Only Life," But "Not Even His"**: Parfit hasn't realized it's "not his only life," but "not even *his*" in the way he thought. * **Cold Comfort**: This realization offers only "cold comfort of having nothing to lose." * **Remedy for Time Passage Emotions**: Parfit describes distress from time's passage (moving faster, darkness, life "gone by"). Remedy for these isn't escaping tunnel, but "to stop moving." * **Eternalism as Remedy (Tralfamadorian View)**: * **Eternalism, Not "Open Air"**: Remedy for Parfit's distress is to become an eternalist, not just live "in the open air." * **Billy Pilgrim/Tralfamadorian Quote**: Quote from Billy Pilgrim (Vonnegut's *Slaughterhouse Five*) describing Tralfamadorian view of death and time. * **Death as Appearance**: "When a person dies he only appears to die. He is still very much alive in the past…" * **Silly to Cry at Funeral**: "…so it is very silly for people to cry at his funeral." * **All Moments Always Exist**: "All moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will exist.…" * **Illusion of Time Sequence**: "It is just an illusion … that one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a moment is gone is it gone forever." * **Tralfamadorian View of Corpses**: Tralfamadorians see corpse as "in bad condition in that particular moment," but "just fine in plenty of other moments." * **"So It Goes"**: Tralfamadorian response to death: "So it goes." * **Tralfamadorian Eternalism and Comfort**: Tralfamadorians are eternalists and derive "great comfort" from this philosophy. * **Reference to Vonnegut**: * **Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., *Slaughterhouse Five; Or The Children’s Crusade* (1969)** - source of Billy Pilgrim and Tralfamadorian quotes. * **Quote (Tralfamadorian View)**: > [W]hen a person dies he only appears to die. He is still very much alive in the past, so it is very silly for people to cry at his funeral. All moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will exist.… It is just an illusion … that one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and that once a moment is gone is it gone forever. (Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., *Slaughterhouse Five; Or The Children’s Crusade* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), 23, as quoted in J. David Velleman, "So It Goes," p. 16) * **Parfit vs. Tralfamadorians: Incomplete Disillusionment**: * **Parfit - No Enduring Self, Time Passage Remains**: Parfit overcomes enduring self illusion, but not time passage illusion. * **Tralfamadorians - No Time Passage, Enduring Self Remains**: Tralfamadorians overcome time passage, but still speak as if believing in enduring self. * **Equally Unsatisfactory**: Both incomplete disillusionments are unsatisfactory. * **Larger Truth: Interdependence**: Larger truth: enduring self and time passage are interdependent illusions. * **Tralfamadorian More Consoling, But Unstable Alone**: Tralfamadorian view more consoling than Parfit's, but unstable in isolation. * **Tralfamadorian Inconsistency and Meta-Time**: * **Tralfamadorian View of Time-Travel**: Tralfamadorians "look at different moments" like Rocky Mountains, "see how permanent all moments are," "look at any moment that interests them." * **Billy Pilgrim "Unstuck in Time"**: Billy Pilgrim loses normal time view, becomes "unstuck in time." * **Random Time Visits**: Billy visits moments randomly (wedding day, death, birth, etc.), "spastic in time," no control. * **Stage Fright**: Billy in "constant state of stage fright" because doesn't know what moment he'll be in next. * **Tralfamadorian Inconsistency**: Tralfamadorians speak as if they can "visit" moments, betaking complete selves from one to another. * **Meta-Time Required**: "Visiting" requires a higher temporal order (meta-time) of "first" and "later" for visits to occur and identities to persist across visits. * **Meta-Time Stream**: Visits to random moments in ordinary time must occur in well-ordered moments in meta-time. Meta-time becomes a temporal stream washing over Tralfamadorians. * **Billy Pilgrim and Meta-Moments**: Billy also washed by meta-moments ordering his visits to random ordinary time moments. * **"Unstuck in Time" Not Easy**: "Coming unstuck in time" is not easy, requires dissolution of enduring self to truly escape time passage. "Billy himself would have to come unglued." * **Reference to Tralfamadorian/Billy Pilgrim Quotes**: Referencing earlier quotes about Tralfamadorian view of time and Billy's experience. ## P. Life Without Passage of Time and Suffering (Implications) * **Billy Pilgrim's Partial Portrait**: Billy Pilgrim tale gives "partial and imperfect" portrait of life without time passage illusion. * **Reduced Mortality Worries**: Life without time passage lacks many ordinary worries about mortality. * **Death and Epicurus**: * **Tralfamadorian Unconcerned About Death**: Tralfamadorians unconcerned about being dead. * **Epicurus on Death**: Epicurus taught long ago death is "nothing" – literally – and nothing to worry about. * **Anxiety About Approaching Death**: Anxiety that makes sense (for time-passage experiencers) is about *approaching* death, time "running out." * **Eternalism and Mortality Anxiety**: * **Eternalism Allays Anxiety**: Anxiety about approaching death would be allayed if time no longer seemed to pass. * **Mortality No Longer Regrettable**: Mere fact of mortality would no longer seem regrettable without time passage. * **Immortality in Time-Passage World**: In time-passage world, we wish for immortality to have "infinite time left on clock." * **Immortality in Eternalist World**: In eternalist world, immortality would be "temporal ubiquity" - existing at every future moment. * **Infinite Time Desirable When Time Runs Out, Not When Still**: Infinite time desirable if time running out, but maybe unattractive if time standing still. * **Truncated Life Span Remains a Concern**: * **Unhappiness About Short Life**: Those who die young could still lament "truncated extent" of lives - having too short a life remains grounds for unhappiness. * **Mortality Itself Not Unhappiness Cause**: What would be groundless is unhappiness about *mortality itself* – fear of death's approach affecting everyone regardless of lifespan. * **Liberation from Suffering (Beyond Mortality)**: * **Liberation from Other Suffering?**: Would liberation from time passage free us from *other* kinds of suffering? * **Not Physical Pain**: Wouldn't spare us from physical pain or unpleasant experiences. * **Preventing Pain -> Suffering Transformation**: Might prevent pain/unpleasantness from being *transformed into suffering*. * **Pain vs. Suffering**: * **Suffering as Not Coping with Pain**: We can undergo pain without *suffering* under it. Suffering is a way of experiencing pain – specifically, *not coping*. * **Time Passage and Not Coping**: Suspects (but can't argue fully) that not coping constitutive of suffering results from perception of time as passing. * **Panic About Endless Pain**: What "undoes" us in suffering is panic that pain will "never abate," no end in sight. * **Acceptance and Mindfulness in Pain Management**: Patients learn to bear pain by "accepting" it, "being with" it, focusing on "pain of the moment," without future-thinking. * **Prospect of Endlessness, Not Pain Itself, Causes Suffering**: Not pain itself, but prospect of it endlessly going on, that causes suffering. * **Liberation from Time Passage -> Liberation from Suffering**: Liberation from time passage might entail liberation from suffering (but not pain). Bad moments and good moments, but no future panic, hence no suffering. * **Reference to Pain Management Research**: * **Lance M. McCracken and Chris Eccleston, "Coping or Acceptance: What to do about Chronic Pain?" *Pain* 105 (2003)** * **Lance M. McCracken, James W. Carson, Christopher Eccleston, and Francis J. Keefe, "Acceptance and Change in the Context of Chronic Pain." *Pain* 109 (2004)** - Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction. * **Chris Eccleston, "The Attentional Control of Pain: Methodological and Theoretical Concerns," *Pain* 63 (1995)** - Methodological problems in this area. ## P. "So It Goes" and Buddhist Advice (Motto Meaning and Practical Application) * **Tralfamadorian Motto "So It Goes"**: Tralfamadorians express consolation with "So it goes." * **Motto's Meaning Less Obvious**: Meaning of "So it goes" is less than obvious in eternalist context where "it" doesn't "go" at all. * **Why Not "So It Is"?**: Why "So it goes" instead of "So it is" if time doesn't pass? * **Translation for Time-Passage Experiencers**: * **Translation for Us**: Maybe "So it goes" translated for us, who can't escape time passage illusion. * **"So It Goes For You"**: "So it goes" means "so it goes *for you*," for creatures experiencing time passage. * **Buddhist Advice Exported**: Buddhist advice similarly exported from meditative state to ordinary consciousness. * **Appropriate Attitude in Ordinary Life?**: What's appropriate attitude in ordinary life where self *seems* enduring and time *seems* passing, knowing these are illusions? * **Coping with Time Passage**: * **Exportable Lessons**: Exportable lessons must include coping with time passage. * **Cannot Stop Illusions, Can Cope Better**: Can't stop self seeming enduring or time seeming to pass, but can cope *better* knowing they're phenomenal. * **Ordinary Bad Coping and Better Coping Strategy**: * **Bad Coping**: Ordinarily Velleman copes badly with time passage and personal endurance. Not Pilgrim-esque stage fright, but still disconcerting. * **Tralfamadorian-Like in Memory/Anticipation**: Feels Tralfamadorian-like in choosing life parts to visit in memory/anticipation. * **Living Different Life Parts at Once**: Disconcerting tendency to live different life parts simultaneously - reliving past, pre-living future, while trying to be present. * **Past Slipping Away, Future Bearing Down**: Past slips away in memory as future bears down in anticipation. * **Overwhelmed Diner Analogy**: Life feels like too many parts "on the table at once," continually served and snatched away like dishes in a restaurant with impatient waitstaff. * **Panic Over Time Passage**: This anxiety-provoking conception adopted out of panic over time passage, needing to anticipate future and remember past *because* time is passing. * **Buddhist Injunction and Present Moment Awareness**: * **Knowledge of Illusions -> Better Coping**: Knowing self doesn't endure, time doesn't pass, allows better following Buddhist injunction to be "fully aware of the present moment," even under illusions. * **Momentary Self and "Being in the Moment"**: Realization of being "of the moment" (momentary part of extended self) reminds to "be in the moment." * **Drawing Attention from Time Passage**: Being in moment draws attention away from time passage, even if doesn't stop it seeming to pass. * **Respite from "Overwhelmed Diner"**: Insofar as we can be in the moment, gain respite from overwhelmed diner experience. * **Savoring the Dish of the Moment**: Each moment can be devoted to "savoring the dish of the moment." ## 2. Conclusion (Implied) * **Summary of Main Argument**: Velleman argues that the Buddhist concept of the illusion of an enduring self is deeply connected to the illusion of the passage of time. He uses analytic philosophy to explore these concepts, drawing on metaphysics of persistence (endurance vs. perdurance), theories of time (eternalism vs. presentism), and philosophical and literary examples. * **Central Thesis**: The illusion of an enduring self generates the illusion of time's passage, and both illusions are sources of human suffering. * **Path to Alleviation**: Dispelling these illusions, while difficult and perhaps requiring meditative practice, offers a path to alleviate suffering and change our fundamental experience of self and time, allowing us to appreciate the present moment without the anxiety of time's relentless flow. * **"So It Goes" as Practical Wisdom**: The Tralfamadorian motto "So it goes" becomes a practical piece of wisdom for those living under the illusion of time passage, encouraging acceptance and present moment awareness. * **Radical Transformation**: Truly internalizing these insights suggests a radical transformation of our existential experience, moving from a time-bound, self-focused perspective to a more timeless and present-centered mode of being.